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ABSTRACT 
The failure of inflation targeting regimes in several emerging economies has received 
renewed interest among academics and policymakers alike. This ineffectiveness can be 
attributed to worsening fiscal positions in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, which 
sheds light on the importance of coordinating fiscal policy and monetary policy to achieve 
price stability. This thesis, therefore, aims to investigate the effects of fiscal policy on the 
different transmission channels of monetary policy, which ultimately results in high 
inflation. We build on the theory of sovereign risk premium, which is a point of difference 
from previous studies. Another empirical contribution of the thesis is the use of the linear 
and non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to test the relationship 
between fiscal policy and the transmission channels of monetary policy in several emerging 
economies, including Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey. The study finds that a 
deterioration of fiscal position significantly leads to higher inflation expectations in Brazil 
and Turkey. An expansion of fiscal deficits results in higher interest rates and domestic 
currency depreciation for Brazil. Interestingly, fiscal policy affects monetary variables in an 
asymmetric way, such that the impact of fiscal deterioration is more powerful than that of 
fiscal improvement. However, there is no relationship found between fiscal policy and the 
transmission channels of monetary policy for the Philippines. The findings are in favour of 
the view that fiscal consolidation is an important requirement for the success of an inflation 
targeting regime in emerging economies. The divergence in empirical results among 
countries sheds light on the importance of a strong policy commitment towards a sustainable 
path to diminish the negative effects of fiscal imbalances on monetary policy. 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
After World War II, fiscal policy was the dominant paradigm, while monetary policy was 
not seen as an important tool. The objective of monetary policy at that time was only to 
lower interest rates to support government bonds. Inflation was incurred to obtain lower 
unemployment based on the Phillips curve relationship . Nevertheless, the bout of 
high inflation experienced by the US during the 1960s showed that high inflation resulted 
not only from burgeoning budget deficits, but also from the application of reckless 
monetary policy (Reynolds, 2001). Since then, the importance of monetary policy to control 
inflation has increased and surpassed that of fiscal policy. In particular, a tightening of 
monetary policy, which leads to an increase in interest rates and an appreciation of the 
domestic currency, would reduce the growth of aggregate demand, and eventually lower 
inflation. If, however, in the context of high levels of fiscal deficits and indebtedness, the 
rise in interest rates raises the level of sovereign risk default and the cost of servicing public 
debt, tightening monetary policy may instead devalue the domestic currency. This, in turn, 
could lead to more inflationary pressures. As such, a proper application of both monetary 
and fiscal policy is crucial to stabilise the level of inflation effectively. 
Nevertheless, during the past two decades, it appears that fiscal policy has played a 
secondary role to monetary policy, as the adoption of an inflation targeting regime has been 
implemented by many countries. Up until 2010, there had been 26 countries adopting an 
inflation targeting regime in an attempt to control inflation. Most of them are emerging 
markets because high inflation and hyperinflation seem to be exclusive to emerging 
countries over the last decade.1 Although inflation targeting countries, in general, have 
achieved lower inflation, together with more stable economic growth, the adoption of 
                                                          
1 See Roger (2010). 
 2 
inflation targeting has still raised many concerns, particularly after the onset of the Global 
Financial Crisis. Adopting an inflation targeting regime in emerging markets is a more 
challenging task than in advanced ones, because of the existence of weak institutions, low 
policy credibility and macroeconomic volatility. In fact, some countries have succeeded in 
maintaining their inflation rates at low and stable levels, whereas others have not. For 
instance, South Korea and Thailand have all achieved their long-term inflation target, while 
Brazil and Turkey have persistently failed to keep inflation around the target. Ghana, Serbia 
and Iceland have even struggled with double-digit inflation rates. Apart from the differences 
in the levels of economic growth and financial development, an obvious difference between 
the success and failure of inflation targeting countries is fiscal performance. During the 
adoption of an inflation targeting regime, the former group have maintained a low ratio of 
public debt to GDP ratio (around 40–50 per cent) and consistently pursued fiscal 
sustainability, while the latter have all accumulated excessive debts and had weak fiscal 
performance (especially Iceland, which has a debt to GDP ratio of over 90 per cent).2 This 
fact raises concerns about whether the adoption of inflation targeting matters in emerging 
countries that bear high debt burdens, along with chronic budget deficits. 
In fact, fiscal sustainability has emerged as a prominent issue for both advanced and 
emerging economies, since most countries have experienced a worsening fiscal balance as a 
result of the Global Financial Crisis. According to the IMF (2016a), fiscal balances 
deteriorated sharply in parallel to a rapid build-up of government debt over the last 10 years. 
Most emerging economies weathered the crisis better than advanced economies. However, 
the former have faced a slowdown in growth and shown signs of distress (Kawai and 
Morgan, 2013). The US interest rate rise is expected to lead to budget problems for emerging 
                                                          
2 According to Bellhocine and Dell’Erba (2013), the debt threshold for emerging countries, in general, is around 
40 per cent of GDP. 
 3 
economies further in the near future, because they may need to further increase interest rates 
as an incentive for capital inflows. For those reasons, the potential negative effects of fiscal 
imbalances on the effectiveness of monetary policy to control inflation need to be examined 
further.  
Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey can be considered typical examples of emerging 
economies. They have been challenged by issues of chronic budget deficits and the 
persistence of high inflation. Indeed, they all experienced a prolonged period of high 
inflation and the failure of either monetary or exchange rate targeting, which caused a 
dramatic shift towards the adoption of an inflation targeting regime. Volatile capital outflows 
and soaring interest rates, primarily attributed to a high probability of defaults during 
recessionary times, puts more pressure on the fiscal balance (Arellano, 2008). The following 
sections provide a more detailed analysis of fiscal and monetary policy in Brazil, the 
Philippines, and Turkey. The stance of fiscal policy leading to fiscal unsustainability can be 
assessed through the following fiscal indicators: (i) fiscal deficits (measured by the ratio of 
primary and overall balance to GDP), (ii) public debt as a share of GDP, and (iii) medium-
term fiscal projections (IMF, 2002). Consequently, we analyse the effectiveness of monetary 
policy to control inflation and link the fiscal stance with current challenges faced by those 
countries that have implemented an inflation targeting regime. 
1.1.1 Fiscal and monetary performance: the case of Brazil 
Brazil’s fiscal position has gradually deteriorated since 1993, shown by fluctuations around 
an upward trend in the level of government debt, along with persistent overall budget 
deficits. As seen in Figure 1.1, during the implementation of The Real Plan in 1994, Brazil at 
first succeeded in reducing both government and external debt. Despite this initial success, 
the reform, in fact, resulted in more severe macroeconomic problems (Averbug, 2002). 
Current account deficits and financial instability, arising from external shocks, also 
 4 
aggravated budget deficits.3 The following period, from 1999 to 2008, was marked by 
significant improvement of the fiscal stance, thanks to the introduction of the Brazilian 
Government’s fiscal stabilisation program. As a result, the fiscal position in Brazil improved 
considerably from 1999 to 2008. The consistent primary surplus helped to reduce the overall 
deficits to only -1.5 per cent in 2008, while the interest expense as a share of GDP gradually 
decreased over time, as shown in Figure 1.2. However, the Brazilian Government’s attempts 
to achieve fiscal sustainability were still hindered by two unexpected shocks: the Global 
Financial Crisis and hosting the World Cup in 2014. Government debt started to climb 
significantly in 2008 and passed 70 per cent of GDP in 2015. Meanwhile, the ratio of overall 
fiscal balance to GDP has continued to drop in recent years, and Brazil is expected to be 
deeply in deficit until 2020 due to the sharp increases in interest expense. Compared with 
other commodity importers, Brazil has suffered from a weaker fiscal position. The sovereign 
risk rating, therefore, has been downgraded, while sovereign bond yields have surged much 
higher than those of its counterparts.  
                                                          
3 The international recession of 1997–1998 following the Mexican, East Asian, and Russian crises deteriorated  
confidence in the Brazilian real, which caused massive capital outflows. The erosion of government credibility 
stemmed from the government’s inability to fulfil its commitment to undertaking strong fiscal adjustment. For 
those reasons, the Brazilian economy became much more vulnerable, so that the level of its external debt 
increased with the depreciation of its domestic currency.  
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Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and IMF (2017a, 2017b) 
Figure 1.1 Brazil: Public debt and external debt (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF(2017b) 
Figure 1.2 Brazil: Fiscal performance (% GDP) 
Regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy, inflation rates in Brazil exceed the target 
rates for almost the whole period of 1995–2015, reaching double-digits in 2001–2003 and 
2015, according to Figure 1.3. This implies that the inflation targeting framework was 
ineffective at stabilising price levels. Despite high interest rates throughout the period, Brazil 
has been unable to strengthen its domestic currency, which ultimately has led to high 
inflation. Apart from volatility stemming from the Global Financial Crisis, delays in fiscal 
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 6 
consolidation could diminish the efforts of monetary policy to control inflation. Increasing 
fiscal deficits and public debt under high interest rate conditions causes a further increase in 
the sovereign risk premium and a weakening of the domestic currency that puts further 
inflationary pressure on the economy. 
 
 
1.1.2 Fiscal and monetary performance: the case of the Philippines 
Generally speaking, the Philippines has shown a considerably better fiscal performance than 
Brazil, but fiscal risk is still a sizeable challenge to sustain fiscal policy in the long run. 
Thanks to the Ramos’ reform enacted in the early 1990s, public and foreign debt declined 
sharply until 1996, when the Asian currency crisis triggered a deep recession, illustrated in 
Figure 1.4. External debt jumped to a peak of roughly 80 per cent of GDP in 1998 and 
remained high until 2003. Simultaneously, the overall budget balance, as a share of GDP, 
dropped from 0.3 per cent in 1997 to -3.8 per cent in 2002 as shown in Figure 1.5, due to 
decreased tax revenue. Since the mid-2000s, long-term fiscal sustainability programs have 
succeeded in improving the Philippines’ fiscal position. Nevertheless, government debt 
remains sensitive to unexpected shocks to a number of economic indicators, such as exchange 
 
Source: IMF (2017b) 
Figure 1.3 Brazil: Monetary indicators (%) 
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 7 
rates, interest rates and input prices. Solvency risk, stemming from government debt 
accumulation, would subsequently threaten its fiscal balance. Moreover, the need for 
infrastructure reconstruction to promote the economy puts higher pressure on the budget and 
might require additional tax revenue which, in turn, would cause more severe tax avoidance 
and evasion (IMF, 2015). The fiscal position is, therefore, still considered to be vulnerable in 
the future.  
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and IMF (2017a, 2017b) 
Figure 1.4 The Philippines: Public debt and external debt (% GDP) 
 
Considering its monetary performance, the Philippines economy failed to meet its 
inflation target from 2002 to 2008, due to the pass-through of oil price shocks to inflation and 
the easing of its monetary stance. The tightening of its monetary policy mid-2007 was 
hampered by the depreciation of its domestic currency, as a result of a weakening balance of 
payments and fiscal position. In the years from 2009 to 2014, the inflation rate was kept 
within target bands as a result of a general tightening of both monetary and fiscal policies to 
improve the market’s confidence. Recently, the headline inflation rate for 2015 was below 
the current target range of 2 to 4 per cent, driven by slow increases in food and oil prices. 
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Source: IMF (2017b)  
Figure 1.5 The Philippines: Fiscal performance (% GDP) 
 
Source: IMF (2017b) 
Figure 1.6 The Philippines: Monetary indicators (%) 
1.1.3 Fiscal and monetary performance: the case of Turkey 
In the case of Turkey, fiscal sustainability has been currently hindered by increasing external 
debt as a consequence of currency depreciation, regardless of considerable progress in fiscal 
management throughout the 2000s. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 indicate that a tightening fiscal policy 
succeeded in lowering levels of fiscal deficits and government debt until the Global Financial 
Crisis, which caused a slight decrease in the primary and overall balances. Figure 1.7 shows 
that government debt has stayed at levels under 40 per cent of GDP, while government debt 
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 9 
maturity and currency structures have become more sustainable with longer maturities and 
lower exposure to exchange rate risk. The post-crisis period highlights a remarkable 
achievement in tackling fiscal imbalances through implicit rules and strong reforms. As such, 
the overall deficit-to-GDP ratio quickly decreased from 6 per cent in 2009 to 0.6 per cent in 
2011, and then remained steady at around 1 per cent, as depicted in Figure 1.8. Yet the IMF 
(2016b) warns that the structure of Turkey’s budget has worsened. Government expenditures 
have exceeded the target, which is temporarily offset by stronger tax revenues. In the absence 
of growth in the upcoming years as predicted, the shortfall in government revenues will 
deteriorate the fiscal position and trigger default risks. 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and IMF (2017a, 2017b) 
Figure 1.7 Turkey: Public debt and external debt (% GDP) 
Despite the effort of inflation targeting that was adopted in 2000, the central bank of 
Turkey still failed to lower the inflation rate to the targeted level, as shown in Figure 1.9. 
This is due to the fact that the economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks, leading to 
extreme volatility in capital flows and exchange rates. Fiscal imbalances and external debt 
are prone to rise, given that the risk appetite and sovereign debt problems worsened after the 
Global Financial Crisis and European debt crisis. This gradually erodes market confidence in 
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the government’s ability to run the economy. Capital flows out quickly as a response to 
shocks to the economy, which results in a large depreciation of the domestic currency and, 
eventually, highly persistent inflation. 
 
Source: IMF (2017b) 
Figure 1.8 Turkey: Fiscal performance (% GDP) 
  
Source: IMF (2017b) 
Figure 1.9 Turkey: Monetary indicators (%) 
1.2 Research motivation 
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section, the performance of inflation in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey provides clear 
and convincing evidence that a tightening of monetary policy fails to lower the inflation rate, 
since a deteriorating fiscal position hinders the transmission of monetary policy channels. 
Under this circumstance, monetary indicators are mainly driven by changes to the budget 
balance and government debt. This issue has increasingly emerged and become more 
complex after the Global Financial Crisis, because of the general increase in public 
indebtedness during crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010).4 However, there is a lack of 
research that estimates the effects of budget deficits on different transmission channels of 
monetary policy. 
A second motivation is that there have been very few studies on the consequences of 
fiscal actions for inflation expectations, which increasingly play an important role in driving 
inflation, especially since more emerging economies have adopted an inflation targeting 
regime (Guinigundo, 2012; Montes, 2013). Some studies assess the linkage between the 
fiscal position and inflation expectations. However, the rationale for their relationship is not 
underpinned by any particular theory (Canzoneri et al., 2002; Celasun et al., 2004). This 
necessitates the adoption of a specific theory that can provide an insight into the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy. 
With regard to the methodological approach for measuring fiscal impacts on monetary 
variables, most empirical studies on emerging markets rely on simple least-squares 
estimates, which are inadequate to resolve the issue of endogeneity (Gale and Orszag, 2004;  
Ardagna, 2009) and to capture the dynamic relationship between fiscal policy and inflation 
(Catao and Terrones, 2005). In particular, the endogenous response of fiscal variables to the 
                                                          
4 Blommestein and Turner (2011) observe that many central banks have to finance government bonds through 
official purchases on the bond market after a crisis, leading to the increased risk of fiscal dominance. Higher 
sovereign risk increases uncertainty about future interest rates and inflation. This triggers the conflict between 
the policy objectives of the monetary authorities, who are attempting to adjust interest rates to control inflation, 
and the fiscal authority, who is attempting to reduce borrowing costs. 
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interest rate can cause downwardly biased estimates, because the fiscal authority will attempt 
to reduce its deficits and debt when interest rates go up. The depreciation of the domestic 
currency also puts upward pressure on fiscal deficits. As such, it is necessary to find a model 
that can examine the causality where the direction runs from fiscal policy to the transmission 
channels of monetary policy. Furthermore, the response of inflation to fiscal shocks may 
change over time because increasing deficits can give rise to inflation in the long run, but not 
necessarily in the short run (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). This requires a dynamic time-series 
model that can distinguish between the long-run and short-run effects. 
More recently, studies employing elaborate techniques to analyse the link between fiscal 
and monetary variables have become quite standard. Nevertheless, the asymmetric effects of 
fiscal policy have been considered only rarely so far. The rationale for this potential non-
linearity arises from the psychological findings that negative/unfavourable information 
generally elicits a stronger response than positive/favourable information (Skowronski and 
Carlston, 1989; Vonk, 1996). Economic agents may react asymmetrically to negative and 
positive changes in the fiscal balance, and the former are prone to induce a stronger reaction. 
Furthermore, the asymmetry can be driven by country-specific fundamentals, as suggested 
by Jammazi et al. (2015). For instance, the sovereign risk premium tends to be more 
sensitive to fiscal shocks at high levels of indebtedness. Monetary variables, therefore, 
respond more strongly to fiscal shocks, especially to negative ones. Shin et al. (2014) 
criticise the results obtained from linear models because it may be invalid to make any 
inferences or to reveal accurate forecasts if non-linear cointegration exists. The assumption 
of linear adjustment is considered to be too restrictive to capture the complexity of economic 
relationships. These shortcomings of the linear model motivate the use of a non-linear model 
to obtain more reliable and comprehensive results. 
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Another motivation is that the findings and implications of the thesis are potentially 
beneficial to policymakers in emerging economies. From a government perspective, the 
recognition of fiscal effects on monetary policy necessitates a credible commitment to fiscal 
consolidation, which ultimately motivates them to undertake reforms to restrict deficits. In 
regard to the Central Bank, it might need to reconsider the possibility and appropriateness of 
adopting an inflation targeting regime, in the circumstance that price stability is not solely 
determined by monetary policy, but requires a combination of fiscal and monetary policy. 
Importantly, this research can contribute to the development of future studies. For example, 
empirical evidence of fiscal effects in countries with a worsening fiscal position gives 
strength to research that explores threshold levels of budget deficits and government debt. 
From a different perspective, policy recommendations would add value to the discussion on 
the arguments for and against the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in emerging 
economies. 
Based on those motivations, this thesis empirically investigates the relationship between 
fiscal deficits and transmission channels of monetary policy in Brazil, the Philippines, and 
Turkey during the period from the 1990s to 2016, which captures changes to the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy between pre-crisis and crisis times. The choice of 
emerging countries with a high inflation history rather than advanced or low-inflation 
economies helps to make more explicit the significant relationship between fiscal deficits 
and inflation (Catao and Terrones, 2005).  
From a theoretical perspective, this study relies on the model of the sovereign risk 
premium to analyse the effects of fiscal performance on conventional monetary transmission 
channels, including the interest rate and exchange rate, in emerging economies which have 
experienced high debt-to-GDP ratios and chronic deficits. The role of fiscal shocks to drive 
inflation expectations, which might be seen as a different transmission channel to stabilise 
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inflation, should be considered thoroughly. Figure 1.10 illustrates a comprehensive depiction 
of the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. The solid arrows denote the impact 
of fiscal policy, while the perforated ones represent the impact of monetary policy.  
 
Figure 1.10 The interactive relationship between monetary and fiscal policy 
To address deficiencies in modelling the relationship between fiscal policy and 
monetary policy, the long-run and short-run effects of budget deficits on monetary policy 
transmission channels should be specified separately, using the ARDL approach to 
cointegration. To provide an insight into the link between fiscal and monetary policy, we not 
only consider the linear relationship between variables, but also examine whether the fiscal 
balance affects monetary variables in a non-linear way. As such, we separate the effects of 
negative and positive changes to the budget balance, utilising the non-linear form of the 
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ARDL model proposed by Shin et al. (2014). The former is expected to have a more 
powerful impact than the latter. As another asymmetric approach to the analysis of fiscal 
policy, the hypothesis that the effects of fiscal performance on transmission channels of 
monetary policy depend on country-specific fundamentals (i.e. country indebtedness) is also 
tested. These features explicitly differ from existing empirical studies on the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy. 
1.3 Aim and objectives 
This thesis aims to assess the effects of fiscal performance on the transmission channels of 
monetary policy in three emerging economies, these being Brazil, the Philippines and 
Turkey, all of which have experienced weak fiscal positions and volatile inflation. The 
objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
(1) To examine the effects of fiscal performance on the main conventional channels of 
monetary policy, namely, the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
(2) To examine the effects of fiscal performance on inflation expectations that 
ultimately drive inflation, and then to investigate whether a tightening of monetary policy is 
effective in controlling inflation, without the presence of fiscal improvement. 
(3) To provide policy recommendations that achieve the objective of price stability, 
without deteriorating a country’s fiscal balance. 
To achieve these three objectives, the following research questions are addressed. It is 
also prudent to specify the research questions. 
(i) Research question 1: Why and to what extent does an increase in fiscal deficits lead 
to higher market interest rates? Does the relationship between fiscal performance and the 
interest rate hold in the long run, short run, or both? 
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Sub-question 1: Does the market interest rate react differently to negative and positive 
changes in the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP? 
Sub-question 2: Does the impact of fiscal performance on the interest rate channel rely 
on the country’s debt performance? 
(ii) Research question 2: Why and to what extent does an increase in fiscal deficits lead 
to a depreciation of the domestic currency? Does the relationship between fiscal performance 
and the exchange rate hold in the long run, short run, or both? 
Sub-question 1: Does the exchange rate react differently to negative and positive 
changes in the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP? 
Sub-question 2: Does the impact of fiscal performance on the exchange rate channel rely 
on the country’s debt performance? 
(iii) Research question 3: Why and to what extent does an increase in fiscal deficits 
raise inflation expectations? Does the relationship between fiscal performance and inflation 
expectations hold in the long run, short run, or both?  
Sub-question 1: Does the expected inflation rate react differently to negative and 
positive changes in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP? Does the asymmetry hold in the 
long run, short run, or both? 
Sub-question 2: Does the impact of fiscal deficits on inflation expectations rely on the 
country’s debt performance? 
(iv) Research question 4: Could the implementation of an inflation targeting regime act 
as an effective application for the conduct of monetary policy in the absence of a fiscal 
improvement? Does the policy rate, in particular, have a significant impact on inflation 
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expectations, given the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy in emerging 
economies? 
1.4 Research contribution 
This thesis makes important contributions to the literature. From a theoretical point of view, 
it presents a comprehensive depiction of the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy 
in emerging economies, underpinned by the model of the risk premium. From an empirical 
perspective, this research applies a different modelling approach from previous studies to 
estimate the effects of fiscal policy on the transmission channels of monetary policy. It 
enriches the literature by using the recently developed NARDL model, which allows the 
practitioner to distinguish the effect between deterioration and improvement of the fiscal 
position, both in the long run and short run. The employment of a newly updated data set is 
another feature that contributes to the existing literature, by providing a more up-to-date 
understanding of how fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in emerging economies, 
which have experienced chronic budget deficits and high public debt. 
1.5 Structure of the research 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature. It 
provides an analysis of the relevant theoretical and empirical studies that focus on the 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, and the suitability of adopting an inflation 
targeting regime under the presence of fiscal effects. Chapter 3 presents the research 
methodology used, which sets out the theory and specification of a linear ARDL model, and 
constructs testable hypotheses. It also specifies the NARDL approach to cointegration, along 
with the linear ARDL model with an interactive dummy variable for debt levels to examine 
the dependence of fiscal impacts on the level of country indebtedness. This is followed by a 
description of the data set and a presentation of some preliminary results. Chapter 4 presents 
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the empirical results obtained from the specified ARDL models, and subsequently, the 
robustness tests to confirm the consistency of the findings. Chapter 5 draws conclusions by 
providing a summary of the findings, together with the significance and policy implications, 
in accordance with those findings. Also, the limitation of the study and suggestions for 
further research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF STUDIES ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY TO ACHIEVE PRICE STABILITY  
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, high rates of inflation have become a challenge for emerging 
markets rather than advanced ones. This can be partly explained by the trade-off between 
inflation and output growth on the pathway to economic transition. Also, major institutional 
differences between emerging and advanced countries might fully justify the issue of high 
inflation volatility in the former (Mishkin, 2000; Eichengreen, 2002). Apart from problems 
such as high dollarisation and unsound financial markets, fiscal imbalances appear to hamper 
the ability of monetary policy to control inflation (Mishkin, 2004). In fact, the crises of 
Turkey and Brazil in the early 2000s strongly show that increasing interest rates could not 
keep inflation down without the need for fiscal consolidation. Recently, Venezuela’s 
economic turmoil has worsened due to the growth of foreign borrowings and budget deficits 
at alarming rates. A number of studies, including those by Zoli (2005), Baldini and Ribeiro 
(2008), Aktas et al. (2010), Baldacci and Kumar (2010), Tomšík (2012), and Chadha et al. 
(2013), have attempted to show that both fiscal deficits and levels of sovereign debt 
influence the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, which eventually drives inflation. 
The issue of unexpected impacts of fiscal imbalances on monetary policy has led to 
concerns about the possibility of implementing an inflation targeting regime in emerging 
market economies. In general, both advocates for and critics of using an inflation targeting 
regime share a common view that fiscal policy is important for the efficiency and suitability 
of implementing an inflation targeting regime (Blanchard, 2004; Favero and Giavazzi, 2004; 
Benigno and Woodford, 2006; Minea and Tapsoba, 2014). 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the interaction between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy to achieve price stability, thereby pointing out the arguments for an appropriate 
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monetary policy regime in emerging markets that suffer from weak fiscal positions. This 
chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a description of the theoretical 
framework for price determination advocated by monetarists, followed by an overview of the 
transmission mechanisms for monetary policy to achieve price stability. The effects of fiscal 
policy on the interest rate and exchange rate channel will be discussed in Section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 presents the arguments for and against the adoption of an inflation targeting 
regime, grounded in the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal 
policy and inflation. Section 2.5 provides an analysis of the non-linear relationship between 
fiscal policy and monetary policy transmission channels. Finally, Section 2.6 provides some 
concluding remarks of this chapter. 
2.2 Transmission channels of monetary policy to achieve price stability: theory and evidence 
2.2.1 Monetarist theory of price determination and the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy 
According to the quantity theory of money (QTM), the growth of the price level will be 
proportional to the growth of the money supply. As such, inflation is considered to be a 
monetary phenomenon. The causal relationship between the money supply and the price level 
can be explained through the ‘equation of exchange’, popularised by Fisher (1911, p. 29): 
M. V = P. Y (2.1) 
where M denotes the stock of money, V denotes the velocity of circulation, which is 
assumed to be constant in the short run, P represents the price level, and Y denotes the level 
of real GDP. 
Since the level of real GDP reaches its potential level in the long run, variations in the 
price level are a result of variations in the supply of money. The central bank takes sole 
responsibility for controlling the price level, as it determines the growth of the money 
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supply. The QTM shows that there is no role for fiscal intervention whatsoever, because 
government spending has little effect on the price level, due to the low interest elasticity of 
the demand for money. 
Based on this proposition, the structural model approach shows the transmission 
channels through which monetary policy drives aggregate demand, leading to price changes. 
Mishkin (2013) classifies transmission channels of monetary policy as the interest rate, 
exchange rate, and credit channel. Regarding the interest rate channel, an increase in the 
short-term policy interest rate causes a corresponding increase in real interest rates, which 
impedes consumer and investment behaviour, thereby leading to a fall in aggregate demand, 
and hence, the price level. The exchange rate channel is associated with interest rate effects. 
Since a rise in interest rates attracts capital inflows, this will result in an appreciation of the 
domestic currency. As such, net exports decline because of higher prices for domestic goods 
relative to foreign goods, leading to a fall in aggregate demand, and, eventually, the price 
level. 
Inflation expectations emerge as an important transmission channel for monetary policy 
in the context of an inflation targeting regime. This principle is based on the Neoclassical 
theory that future expectations are shaped by policy decisions today. As such, monetary 
policy actions, such as announcements of policy goals or the use of a set of monetary policy 
instruments, would primarily form inflation expectations, and ultimately drive economic 
behaviours. If monetary policy gains high credibility in dealing with inflation, economic 
agents lower their inflation expectations as a response to an increase in the key policy rate. 
Accordingly, they set prices and negotiate wages, creating low actual inflation at a targeted 
level. However, a lack of credibility with regard to the central bank could hinder the 
transmission of the inflation expectations channel. It is worth noting that inflation 
expectations may be affected by different factors other than monetary policy itself, since 
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rational economic agents are assumed to use all available and relevant information in 
forming their expectations. 
2.2.2 Studies on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission channels in emerging 
market countries 
In reality, studies about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in emerging markets 
also focus on these three channels mentioned above. However, they tend to give conflicting 
results. For example, the IMF (2006) and Ito and Sato (2008) both estimate the impact of the 
exchange rate channel on inflation in Asian emerging countries, pre and post the currency 
crisis of 1997. While the former finds that the exchange rate channel plays an important role 
in driving inflation, the latter argues that its impact is fairly modest. In addition, the IMF 
(2006) study highlights the positive link between monetary growth and inflation, which 
might give emphasis to the role of the credit channel in explaining inflation fluctuations. 
Similarly, the work of Auel and Mendonça (2011), based on Brazil’s data from 2002 to 
2009, indicates that innovations in interest rates are principally transmitted to the economy 
through the credit channel. To assess the effectiveness of transmission channels in 
economies during monetary transition, Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) adopt traditional 
structural econometric models. The results support the importance of the interest rate and 
exchange rate channel in determining the path of inflation, through their impacts on 
aggregate demand and supply. In the opposite way, Mello and Moccero (2011) suggest that 
the price puzzle is still persistent in the context of emerging countries with monetary policy 
regime shifts, even though monetary policy becomes more sensitive to movements in 
inflation expectations. Regarding the extent to which interest rates affect inflation, it has 
recently been considered as a dominant channel of transmission, as a result of the increased 
credibility emanating from the combination of monetary policy and fiscal policy (Mohanty 
and Turner, 2008). In contrast, Moreno (2008) asserts that the response of market interest 
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rates to innovations in policy rates is quite weak, and long-term interest rates are mainly 
driven by their own shocks. Using a Bayesian VAR with sign restrictions, Mallick and Sousa 
(2012) show that inflation declines instantly in response to a rise in policy rates, but the 
effect is short lived and modest, for 5 large emerging economies for the period 1990 to 2008. 
More recent papers focusing on emerging economies with a floating exchange rate 
regime demonstrate a problematic issue, which is that transmission from the interest rate to 
the exchange rate is weak and uncertain. In particular, Gonçalves and Guimarães (2011) and 
Montes (2013) find that the response of exchange rates to interest rate shocks is puzzling 
(i.e. interest rate increases are associated with the depreciation of the domestic currency) 
when levels of interest rates and indebtedness are already high enough. The finding of 
Kohlscheen (2014) is comparable to those derived from the above-mentioned studies, 
indicating that currency depreciations result from tightening of monetary policy. The policy 
announcement of short-term interest rates has no significant effect on exchange rates. He 
attributes the puzzle to currency market inefficiencies, but rejects the role of fiscal 
dominance as an explanation for driving the exchange rate. 
Apart from traditional channels, an increasing number of scholars point out the 
significance of the expectations channel on the conduct of monetary policy after the adoption 
of inflation targeting in several emerging economies. A fall in policy rates, along with a 
depreciation of the domestic currency, positively affects investors’ expectations, which 
subsequently drive investment decisions and employment (Montes, 2013). More 
interestingly, the adoption of an inflation targeting regime strengthens the expectations 
channel, whereas the link between inflation and interest rates has weakened (Guinigundo, 
2012). 
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2.3 The influences of fiscal policy on the interest rate and exchange rate channel: A 
review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
In examining the effects of fiscal policy on the conventional transmission channels of 
monetary policy, there are two distinct approaches: (i) the traditional view, which suggests 
that fiscal policy affects the interest rate and exchange rate through changes to private 
consumption, and (ii) the non-traditional view, which highlights the role of the country risk 
premium to analyse fiscal policy, with less consideration given to private consumption. This 
section discusses both views and points out the one which is more relevant to the case of 
emerging economies.  
2.3.1 Traditional approaches to the effects of fiscal policy 
From a theoretical point of view, there is a lack of consistency in the relationship between 
fiscal policy, the interest rate, and the exchange rate. This is due to a crucial assumption 
about forward-looking economic agents in any theoretical model (Hebous, 2011). Forward-
looking consumers with rational expectations respond to expected changes in fiscal variables 
in the future, whereas without forward-looking behaviour, available information on expected 
future changes has no effect on current decisions. 
Without the assumption of forward-looking behaviour represented by the conventional 
IS-LM model postulates that an expansionary fiscal policy stimulates aggregate demand and 
thereby leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate. As seen in Figure 2.1, an increase in 
fiscal deficit shifts the IS curve to the right, ceteris paribus, increasing the equilibrium rate 
of interest. The extension of the IS-LM model to a small open economy developed by 
Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) focuses on the effects of fiscal policy on the current 
account and the exchange rate, which depends on the type of exchange rate regime and the 
degree of capital mobility. Under a regime of flexible exchange rates with perfect capital 
mobility, the rise in the domestic rate of interest resulting from a fiscal expansion will be 
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fully offset by foreign capital inflows. The interest rate returns to the initial level, while the 
nominal exchange rate appreciates because of higher demand for the domestic currency. 
With price rigidity in the short run, the real exchange rate also appreciates. However, in the 
case of a fixed exchange rate system, expansionary fiscal policy has no transitory effect on 
the real exchange rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The crowding-out hypothesis also suggests that larger deficits result in higher interest 
rates. However, the higher interest rate is a result of government debt crowding out private 
capital, rather than output growth emanating from expansionary government consumption 
(Engen and Hubbard, 2004). In particular, increased government indebtedness shifts the 
demand for loanable funds upward, implying a shortage of capital to finance investment. 
This imbalance places upward pressure on interest rates, impeding private spending, and 
ultimately output. Thus, the crowding-out hypothesis implies that an expansionary fiscal 
policy retards its stimulus effect on aggregate demand. The shortage of loanable funds can 
be financed by increased capital inflows, which moderate the pressure on interest rates. 
Unless the increase in capital inflows from abroad can fully offset the decline in public 
saving, the additional government borrowing triggered by budget deficits will cause interest 
rates to rise. As such, a country that has its bond market well integrated within the 
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international financial market could mitigate the impact of fiscal deficits on interest rates 
(Claeys et al., 2012). 
 With forward-looking consumers and fully flexible prices, fiscal policy has no effect on 
the interest rate and exchange rate. This point is associated with the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis, which states that budget deficits today simply substitute higher future taxes for 
lower current taxes, or that debt and tax financing are necessarily equivalent. Economic 
agents expect that additional public spending undertaken in the current period will be 
financed by higher taxes in the future. As a result, current consumption declines, whereas 
private savings and labour supply increases. In other words, the increase in government 
spending causes a negative wealth effect on households. The aggregate level of savings 
remains unchanged, as the reduction in government savings can be fully offset by the growth 
in private savings. Therefore, there is no change in the interest rate and exchange rate. 
Despite the fact that some empirical findings on interest rates support the Ricardian view, a 
majority of economists still lean towards the conventional IS-LM model that budget deficits 
have a positive impact on interest rates (Barro, 1989). 
In contrast to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, the theory of ‘spending reversals’ 
posited by Corsetti et al. (2012) predicts that expansionary government spending will result 
in a decrease in long-term interest rates and a depreciation of domestic currency. 
Specifically, the private sector foresees that the short-term increase in government spending 
will subsequently lead to fiscal improvement in the future, because government spending has 
a self-correcting pattern to achieve fiscal sustainability. With an anticipated spending 
reversal, expansionary fiscal policy does not crowd out private consumption, immediately 
resulting in output growth and higher prices. The private sector expects future spending cuts 
to reduce inflation. As such, they decrease prices and wages prior to the spending reversal, 
driving the actual inflation rate down. The policy rate declines in response to lower inflation. 
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As a result, real long-term interest rates fall, which in turn causes a depreciation of the 
domestic currency.  
From a different perspective, the ‘deep habit’ mechanism developed by Ravn et al. 
(2012) provides an explanation for the correlation between positive government spending 
shocks and real exchange rate depreciations.5 An upward trend in aggregate demand arising 
from increased public spending induces firms to reduce their mark-ups in order to stimulate 
sales. Goods in the domestic economy become cheaper relative to the external economy, 
which implies that the real exchange rate depreciates. Unlike in the Ricardian model, where 
an increase in government spending discourages household consumption, the deep habit 
model indicates that government expenditure produces a positive effect on private 
consumption. Without the presence of deep habit, the mark-ups are constant across 
countries, and consequently, the domestic currency is unresponsive to changes in budget 
deficits. Moreover, an anticipated expansion of public consumption would cause the 
domestic currency to appreciate rather than depreciate. Since firms expect government 
spending will increase in the next period, this causes a negative wealth effect, which then 
dampens the desired level of private spending. A decrease in aggregate demand, ceteris 
paribus, raises mark-ups and makes prices in the domestic market more expensive than in 
foreign markets, resulting in an appreciation of domestic currency. 
To differentiate between short-run and long-run effects of fiscal policy, the savers–
spenders theory of fiscal policy claims that a transitory increase in government spending 
affects the interest rate positively, while a permanent increase leaves the interest rate 
unchanged (Mankiw, 2000). In particular, this model states that heterogeneous consumers 
                                                          
5 According to Ravn et al (2006), deep habit occurs when consumers form their habits from the consumption of 
a narrow category of goods, rather than from overall consumption levels. Higher consumption of a particular 
good today will, all else being equal, encourage the consumer to buy that same good in the future through the 
force of habit. Therefore, the demand for an individual good in the future will be highly independent of its 
current sales. 
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include both savers and spenders.6 The former saves more in response to a debt-financed tax 
cut, because they can foresee higher tax liabilities in the future. On the other hand, the 
spenders consume the extra tax cut. The increase in consumption raises the marginal product 
of capital and, therefore, the interest rate in the short run. Higher interest rates encourage 
savers to save more, lowering the marginal product of capital until the interest rate returns to 
the equilibrium level. In the medium to long term, fiscal policy has no effect on the interest 
rate, regardless of whether its change is transitory or permanent.  
Because of the differences in traditional models, empirical studies based on these 
theories have no common findings. Table 2.1 summarises recent empirical evidence on the 
effects of fiscal policy shocks on the interest rate and exchange rate. Most practitioners show 
that the interest rate increases following a fiscal expansion. However, Dungey and Fry 
(2009) and Corsetti et al. (2012) state that the increase in government spending causes a 
reduction in interest rates. This is because they construct their models based on the theory of 
‘spending reversals’, while other studies are grounded in the IS-LM model. Furthermore, the 
literature fails to consistently explain the response of the exchange rate to fiscal policy 
shocks. For instance, Kim and Roubini (2008), Monacelli and Perotti (2010), and Enders et 
al. (2011) all find that the domestic currency depreciates in response to an expansionary 
fiscal policy shock, while Corsetti and Müller (2006) and Bénétrix and Lane (2009) show the 
opposite, using a sample of only developed countries for the period 1980–2005. This 
difference can be attributed mainly to the different theoretical background that these studies 
are based on. Furthermore, it can be partly justified by the differences in the specification 
and identification methods used (Monacelli and Perotti, 2010). Moreover, Bénétrix and Lane 
(2009) suggest that the different reactions of the exchange rate to fiscal shocks emanate from 
                                                          
6 A heterogenous consumer implies that the level of consumption varies for the next consumer. Savers 
(Ricardian consumers) smooth consumption over time, while spenders (non-Ricardian consumers) spend all 
their current incomes. 
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the different types of exchange rate regimes across countries. In particular, a country 
characterised by a fixed nominal exchange rate regime tends to experience a real 
appreciation, whereas a floating regime tends to experience a real depreciation.  
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Table 2.1 The effects of fiscal policy on interest rate and exchange rate: traditional approach 
Study Country Data Methodology Fiscal shock Interest rate Exchange rate 
Afonso and Sousa 
(2009) 
Germany, Italy, the 
UK, the USA 
Quarterly  
1970–2007 
Bayesian VAR 
Positive government 
spending 
Increase  
Beetsma et al. 
(2008)  
14 EU countries 
Annual  
1970–2004 
Recursive panel VAR 
Positive government 
spending 
 
Domestic currency 
appreciation 
Bénétrix and Lane 
(2009) 
11 EMU countries 
Annual  
1970–2006 
Recursive panel VAR 
Positive government 
spending 
 
Domestic currency 
appreciation 
Bouakez et al. 
(2014) 
Australia, Canada, 
the UK, the USA 
Quarterly  
1973–2008 
VAR 
Positive government 
spending 
 
Domestic currency 
depreciation 
Canzoneri et al. 
(2002) 
The USA 1984–2002 
SVAR by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) 
Positive government 
spending 
Increase  
Claeys et al. 
(2012) 
50 OECD and 
emerging countries 
Annual  
1990–2005 
Fixed-effect panel data 
Increase in government 
debt 
Increase  
Corsetti et al. 
(2012) 
The USA 
Quarterly  
1983–2007 
SVAR by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) 
Positive government 
spending 
Decrease 
Domestic currency 
depreciation 
Dungey and Fry 
(2009) 
New Zealand 
Quarterly  
1983–2006 
SVAR combination of 
contemporaneous and sign 
restrictions 
Positive government 
spending 
Decrease  
Enders et al. 
(2011) 
The USA 
Quarterly 
1975–2005 
Sign restrictions 
Positive government 
spending 
Increase 
Domestic currency 
depreciation 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Engen and 
Hubbard (2004)  
The USA 1976–2003 VAR 
Expansionary budget 
deficit 
Increase  
Favero and 
Giavazzi (2007) 
The USA 
Quarterly  
1960–1979 and  
1980–2006 
SVAR by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) 
Positive government 
spending 
Increase pre-1980 
Decrease post-1980 
 
Gale and Orszag 
(2004)  
The USA 1976–2004 Linear regression 
Expansionary budget 
deficit 
Increase  
Kim and Roubini 
(2008) 
The USA 
Quarterly 
1973–2004 
Recursive VAR 
Expansionary budget 
deficit 
Increase 
Domestic currency 
depreciation 
Laubach (2009) The USA 1976–2006 Linear regression 
Expansionary budget 
deficit and government 
debt 
Increase  
Monacelli and 
Perotti (2010) 
Australia, Canada, 
the UK, the USA 
Quarterly  
1980–2006 
SVAR by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) 
Positive government 
spending 
 
Domestic currency 
depreciation 
Perotti (2004) 
Australia, Canada, 
Germany, the UK, 
the USA 
Quarterly  
1960–1979 and  
1980–2001 
SVAR by  
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
Positive government 
spending 
Increase post-1980  
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A great number of studies have employed the VAR approach to analyse the effects of 
fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables. However, there are various strategies that have 
been used in the literature to identify an exogenous fiscal shock. Many scholars, including, 
inter alia, Beetsma et al. (2008), Kim and Roubini (2008), and Bénétrix and Lane (2009), 
apply a recursive VAR approach to identify a fiscal policy shock. According to this 
approach, the order of the variables defines the direction of the causal relationship. As such, 
the fiscal variable, in general, is ordered first in the system, since it is assumed to have 
immediate effects on other variables, without a contemporaneous response to shocks from 
these other variables. The second approach is to use the structural VAR (SVAR) proposed 
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which uses institutional information about taxation and 
spending programs to identify fiscal policy shocks. This requires high-frequency data (e.g. 
quarterly data) to isolate exogenous shocks from endogenous responses of fiscal policy to 
unexpected changes in the economy. For this reason, this identification method has been 
increasingly used for research conducted using data for advanced economies, in which 
quarterly observations are available for longer periods. The third approach is to use the sign 
restrictions developed by Uhlig (2005), which does not impose zero short-run restrictions, 
but rather, imposes the sign of impulse responses of variables to policy shocks. This has led 
some practitioners, including Dungey and Fry (2009), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Pappa 
(2009), and Enders et al. (2011), to apply this approach to fiscal policy analysis. For 
instance, in order to examine the impact of government expenditure on the real exchange 
rate, Enders et al. (2011) identify an unexpected government spending shock as a shock that 
leads to an increase in government spending, output, the nominal interest rate, and the 
inflation rate, for different periods. Moreover, they use sign restrictions to identify 
technology and monetary policy shocks, so that exogenous fiscal policy shocks can be 
distinguishable from other shocks. 
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2.3.2 Non-traditional approach to the effects of fiscal policy: the model of sovereign risk 
premium 
2.3.2.1 Fiscal policy and the interest rate channel 
The majority of research following traditional approaches has concentrated on the effects of 
fiscal policy on transmission channels of monetary policy in advanced economies. In 
general, there is no clear consensus whether an expansion in budget deficit significantly 
causes a rise in the interest rate and an appreciation of the domestic currency. Furthermore, 
even among studies showing a significant relationship between fiscal performance and 
interest rates, the magnitude of the effect is still uncertain (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). The 
model of sovereign risk premium sheds new light on those conflicting results, as it takes the 
role of sovereign risk premia into consideration (Dai and Philippon, 2005). Apart from its 
effect on the interest rate and exchange rate through changes in private consumption, fiscal 
policy can affect the channels of monetary transmission in a different way, namely through 
the sovereign risk premium. The increase in fiscal deficits or government debt can jeopardise 
economic stability, making investors demand a higher risk premium on sovereign bonds. 
This, in turn, puts upward pressure on domestic interest rates and deteriorates the value of 
the domestic currency. The following analysis based on the sovereign risk premium model 
provides a reason why this approach is more appropriate than the traditional approach to this 
line of research on emerging markets. 
From a theoretical view, the sovereign risk premium model claims that the increase in 
budget deficits, or levels of government debt, raises the probability of default, defined as “a 
situation in which the party issuing a debt instrument is unable to make interest payments or 
pay off the amount owned when the instrument matures” (Mishkin, 2013, p.127). Indeed, the 
weaker the current fiscal performance, the more debt the government has to issue to finance 
the deficit in the future, and thus the more likely sovereign default will occur. According to 
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the risk structure of interest rates, an increase in a bond’s default risk will lead to a higher 
risk premium, which is the spread between the interest rate on risky bonds and risk-free 
bonds with the same maturity (Mishkin, 2013). In particular, because of the rise in the 
possibility of sovereign default, the expected returns on government bonds fall relative to the 
expected returns on default-free bonds. The demand for government bonds then goes down, 
causing a decrease in the equilibrium price. This leads to a rise in government bond yields 
and consequently in interest rate spreads, as the bond price and the interest rate are inversely 
related. For that reason, an expansionary fiscal policy, which raises the risk of sovereign 
default, can result in higher interest rate spreads. Furthermore, chronic and persistent budget 
deficits create significant uncertainty about economic sustainability, threatening the 
government’s ability to service its debts and eventually, increasing sovereign risk premia 
(Truman, 2001, and Gale and Orszag, 2004). 
This model can be derived and supported from the market discipline hypothesis, stating 
that lenders charge high interest rates to borrowers who have a high probability of default 
(Flandreau et al., 1998). This aims to provide an incentive for borrowers to restrain 
borrowing, and to prevent irresponsible borrowers from excessive borrowing as well. The 
weak form of the market discipline hypothesis refers to the linear relationship between debt 
levels and risk premia. This specification assumes that bond yields will rise at a constant rate 
with the level of indebtedness. In other words, the marginal cost of extra borrowing remains 
unchanged as debt accumulates. Credit markets for sovereign borrowers would take the 
strong form of the market discipline hypothesis, stating that the relationship between debt 
variables and bond yields is non-linear (Bayoumi et al., 1995). In contrast to the weak form, 
the marginal cost of borrowing rises with debt accumulation, as a result of ‘credit punishing’ 
for higher default risk. When a country runs excessive deficits, the risk premium on 
sovereign bonds increases gradually at first. If budget deficits become persistent, 
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government bond yield spreads will increase sharply. The increase in the cost of borrowing, 
together with reduced access to credit, acts as an incentive to correct the fiscal mismatch. 
In addition, the model of sovereign risk premium outperforms traditional theories in 
explaining the variations of interest rates across countries. Indeed, under the assumption of 
perfect capital mobility, the domestic interest rate and global interest rate are expected to be 
identical, as the traditional IS-LM model shows. This fails to explain the fact that the world 
of capital liberalization still observes large spreads between markets. To give a reason for 
this result, the risk premium model assumes that the domestic interest rate, r, is equal to the 
world interest rate, r∗, plus a sovereign risk premium, θ: 
r∗ + θ = r (2.2) 
The sovereign risk premium can be written as an increasing function of the level of debt: 
θ = f(Dt) (2.3) 
And: 
Dt = Dt−1 + Bt (2.4) 
where Dt and Dt−1 are the levels of government debt in the current and previous period, 
respectively. The term Bt denotes the government budget deficit in the current period. 
According to equations (2.2) to (2.4), as a result of excessive deficits, the sovereign risk 
premium rises and leads to an increase in the domestic interest rate, given the condition that 
the global interest rate 𝑟∗ remains constant. The sovereign risk premium, therefore, is the key 
factor that differentiates interest rates.  
Looking at fiscal impacts on the interest rate channel in more detail, a few studies show 
that medium to long-term interest rates tend to respond more quickly and considerably to the 
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worsening of fiscal performance than short-term rates (Blanchard, 2004). Dai and Philippon 
(2005) and Gale and Orszag (2004) clarify that fiscal policy affects the long-term interest 
rate through the expectation of short-term interest rates. Since the government would issue 
more bonds to finance spending, it exerts upward pressure on expected bond yields in the 
future. Under the expectation hypothesis of the interest rate, financial market participants 
determine long-term interest rates today based on what they expect about the future path of 
short-term interest rates.7 As such, the upward trend in expected short-term interest rates 
drives up the present long-term interest rate. 
Furthermore, public indebtedness not only affects government bond yields, but also the 
interest rates in the private credit market, as the model by Corsetti et al. (2013) shows. 
Specifically, the study indicates that an increase in the level of public debt raises sovereign 
risk premium, which in turn, causes a rise in private-sector financing costs. Strained public 
finances will raise the cost of financial intermediation because the terms on which it is 
possible to borrow are now tightened. If private finance depends heavily on financial 
intermediaries, private borrowing would become costlier. Furthermore, if monetary policy is 
unable to cut the policy rate to prevent the increase of borrowing costs, the fiscal strain 
eventually spills over into private credit markets and drives the real interest rate spread. The 
higher the initial level of public debt or sovereign spreads, the stronger the spill-over effect 
of sovereign risk to private interest rates. 
From an empirical perspective, several recent studies have tested the causal relationship 
between innovations in the fiscal position and the level of interest rate volatility, as reported 
in Table 2.2. There is widespread agreement in policy discussions that fiscal deficits, along 
with public debt, are positively correlated with sovereign spreads, as well as with medium 
                                                          
7 According to the expectations hypothesis, the current long-term interest rate is estimated to be the weighted 
average of expected short-term interest rates over the following period. 
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and long-term interest rates. Notably, more attention has been paid to the determinants of 
interest rate spreads, rather than to the determinants of interest rates themselves. For 
example, using sovereign bond spreads as a measure of sovereign country premium, Haugh 
et al. (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2009) analyse panel data on advanced economies to find 
that both fiscal position and government debt are key determinants of the sovereign risk 
premium. Similar results are provided by Canzoneri et al. (2002) and Dai and Philippon 
(2005), who analyse the effect of expansionary budget deficit on long-term interest rate 
differentials in the US, from around 1980 to 2000. Moreover, Dai and Philippon (2005) 
suggest that the fiscal policy shock affects long-term interest rates through the risk premium, 
and expected short-term rates as well. Regarding studies on emerging markets, several 
scholars have documented the importance of fiscal variables, such as budget deficits 
(Baldacci et al., 2008), total debt (Belhocine and Dell’Erba, 2013; Dell’Erba et al., 2013a), 
and government spending composition (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008), to the volatilities in 
sovereign risk premium measured by the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) Global 
spread. These studies have generally used low-frequency data, available at either an annual 
or semi-annual level, to run a regression model using panel data analysis for large samples of 
emerging economies. 
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Table 2.2 Studies on the effects of fiscal policy on the interest rate channel: non-traditional approach 
Study Country Data Methodology Fiscal variables Interest rate variables 
Akitoby and Stratmann (2008)  
31 emerging 
countries 
Annual 
1994–2003 
Panel data 
Debt-financed  
government spending 
EMBI Global spread 
Ardagna et al. (2004) 16 OECD countries 
Annual 
1960–2002 
VAR 
Primary balance and public 
debt 
Nominal interest rate on 10-
year government bond 
Baldacci et al. (2008)  30 emerging markets 
Annual  
1997–2007 
Panel data Government budget balance EMBI Global spread 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010) 
31 advanced and 
emerging countries 
Annual  
1980– 2008 
Panel data 
Government budget balance 
and public debt 
Nominal yield on 10-year 
government bond 
Belhocine and Dell’Erba (2013) 
26 emerging 
countries 
1994–2011 Panel data Total public debt EMBI Global spread 
Bernoth et al. (2004) 13 EU countries 
Annual 1991–
2002 
Panel data 
Government budget balance, 
public debt and debt service 
Sovereign bond spreads 
(German benchmark bond) 
Bayoumi et al. (1995) 38 States in the USA 
Annual 1981–
1990 
Linear regression State debt 
 
20-year state bond yield 
spreads (New Jersey 
benchmark bond) 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Canzoneri et al. (2002) The USA  
Quarterly 1984–
2002 
Linear regression 
Expected government budget 
balance 
Sovereign bond spreads 
(between five-year/10-year 
Treasury yields and three-
month Treasury bill yields) 
Chadha et al. (2013) The USA 
Semi-annual 
1976–2006 
Linear regression 
5-year ahead government debt 
and the average maturity of 
government debt 
five-year forward 10-year 
yield 
Dai and Philippon (2005) The USA 
Quarterly  
1970–2003 
SVAR by Blanchard 
and Perroti (2002) 
Government budget balance 
10-year nominal rate 
differential (between actual 
and expected level) 
Dell’Erba et al. (2013a) 
24 Emerging 
countries 
Semi-annual 
1995–2010 
Spatial autoregressive 
model (SAR) 
Total external debt EMBI Global spread 
Engen and Hubard (2004), The USA 1976–2003 VAR Government budget balance Real government bond yield 
Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) EMU countries 
Quarterly  
1993–2005 
Panel data 
Government debt and budget 
balance 
10-year sovereign bond 
spreads (German benchmark 
bond) 
Haugh et al. (2009) OECD 
Quarterly  
2005–2009 
Panel data 
Government debt and 
expected budget balance 
10-year sovereign bond 
spreads (German benchmark 
bond) 
Jamilio and Weber (2013) 
26 emerging 
countries 
Monthly  
2005–2011 
Panel data 
Expected overall balance and 
public debt  
10-year domestic bond yields 
 40 
Table 2.2 (continued)      
López et al. (2011) 
54 emerging and 
developing countries 
Annual  
1990–2009 
Panel data 
Government budget balance 
and public debt 
Real interest rate on 10-year 
government bond 
Schuknecht et al. (2009) 
13 European 
countries 
1991–2005 Panel data 
Government budget balance 
and government debt 
Sovereign bond spreads 
Peiris (2010) 
10 emerging 
countries 
Quarterly  
2000–2009 
Panel data 
Government budget balance 
and public debt 
Government bond yields 
Tomšík (2012) Czech 
Monthly  
2004–2008 
Error correction 
model (ECM) 
Government budget balance 
Long-term commercial interest 
rate 
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With regard to the relationship between fiscal policy and the level of interest rates, a 
related line of literature reports that high levels of government deficits resulting in a rise in 
sovereign risk leads to an increase in long-term government bond yields (Ardagna, 2009; 
Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Peiris, 2010; Jaramillo and Weber, 2013). For example, Baldacci 
and Kumar (2010) estimate that a rise in overall deficits by 1 per cent pushes up long-term 
nominal bond yields by 17 basis points. This result is obtained from reduced-form model 
estimates that control for a wide range of country fundamentals, using a panel of 
31 advanced and emerging economies. Moreover, the upward movement in government 
bond yields is transmitted to the growth in client long-term interest rates on loans and 
deposits, as Tomšík (2012) suggests. More recently, findings from Chadha et al. (2013) 
strengthen this view by indicating that the average maturity of government debt is also a 
significant determinant of long-term interest rates and term premiums.   
2.3.2.2 Fiscal policy and the exchange rate channel 
The model of risk premium also provides the analysis of how fiscal policy affects the 
exchange rate through a country’s default risk. As a result of higher levels of government 
debt or budget deficits, the probability of default rises with an increase in the interest rate, as 
the cost of servicing the public debt is higher. The increase in sovereign risk causes capital 
outflows, leading to a depreciation of the domestic currency (Blanchard, 2004, and Favero 
and Giavazzi, 2004). This model is contrary to the predictions of the Keynesian one, which 
demonstrates that an increase in real interest rates is associated with capital inflows, thereby 
resulting in an appreciation of the domestic currency. In other words, with the presence of 
high sovereign risk, the rise in the real interest rate has a perverse effect on the real exchange 
rate. The transmission channel of fiscal policy from the interest rate to the exchange rate 
outweighs the conventional transmission of monetary policy. 
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From a different perspective, the augmented IS-LM model introduced by Mankiw (2007, 
p. 352), with the inclusion of the country’s risk premium, also supports the argument that 
higher interest rates emanating from weak fiscal performances cause a depreciation of the 
domestic currency. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the IS curve shifts leftward as higher interest 
rates reduce investment. Simultaneously, there is a rightward shift in the LM curve because a 
rise in interest rates reduces money demand, and this allows income to increase at any given 
money supply. These two shifts jointly result in a currency depreciation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 An increase in risk premium in an augmented IS-LM model 
A number of empirical studies using a sample of high deficit/high risk-averse 
economies, including, inter alia, Blanchard (2004), Favero and Giavazzi (2004), Giavazzi 
and Missale (2004), Zoli (2005), and Aktas et al. (2010), share a common view that the 
increase in sovereign risk premium leads to capital outflows, causing a depreciation of the 
domestic currency. The impact of fiscal policy on exchange rate movements is far greater 
than the impact of any of the conventional monetary transmission channels, which 
consequently weakens the connection between policy interest rates and exchange rates. 
Aktas et al. (2010) analyse the importance of fiscal discipline and debt dynamics on the 
implementation of monetary policy to control inflation in Turkey, for the period 1997–2006. 
They point out that because of high risk premia arising from large fiscal imbalances, the 
increase in the interest rate is expected to lead to a devaluation of the domestic currency. 
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Equivalent findings are presented in the study of Clostermann and Schnatz (2000), who 
model the relationship between government spending and exchange rates by both a vector 
error correction model (VECM) and a single-equation error correction model. In particular, 
the VECM indicates that a permanent rise in government expenditure by 1 per cent will 
result in a depreciation of the Euro relative to the US dollar by 0.94 per cent, while the 
single-equation approach shows that a 1 per cent increase in fiscal spending will lead to a 
depreciation by 0.64 per cent. Furthermore, Zoli (2005) contributes to the view that fiscal 
variables drive the exchange rate not only in an indirect way through sovereign spreads, but 
also in a direct way, where news relating to fiscal actions, such as the announcement of 
fiscal innovations and tax reforms, influences the value of the domestic currency. Similar 
findings provided by Bouakez and Eyquem (2015) show that the domestic currency 
depreciates in response to positive public spending shocks, if the impact of the country risk 
premium dominates over the impact of the interest rate channel of monetary policy, even in 
the case of advanced economies with fiscal consolidation.  
2.4 Effects of fiscal policy on inflation expectations: theory and evidence 
Apart from the questionable validity of the quantity theory of money, various concerns have 
been raised about the role of fiscal policy in controlling inflation. With regard to the 
consolidated government budget constraint, the price level depends not only on the growth 
of the money supply, but also on the level of government debt and budget deficits. The 
section below describes how different models explain the way fiscal policy affects inflation 
expectations.  
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2.4.1 The theory of unpleasant monetarist arithmetic by Sargent and Wallace (1981)  
Under a regime of fiscal dominance, the growth of the monetary base is directly determined 
by the fiscal authority’s deficits (Sargent and Wallace, 1981).8 In particular, since the 
demand for government bonds imposes constraints on the monetary authority, the central 
bank is forced to raise seigniorage to monetise a country’s debt, if budget deficits cannot be 
financed by the issuance of bonds. There is a positive relationship between the level of fiscal 
imbalance and the creation of money, leading to the point where a government budget in 
deficit is ultimately the source of inflation. The price level is considered to be a function of 
the current level as well as all anticipated future levels of the money supply. Under the 
dominance of fiscal authorities, forward-looking agents expect an increase in the money 
supply later to finance higher budget deficits. Therefore, the current rate of inflation, along 
with inflation expectations will rise, even though the central bank conducts a current 
tightening of monetary policy. Fiscal policy here mainly drives inflation expectations, 
making monetary policy less effective in controlling inflation. 
From an empirical perspective, the direct impact of fiscal policy on monetary policy has 
not received much attention, because the regime of fiscal dominance is not usually relevant 
to developed economies, whose seigniorage constitutes a minor part of total revenue 
(Canzoneri et al., 2011). Moreover, a central bank with a high degree of independence is 
able to control the money base without government intervention (Woodford, 2001). 
According to the small amount of empirical work conducted on emerging markets, the 
evidence of an explicit link between fiscal deficits, monetary growth and inflation emerges 
from countries experiencing either high inflation rates, or large government debt, or both 
                                                          
8 Fiscal dominance refers to where fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. Budget deficits are determined 
exogenously, regardless of government debt levels, and the fiscal authority independently regulates the amount 
of revenue raised through bond sales and seigniorage (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). 
 45 
 
(Fischer et al., 2002; Baldini and Ribeiro, 2008). Therefore, the issue of fiscal dominance 
might be more of a concern for emerging countries than advanced countries. 
2.4.2 The fiscal theory of price level 
The implicit fiscal effects on monetary policy suggest that the price level varies due to fiscal 
actions, which in turn, inhibits the effectiveness of monetary policy to control inflation. This 
view is underpinned by the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), which underscores the 
importance of the fiscal authority to determine the price level. This theory is characterised by 
the assumption that the government budget constraint holds only in equilibrium. Given the 
present value of budget surpluses, a volatile price level either appreciates or depreciates the 
real value of government debt, so that equilibrium is maintained. As such, the central bank 
tries to change interest rates to offset price fluctuations. Otherwise, corresponding changes in 
the money supply would be required to accommodate changes in money demand, due to 
price fluctuations. In this instance, monetary policy loses its ability to control inflation, even 
with a highly independent central bank that can prevent the treasury from determining 
seigniorage. The FTPL therefore suggests that inflation is a fiscal phenomenon, which 
challenges the conventional view of the QTM. Contributions to this literature include Sims 
(1994), Woodford (2001), Bassetto (2008) and Canzoneri et al. (2011). Furthermore, this 
theoretical framework seems to shed some light on the net-wealth effects of non-Ricardian 
fiscal policies, and asserts that the increase in government expenditures creates positive 
household wealth, encouraging consumption and leading to higher aggregate demand. The 
increase in the price level lowers the real value of sovereign bonds until the government 
budget constraint reaches equilibrium (Woodford, 2001, Baldini and Ribeiro, 2008, and 
Canzoneri et al., 2011).  
More generally, Davig et al. (2011) propose that the impact of government spending on 
the economy depends on the regimes of monetary and fiscal policy. The outcome of FTPL 
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becomes valid only when “active” fiscal policy is associated with “passive” monetary policy 
(Chung et al., 2007).910 During the regime of passive fiscal policy together with active 
monetary policy, fiscal stimulus has moderate impact on output but substantially raise 
inflation rate and public debt. In particular, an increase in government spending results in the 
growth of production and labour demand, subsequently raising real wages and real marginal 
costs which eventually leads to higher price levels. Active monetary policy responses 
aggressively to higher inflation by increasing nominal interest rates, exacerbating government 
debt burden. More importantly, Davig and Leeper (2011) discover that the lack of fiscal 
consolidation can perform as an obstacle to central bank’s achievement in inflation targets. At 
the fiscal limit where tax adjustments to finance government debt become infeasible, 
monetary authority is forced to stabilize debt by switching their primary objective from 
inflation targeting to fix the nominal interest rate. As a result, rational consumers expect 
higher inflation and inflation accelerates to persistently high level.  
From an empirical perspective, the theories of the FTPL and a non-Ricardian fiscal 
regime have helped to provide an explanation of the behaviour of inflation in the US during 
the period around 1960 to 1980 (Favero and Monacelli, 2003, and Sala, 2004), and in Brazil, 
during the mid-1980s (Loyo, 1999). Nevertheless, the FTPL has been criticised on 
theoretical grounds (McCallum, 2001, and Buiter, 2002), and has failed to hold in economies 
where foreign-currency denominated or foreign-currency indexed debt constitutes a large 
proportion of total public debt (Favero and Giavazzi, 2004).11 This may explain the fact that 
over the last few decades, much of the research does not explore this issue for emerging 
                                                          
9 Monetary policy is defined as “active” if it adopts the Taylor rule in which interest rate actively adjusts to 
achieve output and price stability. It becomes passive policy when the Taylor principle does not hold and 
monetary policy passively responds to inflation rise.  
10 Regarding the fiscal policy, during the active regime, government weakly responses to changes in debt levels 
and concentrates on the primary goal of economic growth. In other times, tax policy’s reactions can be passive 
to debt accumulation, implying that higher debts are likely to be financed by additional taxes.  
11 Favero and Giavazzi (2004) affirm in such a situation where foreign debt accounts for a large proportion of 
public debt, price fluctuations solely might not be sufficient to maintain the inter-temporal budget constraint 
balance. 
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market economies. For that reason, the following theory will help to explain the causal 
relationship between fiscal policy and inflation volatility, in the case of a country with a high 
debt burden and weak fiscal performance. 
2.4.3 The model of sovereign risk premium 
According to the model of sovereign risk premium, the increase in budget deficits and 
government debt results in an increase to sovereign risk premium, and then the depreciation 
of the domestic currency. In a small open economy, forward-looking economic agents 
expect that the exchange-rate pass through into import prices will cause cost-push inflation, 
thus raising inflation expectations and, eventually, the inflation rate itself. This model is 
distinct from the previous models already discussed, because it explains how a country’s 
fiscal position and public debt drive inflation through their effects on the interest rate and 
exchange rate channels of monetary policy. 
However, there is limited research based on this model that seeks to explain the link 
between fiscal policy and inflation expectations. Seminal papers proposed by Blanchard 
(2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) attribute price fluctuations in Brazil during the early 
2000s to fiscal imbalance. In particular, large deficits lead to the expansion of sovereign 
spreads and domestic currency devaluation, causing a build up of inflationary pressures. To 
keep inflation within the target, the central bank had to raise the nominal interest rate 
sharply, which further raised the cost of servicing the debt. The government was more prone 
to default, since it would have to pay higher interest rates for any given amount of 
borrowing. As a result, capital outflows weakened the domestic currency, further increasing 
the inflation rate. Without fiscal consolidation, inflationary targeting is ineffective in 
controlling inflation rates. In line with the model of sovereign risk premium, Aktas et al. 
(2010) investigate the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy in Turkish 
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economy for the period 1999–2006. They make the observation that when the expected risk 
premium is high, the rise in the real interest rate will lead to a devaluation of the domestic 
currency and an increase in the inflation rate afterwards. Cerisola and Gelos (2005) also 
highlight the role of fiscal policy in shaping inflation expectations in practice by employing 
three different methods, including ordinary least square (OLS), the generalised method of 
moments (GMM), and fully modified OLS (FM-OLS) in the case of Brazil during the period 
2000–2004. All three econometric methods return a consistent result that a growth in the 
ratio of the consolidated primary surplus to GDP by 1 per cent is expected to lower the 
expected rate of inflation by about 1 per cent. However, their explanation of these results is 
mainly grounded in the theory of arithmetic monetary policy (Sargent and Wallace, 1981), 
rather than highlighting the role of country risk premium. A few existing studies also show 
support for the positive relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation expectations, but 
neglect the importance of the risk premium (Aarle et al., 2003; Celasun et al., 2004; Tekin-
Koru and Özmen, 2010; Canzoneri et al., 2011). 
With the consideration about the interaction between inflation credibility and sovereign 
debt levels, Aguiar et al. (2014) model debt dynamics in response to the inflation credibility 
switching. During the high inflation credibility regime, the incentive to inflate away the real 
value of government debts reduces as sovereign default hardly occurs. As a result, debt 
accumulation is not associated with high inflation pressure. When the credibility turns low, 
creditors increase nominal interest rate due to the concern about default risks, leading to high 
possibility of inflating debts away. Debt build-up is linked with high inflation in this 
situation.  
 49 
 
2.4.4 The adoption of inflation targeting with regard to the interaction of monetary and 
fiscal policy 
Since its adoption by New Zealand in 1990, inflation targeting has spawned a large and 
growing literature that tests whether inflation targeting can be an effective tool for 
implementing monetary policy in emerging markets. For example, some point out that the 
advantages of adopting an inflation targeting regime are to reinforce the transparency and 
accountability of the central bank (Mishkin, 2000, and Mishkin and Hebbel, 2001). 
However, others challenge the adoption of inflation targeting in countries that have a high 
vulnerability to external shocks, are highly dollarized, and face a lack of policy credibility 
(Amatoa and Gerlach, 2002, and Eichengreen, 2002). In this study, it is more suitable to 
address the appropriateness of inflation targeting as an approach to the application of 
monetary policy, regarding the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy.  
Despite the consensus about the considerable impact of fiscal policy on the conventional 
monetary transmission channels, there has been no agreement on the adoption of inflation 
targeting in emerging countries that have encountered unsustainable fiscal positions.  
On the one hand, a number of studies argue that countries with high levels of debt and 
budget deficits will find implementing an inflation targeting regime more challenging in its 
attempt to achieve price stability, because fiscal imbalances hinder the effectiveness of a 
contractionary monetary policy. This is underpinned by the view that fiscal stability is a pre-
requisite for implementing an inflation targeting regime (Amatoa and Gerlach, 2002; Fraga 
et al., 2003; Mishkin, 2004). To endorse this view, Sims (2004) offers a theoretical 
possibility in which attempting to target inflation eventually leads to higher inflation, as a 
tightening of monetary policy may cause a sovereign debt explosion, which in turn, devalues 
the domestic currency and consequently, raises inflation. Empirical evidence of this 
hypothesis has been presented by Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004). Both 
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studies analyse price fluctuations in Brazil during the early 2000s, which were triggered by 
the perverse effects of inflation targeting. In particular, large fiscal imbalances led to the 
expansion of sovereign spreads and a domestic currency devaluation, causing a build-up of 
inflationary pressures. To keep inflation within the target, the central bank had to raise the 
nominal interest rate sharply, which further raised the cost of servicing the debt, the fiscal 
deficit, and the country risk premium. As a result, capital outflows weakened the domestic 
currency, further increasing the inflation rate. In such a situation, the economy can fall into a 
“bad equilibrium” (Favero and Giavazzi, 2004, p. 3), since weak fiscal performance hampers 
the conventional effects of the monetary transmission channels. As a result, fiscal 
consolidation is considered to be a more effective instrument to decrease inflation, rather 
than implementing an inflation targeting regime. Similarly, Aktas et al. (2010) confirm that 
the policy implications of Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) seem to be 
highly applicable to the Turkish economy for the period 1999–2006. Furthermore, with 
considerations for the policy mix to stabilise the inflation rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio 
simultaneously, Dosi et al. (2015) recommend the combination of a dual-mandated monetary 
policy and an unconstrained fiscal policy, rather than implementing an inflation targeting 
regime coupled with fiscal discipline. 
On the other hand, regardless of the character of fiscal policy and a country’s fiscal 
institutions, it is possible to prescribe the implementation of an inflation targeting regime as 
an optimal approach to monetary policy, as long as its adoption specifies an appropriate 
target criterion, together with the conduct of suitable instruments. As advocates for the 
inflation targeting regime, Benigno and Woodford (2006) acknowledge that the negative 
impact of fiscal imbalances on the inflation rate would be diminished, as a result of the 
credible commitment by the central bank to fulfil its target criterion. The target criterion 
needs to specify a consistent growth rate for the output-gap adjusted price level in the long 
 51 
 
run, along with well-anchored inflation expectations. It is important that the commitment 
must guarantee a prompt stabilisation of inflation after any disturbance arising from shocks 
to the government budget. With respect to the implementation of monetary instruments, 
Schaber and Wijnbergen (2014) make a suggestion that in countries with a high risk 
premium, the central bank should not utilise the interest rate as a prevalent monetary 
instrument. This is in agreement with relevant literature that finds the interest rate channel 
has a perverse effect on inflation due to the increasing risk of a public debt explosion. This 
implies that an inflation targeting policy based on a money rule appears to be a better choice 
that can safely control inflation without the presence of fiscal consolidation. 
From a different perspective, the argument for the adoption of inflation targeting in 
emerging countries is reinforced by the view that requirements for inflation targeting help to 
improve fiscal discipline (Bernanke et al., 1999; Brash, 2002). Since most developing 
countries do not satisfy the prior conditions of fiscal stability for implementing an inflation 
targeting regime, they have strong incentives to promote fiscal reforms following the 
adoption of an inflation targeting regime, in order to reduce the probability of default, which 
can drive the inflation rate above its targeted rate. Recently, Minea and Tapsoba (2014) point 
out the positive side effects of inflation targeting on a country’s fiscal performance. Using a 
sample of 84 countries, they find that an inflation targeting regime not only controls 
inflation, but also leads to significant improvements in fiscal stability for developing 
countries. To examine whether the implementation of inflation targeting as a framework for 
monetary policy enhances fiscal balance, Kadria and Aissa (2014) employ the propensity-
score matching methodology to compare the fiscal performance between inflation targeting 
adopters and non-inflation targeting ones on the condition of the same observed 
characteristics. They reach a consistent conclusion that adopting inflation targeting has a 
considerable impact on reducing budget deficits, based on a sample of 41 emerging 
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countries. More interestingly, Kadria and Aissa (2016) find that inflation targeting starts to 
significantly diminish budget deficits from the second year following its adoption, implying 
that there exists a lagged effect on fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the implementation of an 
inflation targeting regime improves not only fiscal discipline, but also sovereign debt risk, 
based on the large sample of emerging markets (Fouejieu and Roger, 2013;  Balima et al., 
2017). This strengthens the view in favour of adopting inflation targeting in emerging 
market economies. 
2.5 An analysis of a non-linear effect of fiscal policy on monetary transmission channels  
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2.1, the model of sovereign risk premium emphasizes that there 
is a sizeable non-linear relationship between fiscal policy and the various monetary 
transmission channels, which is in line with the strong form of market discipline hypothesis 
advocated by Bayoumi et al. (1995). First, a relatively small body of literature reveals that 
the response of monetary variables to fiscal shocks appears to rely to some extent on the 
nature of fiscal changes. For example, Ardagna (2009) pays particular attention to the 
magnitude of changes in the fiscal stance for OECD countries from 1960 to 2002. She 
explores the hypothesis that sharp increases in budget deficits raise government bond yields 
more significantly than moderate ones. From a different perspective, Afonso and Sousa 
(2012) and Afonso and Jalles (2014) differentiate the effects of government spending shocks 
from those of revenue shocks. The former is expected to lead to increases in both the price 
level and interest rate, while the latter has no impact on the price level but a mixed effect on 
the interest rate. Considering non-linearity in fiscal impacts arising due to the business cycle, 
Candelon and Lieb (2013) show that the deficit-spending multiplier effect on output 
becomes much stronger in times of recession. 
Several empirical studies prove that the size of fiscal effects on interest rates and 
exchange rates depend on country-specific fundamentals, since these factors can primarily 
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drive sovereign risk premium. This also helps to explain why the model of risk premium 
might work well in the case of emerging countries rather than advanced ones. There are four 
country-specific patterns identified: (i) the level of indebtedness, (ii) the fiscal policy 
framework, (iii) the monetary policy stance, and (iv) inflationary pressures.  
First, if the initial level of government debt or external debt-to-GDP ratio is still below a 
threshold, expansionary fiscal policy will not raise the probability of default, and hence, the 
interest rate and exchange rate will remain stable. However, when the level of the debt ratio 
reaches a certain point, such that sovereign default is more likely to occur, the risk premium 
starts to increase, causing movements in interest rates and exchange rates (Bi, 2012). Some 
researchers observe from their simulation scenarios that the transmission from sovereign risk 
to interest rates is more powerful when the initial level of government debt is higher. For 
instance, using a large sample of emerging economies, Alper and Forni (2011) show that 
public debt has a positive effect on long-term real interest rates when the government debt-
to-GDP ratio passes a threshold of about 50 per cent (with a median of 40 per cent), using 
data for the period 2002–2010. The study of Belhocine and Dell’erba (2013) demonstrates a 
comparable result that the elasticity of EMBI spreads to debt increases twofold when the 
level of government debt surpasses 45 per cent of GDP. In consideration of the observed 
behaviour of excessive external debt accumulation, Reinhart et al. (2003) suggest the 
external debt threshold of around 35 to 40 per cent of GDP that is obtained from the fact that 
a debt default in emerging economies is more likely to occur at an external debt-to-GDP 
ratio over that range. Similarly, the IMF (2002) suggests that a level of external debt below 
45 per cent of GDP is safe. However, even at the level where the debt ratio could be 
considered ‘safe’, default can still occur. The dataset of Reinhart et al. (2003) indicates that 
over 50 per cent of default episodes occurred when debt-to-GNP ratios were below 60 per 
cent, and 13 per cent of defaults took place at debt ratios below 40 per cent, for middle-
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income countries between 1970 and 2001. On the other hand, some developed economies, 
such as Japan, Iceland, and the US, remain creditworthy, despite their current levels of debt 
being over 100 per cent of GDP. This refers to the viewpoint that the emerging country’s 
debt threshold is much lower than those of advanced economies (Belhocine and Dell’erba, 
2013). As such, while the default risk increases with the level of public debt for the case of 
emerging economies, this might not be relevant to advanced economies, which can sustain 
large debts with low levels of risk. 
Second, countries that have been characterised by weak policy frameworks and a 
volatile macroeconomy are likely to suffer deeper distress from expansionary fiscal policy 
(Fischer et al., 2002; Catao and Terrones, 2005; Baldini and Ribeiro, 2008; Hallerberg and 
Wolff, 2008; Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Alper and Forni, 2011; Chadha et al., 2013; 
Corsetti et al., 2013). In relation to Europe’s history of default, Reinhart et al. (2003) 
conclude that a high degree of capital flight and tax avoidance reduce the ability of a 
government to meet its debt obligations. In addition, the absence of fiscal discipline is often 
regarded as an obstacle to the smooth transmission of monetary policy. Without the response 
of a fiscal surplus to the level of government debt, the increase in the debt stock raises issues 
about debt sustainability and the risk premium, resulting in the volatility of interest rates and 
exchange rates (Baldini and Ribeiro, 2008; Chadha et al., 2013). Ardagna (2009) provides a 
further supporting argument that the influence of the fiscal position on long-term 
government bonds is mainly driven by an economy’s initial fiscal condition and the type of 
fiscal consolidation. At high levels of fiscal deficits, a government spending cut followed by 
a considerable and permanent decrease in government debt substantially lowers interest rates 
and raises stock market prices. 
Third, Corsetti et al. (2013) show that when monetary policy is constrained under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, it is unable to offset the spill-over effects of high risk premia to 
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market interest rates. Indeed, the central bank cannot reduce policy interest rates, nor can it 
expand the monetary base, due to a fear of depreciating the domestic currency. 
Finally, countries under high inflationary pressure are prone to become insolvent even at 
low levels of deficits and public debt, so that the sovereign risk premium, and consequently 
monetary transmission channels, are highly vulnerable to negative changes in fiscal policy. 
In fact, high inflation rates frequently prevail in emerging economies, so they would suffer 
more from deterioration of fiscal position than advanced ones. This argument gains support 
from the empirical evidence presented by Baldacci and Kumar (2010), which shows that 
countries with high inflationary pressures tend to face greater fiscal deterioration. To control 
inflation, the central bank has to constrain the growth of the money supply. The revenue 
collected from seigniorage, hence, falls sharply. The government now finds it more difficult 
to balance the budget and repay its debts, leading to a higher probability of sovereign 
default. Similarly, Catao and Terrones (2005) find a strong positive association between 
persistent deficits and inflation in developing countries experiencing high inflationary 
pressures, but not in low-inflation advanced economies. 
Those factors above explain why the magnitude of fiscal effects on the monetary 
transmission channels varies across countries, and reaffirm that emerging countries are 
vulnerable to weakening fiscal positions, since an increase in budget deficits can easily 
trigger a higher probability of default on sovereign debts. For this reason, the model of 
sovereign risk premium might work well in the case of emerging countries characterised by 
heavy debt burdens, an unsustainable fiscal balance, and persistent inflationary pressures. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The above-mentioned studies on the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy 
have traced out the way that fiscal deficits and government debt affect the conventional 
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channels of monetary policy. Generally, there are two theoretical approaches underpinning 
research into the relationship between fiscal and monetary variables. One is the traditional 
approaches of the Keynesian and Neoclassical views, and the other is the model of the risk 
premium as a non-traditional approach. Research based on traditional theories reveals rather 
controversial and inconsistent findings about the impacts of fiscal policy on interest rates and 
exchange rates. On the other hand, most studies adopting the theory of sovereign risk 
premium reach an agreement that a rise in budget deficits and government debt leads to an 
increase in interest rates and a depreciation of domestic currency, because larger fiscal 
imbalance gives rise to the risk of sovereign default. Interestingly, some papers address the 
difference in fiscal effects across countries, showing that emerging economies suffering a 
high degree of fiscal unsustainability may be vulnerable to changes in fiscal position. In 
contrast, advanced economies can tolerate high levels of budget deficits and public debt 
without bearing higher default risks. As a result, the model of sovereign risk premium is 
considered to be more appropriate for the case of emerging economies. Another notable 
feature of the literature is that most of the current studies focus on the relationship between 
fiscal policy and the interest rate and exchange rate channels, while there are very few 
studies that focus on the impacts of budget deficits and government debt on inflation 
expectations. 
This chapter also provides a critical insight into the adoption of an inflation targeting 
regime, with the consideration of negative effects of fiscal unsustainability on the conduct of 
monetary policy. This is a controversial topic. On the one hand, some scholars suggest that 
when a country experiences a large fiscal imbalance, fiscal policy plays a predominant role 
in controlling inflation. Increasing the policy rate to curb inflation, therefore, becomes 
ineffective. This deteriorates the fiscal balance further by raising borrowing costs. On the 
other hand, several studies argue that the use of an inflation targeting regime is an effective 
 57 
 
measure to overcome chronic fiscal imbalances, since it acts as a motivation to strengthen 
fiscal discipline. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter specifies the ARDL model that corrects for the problem of endogeneity and 
autocorrelation in the other single-equation models (Boyd et al., 2001; Halicioglu, 2009). 
This model will serve as the primary analytical tool to address the research objectives. The 
chapter also includes the specification of the model and a description of the data, in which 
the choice of variables and data sample are presented. It provides time series plots of the 
variables along with some preliminary tests, in order to construct the model and support the 
analysis in the following chapters. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces an overview of the ARDL 
approach to test the effects of fiscal policy on the transmission channels of monetary policy, 
and then highlights its distinct features. The specification of the model will be shown in 
Section 3.3, followed by the testable hypotheses in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes the 
three-step procedure for estimating the linear ARDL models, while Section 3.6 presents the 
modified ARDL models with the presence of an interactive dummy variable for a debt 
threshold. To consider the asymmetric effects of fiscal performance, we utilise the NARDL 
models developed by Shin et al. (2014) in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 describes the data, while 
Section 3.9 presents the results of the preliminary tests. Finally, some concluding remarks 
are provided in Section 3.10. 
3.2 The empirical approach to modelling the effects of fiscal policy on the transmission 
channels of monetary policy 
3.2.1 An overview of the linear ARDL model 
The original form of the bivariate ARDL model can be expressed as: 
yt = c0 + δωt + ∑γiyt−i
p
i=1
+ ∑βj
q
j=0
xt−j + εt 
(3.1) 
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where yt is the dependent variable, xt is the explanatory variable, ωt denotes a time trend or 
other exogenous variables with fixed lags, c0 is the constant term, and εt is a disturbance 
term, which is assumed to be white noise. The parameters, γi and βj, are the coefficients on 
yt−i and xt−j respectively. Equation (3.1) shows that the ARDL(p, q) model regresses the 
explained variable yt on p lags of itself (autoregression) and q lags of the explanatory 
variable xt (distributed lags). 
The ARDL model can be used to estimate the long-run effect of a regressor on the 
dependent variable. In particular, the distributed lag form of the ARDL model can be written 
more compactly as: 
A(L)yt = c0 + δωt + B(L)xt + εt (3.2) 
where L is the lag operator, such that Lyt = yt−1, and: 
A(L) = (1 − γ1L − γ2L
2 −  … − γpL
p) (3.2a) 
B(L) = (β0 + β1L + β2L
2 +  … + βqL
q) (3.2b) 
Dividing (3.2) by A(L) gives: 
yt =
c0
A(L)
+
δ
A(L)
ωt +
B(L)
A(L)
xt +
1
A(L)
εt 
(3.3) 
The long-run coefficient for the response of yt to a unit change in xt is represented by: 
θ =
B(L)
A(L)
=
β0 + β1 + β2 +  … + βq
1 − γ1 − γ2 −  … − γp
 
(3.3a) 
The long-run coefficient on the exogenous or deterministic variable is given by: 
μ =
δ
A(L)
=
δ
1 − γ1 − γ2 −  … − γp
 
(3.3b) 
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Without any violations of the assumptions of linear regression, θ̂ and μ̂ can be estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS), and conventional testing procedures are asymptotically valid 
as well. The parameter θ is called the cointegrating coefficient if xt and yt are cointegrated, 
or if there is a long-run relationship between the regressor and dependent variable. 
Furthermore, an ECM associated with the ARDL(p, q) model can be obtained by 
rewriting equation (3.1) in terms of the first differences of yt: 
∆yt = c0 + δωt + (γ1 − 1)yt−1 + ∑ γiyt−i
p
i=2
+ ∑ βj
q
j=0
xt−j + εt (3.4) 
After some re-arranging, we have:12 
∆yt = c0 + δωt + ∅(yt−1 −  θxt−1) + β0∆xt − ∑ γi
∗∆yt−i
p−1
i=1
−  ∑ βj
∗
q−1
j=1
∆xt−j + εt (3.5) 
where the term, (yt−1 −  θxt−1), is the error correction term, which shows the deviation of 
the system from its long-run equilibrium value, and: 
 γ1
∗ = γ2 + γ3 +  … + γp−1 + γp 
 γ2
∗ = γ3 +  … + γp−1 + γp 
… 
γp−1
∗ = γp 
(3.5a) 
Similarly: 
β1
∗ = β2 + β3  … + βq−1 + βq 
 β2
∗ = β3 +  … + βq−1 + βq 
… 
βq−1
∗ = βq 
(3.5b) 
                                                          
12 Details are provided in Appendix 1. 
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The long-run equilibrium is attained when yt−1 −  θxt−1 = 0. The parameter ∅ =
(γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + … + γp − 1) measures the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium. 
The larger the parameter ∅ is, the greater the response of yt to the previous period’s 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium value. It should be statistically significant with a 
negative sign, providing further evidence of a stable long-run relationship between xt and yt 
(Banerjee et al., 1998).  
Equation (3.5) is known as the ECM. It shows that the change in yt between time period 
t-1 and t is a result of a change in the explanatory variable, xt, between time period t-1 and t, 
and the adjustment to correct for any disequilibrium existing in the period t-1. The parameter 
θ defines the long-run relationship between xt and yt, while the parameter β0 defines the 
short-run relationship between them. The remaining coefficients γi
∗ and βj
∗ explain the short-
run dynamics of the model’s convergence to equilibrium. Since xt and yt variables are 
cointegrated with the cointegrating coefficient θ, the term  (yt−1 −  θxt−1) will be I(0). The 
ECM can be estimated directly by OLS to analyse both the short-run and long-run dynamics 
of the system. 
3.2.2 The ARDL approach to cointegration testing 
Although the Johansen (1988) technique and the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure for 
testing the presence of cointegration have been widely adopted, they focus on the 
relationship between I(1) variables only. Pesaran et al. (2001) develop the bounds testing 
approach to the relationship between variables in levels, which can be applied irrespective of 
whether the underlying variables are purely I(1), I(0), or a combination of both. This 
alternative approach is based on the use of the ARDL model, in order to test for the joint 
significance of the long-run parameters.  
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The error correction representation of the ARDL model, following Pesaran et al. (2001), 
is expressed as: 
∆yt = c0 + δt + αyt−1 + βxt−1 + ∑ ψi∆yt−i
p−1
i=1
+  ∑ τj
q−1
j=0
∆xt−j + ut (3.6) 
where c0 and δ denotes the constant term and the parameter on the time trend t, respectively. 
The parameters α and β represent long-run coefficients, while ψi and τj represent the short-
run coefficients. The term ut is a white noise disturbance term.  
The null hypothesis of the bounds test assumes that there is no significant level 
relationship between xt and yt, that is: 
Η0: α = β = 0 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
Η𝐴: α ≠ β ≠ 0 
The estimated F-statistic is compared with the critical value bounds computed by 
Pesaran et al. (2001). Since xt can be I(0) or I(1), there are two sets of critical values 
covering all possible cases of xt. The lower-bound values are obtained for the case in which 
xt is assumed to be I(0), while the upper bound values are specified for the case in which xt 
is I(1). There are three possibilities for the result of the bounds testing procedure: 
 Case 1: F-statistic > The upper bound Reject Η0 
 Case 2: F-statistic < The lower bound Fail to reject Η0 
 Case 3: The lower bound ≤ F-statistic ≤ The upper bound Inconclusive 
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If the null hypothesis H0: α = β = 0 is rejected, then there is a level relationship between xt 
and yt. Moreover, the t-test for the significance of the coefficient α can be conducted to 
confirm the existence of a level relationship between the dependent and explanatory 
variables. The null hypothesis states that the coefficient on yt−1 is not significantly different 
from zero, that being Η0: α = 0. The alternative hypothesis states that Η𝐴: α ≠ 0. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, then this supports the presence of a level effect of xt on yt. The 
asymptotic critical value bound for the t-statistics is also tabulated in Pesaran et al. (2001). 
3.2.3 Justifications for choosing the ARDL model 
First, in the context of emerging economies, a model estimated on each individual country 
with similar fiscal characteristics may outperform fixed-effect or pooled OLS models with 
panel data, in regard to the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on the transmission 
channels of monetary policy. The aforementioned literature in Chapter 2 indicates that the 
response of the interest rate and exchange rate to changes in the fiscal balance varies across 
countries, depending on country-specific fundamentals. Indeed, there has been increasing 
heterogeneity in economic performance across emerging economies from different regions in 
the post-crisis period: Asian economies tend to recover strongly while the recessions tend to 
persist in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Didier et al., 2012). A recent report 
proposed by the World Bank (2016a) shows there are large subregional divergences between 
countries’ budget balance. For example, while Central America and Mexico are on a path of 
fiscal consolidation, fiscal deficits are on the rise in South America. Furthermore, the fiscal 
position between the central and southern parts of Asia has also been diverging. The large 
divergence in fiscal fundamental factors across emerging economies would enlarge the 
heterogeneity of fiscal effects, which might not be captured by fixed-effects or pooled OLS 
models. 
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Second, in comparison with the conventional VAR model that requires stationary 
variables in the system, the use of the ARDL model is preferred, when the variables are a mix 
of I(0) and I(1) variables. The ARDL approach does not require the difference transformation 
to remove the stochastic trend in I(1) variables. As such, the potential cointegrating 
relationships among non-stationary variables could be investigated. Furthermore, the ECM 
can be simply derived from the ARDL model to estimate the short-run dynamic coefficients 
associated with the long-run relationships. Enders (2010) shows that the ARDL model is 
common and consistent with the VAR methodology. In this study, the ARDL model aims to 
empirically analyse the long-run relationships and dynamic interactions between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy. 
Third, in contrast to the testing procedures used by Engle and Granger (1987) and 
Johansen (1988), the ARDL approach to the analysis of level relationships does not require 
the variables to be integrated of the same order. The asymptotic distribution of the Wald 
statistic, F-statistic and t-statistic are non-standard, under the null hypothesis that there is no 
level relationship between variables, regardless of whether the underlying variables are 
purely I(0), purely I(1), or a combination of both. As such, the ARDL bounds test proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (2001) can be applied without prior knowledge of the univariate properties 
of the regressors. It outperforms other cointegration techniques when the results of unit root 
tests are inconclusive, or unreliable (Sari et al., 2008; Delatte and López-Villavicencio, 2012; 
Ozturk and Acaravci, 2013). 
In addition, the ARDL approach to cointegration analysis is applicable even when the 
problems of serial correlation and an endogenous regressor exist. It is worth noting that the 
FM-OLS method can also correct for autocorrelation and endogeneity, but it requires the 
variables to be stationary. When the variables are integrated with different orders, the FM-
OLS technique is inappropriate for use. If the error terms are serially correlated, and possibly 
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contemporaneously correlated with the independent variables, the OLS method will violate 
the conventional assumptions of linear regression. Indeed, the long-run parameters, together 
with their standard errors, estimated directly by OLS, become biased. This will lead to 
misleading results for significance tests (Ghatak and Siddiki, 2010). The ARDL approach can 
avoid this issue, by appropriately expanding the lag lengths of the variables to correct for 
autocorrelation and endogeneity (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). A generous lag length should be 
chosen, as this reduces any bias. As a result, the OLS estimator still has desirable asymptotic 
properties including the consistency and asymptotic normality, implying that further 
inferences are valid.  
Finally, the ARDL approach has the additional advantage of yielding efficient 
cointegrating relationships in small and finite sample sizes, while other testing procedures, 
such as Johansen (1991, 1995) uses a systems framework, which requires a large sample of 
data to obtain valid inferences (Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pahlavani, 2005). For example, the 
ARDL approach is employed in a number of empirical studies, such as those by Narayan 
(2005), Duasa (2007), Ghatak and Siddiki (2010), and Belloumi (2014), because of the small 
sample size used in those studies. This supports the use of the ARDL model in empirical 
analyses with limited observations. 
3.3 Model specification  
In order to examine the relationship between a country’s fiscal position and the transmission 
channels of monetary policy, the variables in the model are specified as follows. For the 
fiscal position variable, this research uses the overall budget balance-to-GDP ratio (bt), 
which is also employed by a number of previous studies (Engen and Hubbard, 2004; Gale 
and Orszag, 2004; Kim and Roubini, 2008). A negative number indicates a budget deficit, 
while a positive one shows a budget surplus. An increase in the ratio of the fiscal balance to 
GDP indicates a fiscal improvement, while a decrease shows an increase in fiscal deficits. 
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Data on the budget balance is not seasonally adjusted, since the use of a seasonal adjustment 
procedure might lead to biased estimates if it dismisses information about rational 
expectations (Sims, 1993). Moreover, seasonal adjustment is likely to distort parameter 
estimates when variables are adjusted using different methods (Meese and Rogoff, 1983). 
The risk premium on US dollar-denominated debt (Riskt) reflects the possibility of 
sovereign default, since debts denominated in US dollars account for the largest part of the 
total public and public-guaranteed debts in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey. Indeed, its 
size did not cease to rise from the early 1990s to 2014 in those countries. Studies by 
Canzoneri et al. (2002) and Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) also measure the default risk using 
the risk premium on US-denominated debt. The higher risk premium on US dollar-
denominated debt shows a greater possibility of default. 
The lending rate (short-to-medium term) offered by depository institutions to the private 
sector (Lendingt) is added to the model to analyse how a government’s fiscal position 
affects the interest rate channel. We also include the nominal exchange rate (EXt) to 
investigate the link between fiscal policy and exchange rate channel, following several 
empirical papers, such as Lambertini and Tavares (2005), IMF (2010), Devries et al. (2011), 
Delatte et al. (2012), and Alesina and Ardagna (2013).13 In addition, the inclusion of the 
policy rate (Policyt) as a monetary policy instrument to control inflation is used to compare 
the effects of monetary policy with that of fiscal policy. The insignificance of policy rate 
combined with the significance of fiscal balance suggests that the impact of monetary policy 
on inflation expectations is eroded by increasing fiscal deficits.  
                                                          
13 Since Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey adopted a floating exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate 
can move freely in response to changes in fiscal policy and monetary policy. We also conduct the empirical 
model using the real effective exchange rate. The results are comparable to those using the nominal exchange 
rate. 
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We include the expected inflation rate (πt
e) in the model to measure the influence of 
fiscal deficits on the expectation channel of monetary policy. This index is obtained from the 
World Economic Survey, which aims to assess the public’s expectations about key national 
economic indicators.14 
 In general, the model consists of six variables, denoted by Zt, where Zt is a column 
vector composed of the six variables: Zt
′ = {bt; Riskt; Lendingt; EXt; Policyt; πt
e}. In 
particular, bt represents the ratio of the government budget balance-to-GDP in period t; 
Riskt denotes the sovereign risk premium in period t; Lendingt represents short-to-medium 
term lending rates in period t; EXt represents the nominal exchange rate of the domestic 
currency to the US dollar in period t (for example, Turkish Lira per one US dollar); Policyt 
denotes the central bank’s policy rate in period t, and πt
e is the expected inflation rate 
prevailing in period t. 
3.4 Testable hypotheses 
Based on the aims and objectives of this study, which are to investigate the empirical effects 
of fiscal deficits on three transmission channels of monetary policy, we propose six main 
hypotheses that will be tested using the ARDL model. These are described in detail below. 
(i) The interest rate channel: 
According to the model of the risk premium, since weaker fiscal performance raises the 
risk premium, the cost of financing debt would go up. As such, the first two hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 1 
                                                          
14 World Economic Survey predicts world economic prospects by polling transnational and national institutions 
on current economic situations and future developments prevailing in their respective countries. It is conducted 
in coordination with the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. 
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H0: A decrease in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP has no significant impact on lending 
rates. 
HA: A decrease in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP leads to a rise in lending rates. 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: Higher sovereign risk premium has no significant impact on lending rates. 
HA: Higher sovereign risk premium leads to a rise in lending rates. 
(ii) The exchange rate channel:  
The following hypotheses analyse the effect of fiscal policy on the exchange rate. As a 
result of the high probability of default that arises from weak fiscal performance, the 
domestic currency depreciates. 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: A decrease in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP has no significant effect on the 
value of the domestic currency. 
HA: A decrease in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP leads to a depreciation of the 
domestic currency. 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: Increasing sovereign risk premium has no significant effect on the value of the domestic currency. 
HA: Increasing sovereign risk premium leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency. 
(iii) The inflation expectation channel: 
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The remaining hypotheses focus on the effect of fiscal policy on the inflation 
expectation channel of monetary policy to achieve price stability. Since a fiscal policy shock 
is assumed to bring about a monetary expansion and domestic currency depreciation, it 
might eventually raise the public’s expectations of inflation. As such, the last two hypotheses 
are: 
Hypothesis 5 
H0: A decrease in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP does not significantly affect 
inflation expectations. 
HA: A decrease in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP leads to higher inflation 
expectations. 
Hypothesis 6 
H0: The rise in sovereign risk premium does not significantly affect inflation expectations. 
HA: The rise in sovereign risk premium leads to higher inflation expectations. 
3.5 The modelling procedure 
3.5.1 Step 1: The ARDL bounds test  
The bounds testing procedure identifies the direction of the long-run relationship by 
positioning a dependent variable on one side followed by its forcing variables on the other 
side of the equation. The F-statistic is calculated when each of the independent variables 
appears as a dependent variable separately. According to equation (3.6), when bt is the 
dependent variable, the ARDL(p, q) model for the bounds test is: 
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∆bt   =    c0
b + δbt + αbbt−1 + β1
bRiskt−1 + β2
bLendingt−1 + β3
bEXt−1
+ β4
bPolicyt−1 + β5
bπt−1
e + ∑ ψi
bΔbt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1i
b ΔRiskt−i
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ2j
b ΔLendingt−i
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ3j
b ΔEXt−i
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ4j
b ΔPolicyt−i
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ5j
b Δπt−i
e
q−1
i=0
+ ut
b 
(3.7) 
The F-test for the null hypothesis H0: α
b = β1
b = β2
b = β3
b = β4
b = β5
b = 0  in equation (3.7) is 
denoted by F(bt|Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e). 
Similarly, the regression equation for Riskt is: 
∆Riskt  =    c0
Risk + δRiskt + αRiskRiskt−1 + β1
Riskbt−1 + β2
RiskLendingt−1
+ β3
RiskEXt−1 + β4
RiskPolicyt−1 + β5
Riskπt−1
e + ∑ ψi
RiskΔRiskt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
RiskΔbt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ2j
RiskΔLendingt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ3j
RiskΔEXt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ4j
RiskΔPolicyt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ5j
RiskΔπt−j
e
q−1
i=0
+ ut
Risk 
(3.8) 
The F-test for the null hypothesis H0: α
Risk = β1
Risk = β2
Risk = β3
Risk = β4
Risk = β5
Risk = 0 in 
equation (3.8) is denoted by F(Riskt|bt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e). 
The regression equation for Lendingt is: 
∆Lendingt  =  c0
Lending
+ δLendingt + αLendingLendingt−1 + β1
Lending
bt−1
+ β2
Lending
Riskt−1 + β3
Lending
EXt−1 + β4
Lending
Policyt−1
+ β5
Lending
πt−1
e + ∑ ψi
Lending
ΔLendingt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
Lending
Δbt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ2j
Lending
ΔRiskt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ3j
Lending
ΔEXt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ4j
Lending
ΔPolicyt−j
q−1
i=0
+ ∑ τ5j
Lending
Δπt−j
e
q−1
i=0
+ ut
Lending
 
 
(3.9) 
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The F-test for the null hypothesis H0: α
Lending = β1
Lending
= β2
Lending
= β3
Lending
= β4
Lending
=
β5
Lending
= 0 in equation (3.9) is denoted by F (Lendingt| bt,  Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e). 
The regression equation for EXt is given as: 
 ∆EXt    =    c0
EX + δEXt + αEXEXt−1 + β1
EXbt−1 + β2
EXRiskt−1 + β3
EXLendingt−1
+ β4
EXPolicyt−1 + β5
EXπt−1
e + ∑ ψi
EXΔEXt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
EXΔbt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
EXΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
EXΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ1j
EXΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ1j
EXΔπt−j
e
q−1
j=0
+ ut
EX 
(3.10) 
The F-test for the null hypothesis H0: α
EX = β1
EX = β2
EX = β3
EX = β4
EX = β5
EX = 0 in equation 
(3.10) is denoted by F(EXt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e). 
The regression equation for Policyt is given as: 
∆Policyt   =   c0
Policy
+ δPolicyt + αPolicyPolicyt−1 + β1
Policy
bt−1 + β2
Policy
Riskt−1
+ β3
Policy
Lendingt−1 + β4
Policy
EXt−1 + β5
Policy
πt−1
e
+ ∑ ψi
Policy
ΔPolicyt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
Policy
Δbt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
Policy
ΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
Policy
ΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
Policy
ΔEXt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
Policy
Δπt−j
e
q−1
j=0
+ ut
Policy
 
(3.11) 
The F-test for the null hypothesis H0: α
Policy = β1
Policy
= β2
Policy
= β3
Policy
= β4
Policy
=
β5
Policy
= 0 in equation (3.11) is denoted by F(Policyt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, πt
e). 
Finally, the regression equation for πt
e is given as: 
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 ∆πt
e       =    c0
π + δπt + αππt−1
e + β1
πbt−1 + β2
πRiskt−1 + β3
πLendingt−1
+ β4
πEXt−1 + β5
πPolicyt−1 + ∑ ψi
πΔπt−i
e
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
π Δbt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
π ΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
π ΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
π ΔEXt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
π ΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ut
π 
(3.12) 
The F-test for the null hypothesis H0: α
π = β1
π = β2
π = β3
π = β4
π = β5
π = 0  in equation (3.12) is 
denoted by F(πt
e|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt). 
3.5.2 Step 2: Long-run estimation and hypothesis testing 
This step is the most important one, as it will test the significance of fiscal policy on the 
transmission channels of monetary policy in the long run, which achieves the first and 
second objectives of this research. If cointegration exists, estimation of the levels 
relationship between fiscal performance and the interest rate corresponding to equation (3.9) 
can be written as: 
Lendingt = θ̂1
Lending
bt + θ̂2
Lending
Riskt + θ̂3
Lending
EXt + θ̂4
Lending
Policyt
+ θ̂5
Lending
πt
e + ut
Lending
 
(3.13) 
Similarly, the long-run effects of fiscal deficits on the exchange rate and on inflation 
expectation can be shown, respectively, as: 
EXt = θ̂1
EXbt + θ̂2
EXRiskt + θ̂3
EXLendingt + θ̂4
EXPolicyt + θ̂5
EXπt
e + ut
EX (3.14) 
πt
e = θ̂1
πbt + θ̂2
πRiskt + θ̂3
πLendingt + θ̂4
πEXt + θ̂5
πPolicyt + ut
π (3.15) 
The parameters θ̂1
Lending
,  θ̂1
EX, and θ̂1
π are the estimated long-run effects of bt on 
Lendingt, EXt, and πt
e, respectively. They are calculated based on α̂ and β̂ from equations 
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(3.9), (3.10), and (3.12). For example, from equation (3.9), the parameter,  θ̂1
Lending
 can be 
calculated as θ̂1
Lending
= −
β̂1
Lending
α̂Lending
. The parameters θ̂2
Lending
,  θ̂2
EX, and θ̂2
π show the 
estimated long-run effects of sovereign risk premium. Also, the estimated impacts of 
monetary policy on the lending rate, exchange rate and expected level of inflation are given 
by θ̂4
Lending
, θ̂4
EX, and  θ̂5
π, respectively. 
According to Section 3.4, the testable hypotheses can be listed, as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Testable hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 H0: θ̂1
Lending
= 0 
HA: θ̂1
Lending
< 0 
H0: θ̂2
Lending
= 0 
HA: θ̂2
Lending
> 0 
Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: θ̂1
EX = 0 
HA: θ̂1
EX < 0 
H0: θ̂2
EX = 0 
HA: θ̂2
EX > 0 
Hypothesis 5 
 
Hypothesis 6 
H0: θ̂1
π = 0 
HA: θ̂1
π < 0 
H0: θ̂2
π = 0 
HA: θ̂2
π > 0 
 
3.5.3 Step 3: Granger causality test for weak exogeneity 
The Granger representation theorem states that the existence of a cointegrating relationship 
among variables gives rise to Granger causality in at least one direction. The third step, 
therefore, is to apply a Granger causality test, in order to examine whether fiscal imbalance 
Granger-causes monetary variables, or whether there is reverse causality from monetary 
variables to fiscal imbalance. This helps identify whether the fiscal variable appears to be 
weakly exogenous. For example, if cointegration does not exist, the equation below is utilised 
to test for Granger causality, which runs from xt to yt: 
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∆yt = 𝑐0 + δt + ∑ ψ1,i∆yt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ ψ2,j∆xt−j
q−1
j=0
+ εt 
(3.16) 
The rejection of the null hypothesis H0: ψ2,0 = ψ2,1 = ⋯ = ψ2,(q−1) = 0 implies that xt 
Granger-causes yt. 
However, if cointegration exists in the system, the Granger causality test should be 
reinterpreted (Granger et al., 2000; Enders, 2010). In particular, the inclusion of an error-
correction term is necessary to capture the long-run relationship, apart from the short-run 
dynamics. As such, Granger causality tests based on the ECMs can be used as a test for weak 
exogeneity. Several papers, such as Awokuse (2007), Halicioglu (2009), Belloumi (2014), 
and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), have employed an ECM to investigate the presence of 
Granger causality between variables. The ECM representation for cointegration between xt 
and yt can be given as: 
∆yt = c0 + ∅ECt−1 + ∑ ψ1,i∆yt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ ψ2,j∆xt−j
q−1
j=0
+ εt (3.17) 
where the term, ECt−1, denotes the lagged error-correction term, and refers to the error term 
ût in equations (3.13) to (3.15) for the long-run relationships. 
Equation (3.17) is employed to test for Granger causality from xt to yt. The rejection of 
the null hypothesis, H0: ψ2,0 = ψ2,1 = ψ2,2 = ⋯ = ψ2,q−1 = 0, indicates that xt does 
Granger-cause yt in the short run. On the other hand, long-run Granger causality exists if and 
only if the error-correction term is statistically significant, suggesting that the null hypothesis 
H0: ∅ = 0 is rejected. In general, in a cointegrated system, xt does not Granger-cause yt if and 
only if yt does not respond to the deviation from long-run equilibrium, or in other words, the 
error-correction term in the regression of yt on xt is statistically insignificant. In this 
circumstance, it is possible to argue that yt might be weakly exogenous, and an econometric 
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model for yt can be estimated without taking xt into account. Since all variables in the ECM 
are I(0), the direct way to run the test is to utilise the standard F-test for joint significance. 
3.6 The ARDL models with the interactive dummy variable for the debt threshold 
As discussed in the literature review, the effects of fiscal deficits on transmission channels of 
monetary policy vary depending on the debt stock. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggest that 
an insight into the thresholds for external debt is crucial for emerging economies, since they 
often depend heavily on external funds. For this reason, we examine the hypothesis that 
monetary variables respond differently to fiscal shocks, once the level of external debt passes 
a certain threshold level. This also aims to address the research sub-question 2, which is, to 
what extent the impact of fiscal deficits on monetary variables relies on the country’s debt 
performance. 
For this, we add an interactive term between the dummy variable for the debt threshold 
and budget deficits, (Dt−1 × bt−1), as a fixed regressor for the ARDL models, specified for 
equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12), respectively: 
∆Lendingt  =  c0
Lending
+ δLendingt + μLending(Dt−1 × bt−1)
+ αLendingLendingt−1 + β1
Lending
bt−1 + β2
Lending
Riskt−1
+ β3
Lending
EXt−1 + β4
Lending
Policyt−1 + β5
Lending
πt−1
e
+ ∑ ψi
Lending
ΔLendingt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
Lending
Δbt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
Lending
ΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
Lending
ΔEXt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
Lending
ΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
Lending
Δπt−j
e
q−1
j=0
+ ut
Lending
 
(3.18) 
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∆EXt    =    c0
EX + δEXt + μEX(Dt−1 × bt−1) + α
EXEXt−1 + β1
EXbt−1 + β2
EXRiskt−1
+ β3
EXLendingt−1 + β4
EXPolicyt−1 + β5
EXπt−1
e + ∑ ψi
EXΔEXt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
EXΔbt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
EXΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
EXΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
EXΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
EXΔπt−j
e
q−1
j=0
+ ut
EX 
(3.19) 
 
∆πt
e       =    c0
π + δπt + μπ(Dt−1 × bt−1) + α
ππt−1
e + β1
πbt−1 + β2
πRiskt−1
+ β3
πLendingt−1 + β4
πEXt−1 + β5
πPolicyt−1 + ∑ ψi
πΔπt−i
e
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
π Δbt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
π ΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
π ΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
π ΔEXt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
π ΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ut
π 
(3.20) 
The term Dt takes the value of 1 if the external debt-to-GDP ratio is equal and above the 
threshold level, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient μ measures the threshold effects of the fiscal 
balance on monetary variables when the external debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a particular 
threshold.  
Subsequently, the estimates of a long-run relationship corresponding to the equations 
(3.18) to (3.20) can be written as follows: 
Lendingt = θ̂1
Lending
bt + ϕ̂
Lending(Dt × bt) +  θ̂2
Lending
Riskt + θ̂3
Lending
EXt
+ θ̂4
Lending
Policyt + θ̂5
Lending
πt
e + ût
Lending
 
(3.21) 
EXt = θ̂1
EXbt + ϕ̂
EX(Dt × bt) + θ̂2
EXRiskt + θ̂3
EXLendingt + θ̂4
EXPolicyt + θ̂5
EXπt
e
+ ût
EX 
(3.22) 
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πt
e = θ̂1
πbt + ϕ̂
π(Dt × bt) + θ̂2
πRiskt + θ̂3
πLendingt + θ̂4
πEXt + θ̂5
πPolicyt + ût
π (3.23) 
The parameter, θ̂1, is interpreted as the estimated long-run impact of fiscal deficits on 
monetary variables for a level of external debt below the threshold, while θ̂1 + ϕ̂ shows the 
fiscal effect for levels of external debt equal to or above the threshold. We expect that the 
coefficient on the interactive term, ϕ̂, to be negative and statistically significant, which 
reflects higher vulnerability to negative fiscal shocks once the level of external debt 
accumulates to unsustainable levels. 
3.7 The NARDL approach to modelling the asymmetric effects of fiscal policy on the 
transmission channels of monetary policy 
3.7.1 An overview of NARDL 
We further employ the NARDL model developed by Shin et al. (2014) to examine whether 
the transmission channels of monetary policy react differently to negative and positive 
changes to the fiscal balance in the short run, as well as the long run. In comparison to the 
linear ARDL approach, the NARDL approach uses the decomposition of the fiscal variable 
bt into its negative (bt
−) and positive (bt
+) partial sums, which are defined in the following 
way: 
bt
− = ∑ ∆bj
−
t
j=1
= ∑ min (∆bj, 0)
t
j=1
 (3.24) 
And: 
bt
+ = ∑ ∆bj
+
t
j=1
= ∑ max (∆bj, 0)
t
j=1
 (3.25) 
Therefore, equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12) will be re-written in the following non-linear 
forms: 
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∆Lendingt  =  c0
Lending
+ δLendingt + αLendingLendingt−1 + β1
Lending
bt−1
−
+  β2
Lending
bt−1
+ + β3
Lending
Riskt−1 + β4
Lending
EXt−1
+ β5
Lending
Policyt−1 + β6
Lending
πt−1
e + ∑ ψi
Lending
ΔLendingt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
Lending
∆bt−j
−
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
Lending
∆bt−j
+
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
Lending
ΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
Lending
ΔEXt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
Lending
ΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ6j
Lending
Δπt−j
e
q−1
j=0
+ ut
Lending
 
(3.26) 
 
 
  
The bounds test for the null hypothesis of an asymmetric cointegrating relationship 
(H0: α
Lending = β1
Lending
= β2
Lending
= β3
Lending
= β4
Lending
= β5
Lending
= β6
Lending
= 0) is 
denoted by F (Lendingt| bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e). 
The regression equation for EXt is given as: 
 ∆EXt    =    c0
EX + δEXt + αEXEXt−1 + β1
EXbt−1
− + β2
EXbt−1
+ + β3
EXRiskt−1
+ β4
EXLendingt−1 + β5
EXPolicyt−1 + β6
EXπt−1
e + ∑ ψi
EXΔEXt−i
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
EX∆bt−j
−
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
EX∆bt−j
+
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
EXΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
EXΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
EXΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ6j
EXΔπt−j
e
q−1
j=0
+ ut
EX 
(3.27)) 
The bounds test for null hypothesis of an asymmetric cointegrating relationship   
(H0: α
EX = β1
EX = β2
EX = β3
EX = β4
EX = β5
EX = β6
EX = 0) is denoted by 
F(EXt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e). 
The regression equation for πt
e is given as: 
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∆πt
e       =    c0
π + δπt + αππt−1
e + β1
πbt−1
− + β2
πbt−1
+ + β3
πRiskt−1
+ β4
πLendingt−1 + β5
πEXt−1 + β6
πPolicyt−1 + ∑ ψi
πΔπt−i
e
p−1
i=1
+ ∑ τ1j
π ∆bt−j
−
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ2j
π ∆bt−j
+
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ3j
π ΔRiskt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ4j
π ΔLendingt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ5j
π ΔEXt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ∑ τ6j
π ΔPolicyt−j
q−1
j=0
+ ut
π 
(3.28) 
 
The bounds test for null hypothesis of an asymmetric cointegrating relationship         
(H0: α
π = β1
π = β2
π = β3
π = β4
π = β5
π = β6
π = 0) is denoted by 
F(πt
e|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt). 
3.7.2 Asymmetric long-run estimation  
If the F-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of the bounds test, estimation of the 
asymmetric long-run effects of fiscal balance on the interest rate, exchange rate and inflation 
expectations can be conducted as follows: 
Lendingt = θ̂1
Lending
bt
− + θ̂2
Lending
bt
+ + θ̂3
Lending
Riskt + θ̂4
Lending
EXt
+ θ̂5
Lending
Policyt + θ̂6
Lending
πt
e + ût
Lending
 
(3.29) 
EXt = θ̂1
EXbt
− + θ̂2
EXbt
+ + θ̂3
EXRiskt + θ̂4
EXLendingt + θ̂5
EXPolicyt + θ̂6
EXπt
e + ût
EX (3.30) 
πt
e = θ̂1
πbt
− + θ̂2
πbt
+ + θ̂2
πRiskt + θ̂3
πLendingt + θ̂4
πEXt + θ̂5
πPolicyt + ût
π (3.31) 
The parameters θ̂1
Lending
,  θ̂1
EX, and θ̂1
π are the estimated long-run effects of bt
− on Lendingt, 
EXt, and πt
e, respectively. Similarly, θ̂2
Lending
,  θ̂2
EX, and θ̂2
π are the estimated long-run effects 
of bt
+ on those respective monetary variables. 
Apart from the significance tests for the long-run estimators, the restriction of long-run 
symmetry can be tested using a standard Wald test for the null hypothesis that θ̂1 = θ̂2 in 
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equations (3.29) to (3.31). The rejection of the null implies the existence of long-run 
asymmetry. 
3.7.3. Short-run asymmetric estimations 
When the asymmetries in the short-run dynamics are analysed, the standard ECMs shown in 
equation (3.17) are extended in the following way: 
∆Lendingt = c0
Lending
+ ∅LendingECt−1
Lending
+ ∑ λi
Lending
∆Lendingt−i
p−1
i=1
+  ∑ ψ1j
Lending
q−1
j=0
∆bt−j
− + ∑ ψ2j
Lending
q−1
j=0
∆bt−j
+ + ∑ ψ3j
Risk
q−1
j=0
∆Riskt−j
+ ∑ ψ4j
Lending
q−1
j=0
∆EXt−j + ∑ ψ5j
Lending
q−1
j=0
∆Policyt−j
+ ∑ ψ6j
Lending
q−1
j=0
Δπt−j
e + εt
Lending
 
(3.32) 
∆EXt = c0
EX + ∅EXECt−1
EX + ∑ λi
EX∆EXt−i
p−1
i=1
+  ∑ ψ1j
EX
q−1
j=0
∆bt−j
− + ∑ ψ2j
EX
q−1
j=0
∆bt−j
+
+ ∑ ψ3j
EX
q−1
j=0
∆Riskt−j + ∑ ψ4j
EX
q−1
j=0
∆Lendingt−j + ∑ ψ5j
EX
q−1
j=0
∆Policyt−j
+ ∑ ψ6j
EX
q−1
j=0
Δπt−j
e + εt
EX 
(3.33) 
  
∆πt
e = c0
π + ∅πECt−1
π + ∑ λi
ππt−i
e
p−1
i=1
+  ∑ ψ1j
π
q−1
j=0
∆bt−j
− + ∑ ψ2j
π
q−1
j=0
∆bt−j
+
+ ∑ ψ3j
π
q−1
j=0
∆Riskt−j + ∑ ψ4j
π
q−1
j=0
∆Lendingt−j + ∑ ψ5j
π
q−1
j=0
∆EXt−j
+ ∑ ψ6j
π
q−1
j=0
ΔPolicyt−j + εt
π 
(3.34) 
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The parameters ψ1j and ψ2j capture the short-run adjustment of monetary variables to negative 
and positive shocks emanating from the fiscal balance. Like the linear models, the lagged error-
correction terms, ECt−1, in the non-linear regressions are expected to be significantly negative, 
indicating the presence of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. A Wald test can be used to 
test the null hypothesis of the short-run additive symmetry H0 : ∑ ψ1j
q−1
j=0 = ∑ ψ2j
q−1
j=0 . The 
models in equations (3.32) to (3.34) reduce to the traditional ECMs, shown as equation (3.17), 
if none of the null hypotheses for short-run and long-run symmetry are rejected.  
3.8 Data descriptions 
3.8.1 Data collection 
The data used in this study consist of a sample of quarterly observations for three emerging 
economies, these being, Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey. Data on the variables are collected 
from Datastream, except for the exchange rate and the lending rate, which are gathered from 
Bloomberg and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) dataset, respectively. Due to the 
limitations in the data, the sample size varies among countries, generally spanning from the 1990s 
to 2016. This period was characterised by sharp fluctuations in government debt and high 
inflation rates in all three countries, especially for Brazil and Turkey. Indeed, their external debt-
to-GDP ratios in the early 2000s were far above the debt threshold of 40-45 per cent for emerging 
markets listed in a number of relevant studies (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Pattillo et al., 
2002; Reinhart et al., 2003; Baldacci et al., 2011), before dropping in the second half of the 
2000s. Furthermore, the Global Financial Crisis and European debt crisis highlight the fact that 
investors have become more sensitive to sovereign default risk. As such, it is expected that the 
sovereign risk premium has increasingly played an important role in transmitting the effects of 
fiscal policy to economic activity.  
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3.8.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 reports some descriptive statistics, while Figures 3.1 to 3.3 illustrate the variables 
over time. In general, all three countries have suffered from chronic budget deficits, since the 
mean values of the ratio of the budget balance to GDP are negative. The fiscal imbalance in 
the case of Brazil and Turkey tends to be more serious than that for the Philippines, since the 
former countries have higher deficit ratios on average. In particular, Brazil’s fiscal 
performance has been worsening since 2013, reaching -13.980 per cent of GDP in the third 
quarter of 2015.  
For the sovereign risk premium, the standard deviation is reasonably large, implying that 
the probability of sovereign risk in all economies is quite volatile. Brazil and Turkey’s default 
risks seem to have the same trend: both surged up in the 1990s and then plummeted since 
2003, while that of the Philippines gradually declined over that period. 
The policy rate and lending rate in Brazil and the Philippines share the same trend, that 
being that they fluctuate upward during the 1990s, and gradually decrease thereafter. The 
high average of the policy rate in Turkey is attributable to the recent period of hyperinflation, 
as the Central Bank of Turkey raised the policy rate up to 54.730 per cent. Regarding the 
lending rate, borrowing costs in Brazil are much higher than those in the other two countries, 
due to a prolonged period of high interest rates set by its central bank.  
A depreciation of the domestic currency is observed for Turkey and the Philippines, 
while Brazil’s exchange rate shows a volatile trend. Figure 3.2 illustrates that there is a sharp 
depreciation in the Philippines peso because of the Asian currency crisis of 1997, explaining 
why its exchange rate has a much higher standard deviation than the other two countries. The 
exchange rate regime shift from a fixed rate to a floating rate system after the crisis also leads 
to a sharp depreciation of the Philippines currency. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable  Brazil (1997Q1–2016Q1) Turkey (2002Q1–2016Q1) The Philippines (1991Q1–2016Q1) 
 Obs Mean Sd Min Max Obs Mean Sd Min Max Obs Mean Sd Min Max 
bt 
 77 -4.096 2.736 -13.980 0.110 57 -3.396 4.031 -18.190 3.140 101 -1.921 2.190 -6.620 2.360 
Riskt 
 
77 4.972 3.726 1.480 19.060 57 3.361 1.731 1.720 9.490 101 3.854 2.259 1.070 11.860 
Lendingt 
 
77 53.122 16.358 26.230 97.700 57 19.297 11.314 8.300 52.430 101 11.204 4.670 5.430 26.250 
EXt 
 
77 2.183 0.667 1.059 3.964 57 1.696 0.443 1.170   3.025 101 41.535 10.067 24.420 56.360 
Policyt 
 
77 14.567 6.498 1.580 42.000 57 14.683 12.637 1.500   54.730 101 7.667 3.406 3.500   16.500 
πt
e 
 
77 6.287 1.881 2.300 12.500 57 11.935 9.692   6.300 51.000 101 6.516 3.005 1.700 16.700 
Notes: The term “Obs” represents the number of observations, while “Sd” stands for the standard deviation. Min and Max indicate the smallest and largest 
observation, respectively. The variables bt, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, and πt
e are measured in percentages, while EXt is measured in terms of the domestic 
currency per US dollar. 
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Figure 3.1: Time series plots for Brazil 
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Figure 3.2: Time series plots for the Philippines 
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Figure 3.3: Time series plots for Turkey 
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These countries have all experienced a period of double-digit inflation. Notably, of the 
three economies, Turkey has the highest expected inflation rate on average (11.935 per cent), 
with a maximum value of 51 per cent. This indicates that inflation expectations are highly 
persistent and are a burgeoning challenge for this economy.  
Table 3.3: Correlation matrix of the variables 
Brazil 
Variables bt  Riskt Lendingt  EXt  Policyt πt
e 
bt  1.000      
Riskt 
-0.253** 1.000     
Lendingt  
-0.277** 0.665*** 1.000    
EXt  
-0.328*** 0.282 ** -0.215* 1.000   
Policyt 
-0.212* 0.671*** 0.585*** 0.237** 1.000  
πt
e -0.294*** 0.364*** 0.275** 0.447*** 0.175 1.000 
The Philippines 
Variables bt  Riskt Lendingt  EXt  Policyt πt
e 
bt  
1.000      
Riskt 
-0.117 1.000     
Lendingt  
0.206** 0.746*** 1.000    
EXt  
-0.499*** -0.317*** -0.641*** 1.000   
Policyt 
0.134 0.461*** 0.672*** -0.468*** 1.000  
πt
e 0.202** 0.775*** 0.886*** -0.612*** 0.524*** 1.000 
Turkey 
Variables bt  Riskt Lendingt  EXt  Policyt πt
e 
bt  1.000      
Riskt 
-0.710*** 1.000     
Lendingt  
-0.729*** 0.870*** 1.000    
EXt  
0.201 -0.115 -0.302** 1.000   
Policyt 
-0.696*** 0.820*** 0.978*** -0.346*** 1.000  
πt
e -0.745*** 0.842*** 0.913*** -0.168 0.918*** 1.000 
Notes: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent 
levels, respectively. The unadjusted significance level corresponding to the critical t-statistic is obtained using 
the method developed by Pearson (1986) and Pearson and Filon (1988). 
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Table 3.3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients among the variables for the three 
economies. In general, there is significant correlation between the budget deficits, the risk 
premium, and monetary variables, justifying the existence of fiscal effects on the conduct of 
monetary policy. Additionally, there is a strong association between the interest rate and 
exchange rate, the interest rate and inflation expectations, and the exchange rate and inflation 
expectations. This might reflect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Notably, 
the policy rate and budget deficits with respect to Brazil and the Philippines are 
insignificantly correlated at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that fiscal policy may not be 
responsive to monetary policy, and vice versa. 
3.9 Preliminary tests 
3.9.1 Traditional unit root tests 
The ARDL model can be applied irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1), but 
not I(2) (Pesaran et al., 2001). As such, it is necessary to conduct unit root tests prior to 
estimating the model, to ensure that all variables are either I(0) or I(1). We attempt to utilise 
different unit root tests in order to obtain a comprehensive view about the order of 
integration, and the sensitivity of results regarding variable properties.  
First, we use the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test for the presence of a unit root. 
The ADF test can be represented as: 
Δyt = a0 + a1t + γyt−1 + +εt (3.35) 
where Δyt = yt − yt−1, t refers to the time trend, a0 is the intercept term, a1 and γ are 
parameters of the model, and εt is the residual term. The null hypothesis for the ADF test is 
that the series contains a unit root, or γ = 0. The rejection of the null hypothesis means that 
yt is integrated of order zero, or is an I(0) process in levels. 
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With the consideration of variable properties, we conduct the Phillips–Perron (PP) unit 
root test, which can correct for any serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of the error 
terms by directly modifying the test statistics for the coefficient γ. An added advantage of 
the PP test over the ADF test is that it is nonparametric in terms of nuisance parameters, 
which allows a wider variety of time series models (Phillips and Perron, 1988).  
Furthermore, we employ the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test, known as the KPSS test, which 
is a commonly used stationarity test. This test differs from the other unit root tests discussed, 
in that the null hypothesis states that the variable is stationary. 
Since the presence of a constant and linear time trend determines the asymptotic 
distribution of the unit root test statistics, it is essential to deal with deterministic terms prior 
to running the regression (Campbell and Perron, 1991). The data-generating process might 
contain some deterministic regressors (i.e., an intercept, a time trend, or both), and so the 
issue is whether the variable is trend stationary, or contains a unit root with drift. Including 
an irrelevant deterministic term in a unit root test might cause loss of power. However, 
omitting a regressor that actually exists in the data-generating process leads to a 
misspecification error, resulting in a misleading value for the t-statistic. As such, without any 
information on the form of the data-generating process, the test procedure initially includes 
only a constant term, and then a constant term and a time trend. 
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 report the results of the unit root tests, showing that the ADF and PP 
unit root tests demonstrate comparable results, whereas the KPSS stationary test returns 
quite different outcomes from them. Despite the inconsistent results across the different 
approaches, there is conclusive evidence that the variables are a mix of I(1) and I(0) in 
levels, but not I(2). The application of the ARDL approach, therefore, is feasible.   
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Table 3.4: Brazil – results of testing for unit roots 
Variable Levels PP KPSS 
 
Constant  
term  
Constant and 
trend terms 
Constant 
term 
Constant and  
trend terms 
Constant 
term 
Constant and  
trend terms 
A. Levels 
bt  -1.414 (4) -0.899 (4) -5.053*** -5.020*** 0.185 0.188** 
Riskt -1.899 (2) -2.921 (2) -2.078 -2.786 0.699** 0.121* 
Lendingt  -1.971 (1) -3.300 (1) -1.838 -2.193 0.990*** 0.102 
EXt  -1.320 (0) -1.472 (0) -1.423 -1.582 0.231 0.147** 
Policyt -3.180** (3) -4.761*** (1) -3.594*** -4.253*** 0.520** 0.104 
πt
e -3.158** (0) -3.053** (0) -3.158** -3.053 0.213 0.132* 
B. First differences 
∆bt  -5.123*** (2) -12.097*** (2) -19.843*** -20.633*** 0.1222 0.105 
∆Riskt -7.137*** (1) -7.090*** (1) -7.251*** -7.169*** 0.101 0.101 
∆Lendingt  -6.112*** (0) -8.227*** (1) -5.831*** -5.968*** 0.121 0.054 
∆EXt  -7.494*** (0) -7.437*** (0) -7.404*** -7.340*** 0.164 0.163 
∆Policyt -5.755*** (2) -5.807*** (2) -9.798*** -9.797*** 0.145 0.101 
∆πt
e -7.097*** (1) -7.098*** (1) -8.038*** -8.029*** 0.103 0.044 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the lag length chosen by the HQC for the corresponding ADF tests with 
the maximum lag length of 4 chosen. The asterisks ***, **, * for the ADF and PP tests indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels, respectively, while those 
for the KPSS test indicate that the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: The Philippines – results of testing for unit roots 
 
Variable ADF PP KPSS 
 
Constant 
term  
Constant and 
trend terms 
Constant  
term 
Constant and  
trend terms 
Constant 
 term 
Constant and  
trend terms 
A. Levels 
bt  -1.975 (4) -1.973 (4) -7.783*** -7.835*** 0.205 0.153** 
Riskt -3.509*** (3) -4.703*** (3) -2.398 -3.155* 0.899*** 0.086 
Lendingt  -2.540 (2) -3.864** (2) -3.217** -4.759*** 1.154*** 0.118 
EXt  -1.344 (0) -1.017 (0) -1.422 -1.223 0.674** 0.257*** 
Policyt -0.966 (3) -3.118 (2) -2.908** -6.433*** 1.020*** 0.147** 
πt
e -3.337** (0) -4.623*** (1) -3.302** -4.228*** 1.057*** 0.154** 
B. First differences 
∆bt  -6.510*** (3) -6.474*** (3) -31.889*** -31.514*** 0.061 0.054 
∆Riskt -6.556*** (3) -6.618*** (3) -9.727*** -9.743*** 0.133 0.0875 
∆Lendingt  -9.024*** (1) -9.123*** (1) -10.422*** -10.789*** 0.228 0.072 
∆EXt  -8.911*** (0) -8.937*** (0) -8.994*** -9.004*** 0.187 0.098 
∆Policyt -9.385*** (2) -9.418*** (2) -18.039*** -19.168*** 0.228 0.144 
∆πt
e -9.932*** (0) -9.939*** (0) -10.106*** -10.281*** 0.263 0.164 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the lag length chosen by the HQC for the corresponding ADF tests with 
the maximum lag length of 4 chosen. The asterisks ***, **, * for the ADF and PP tests indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels, respectively, while those 
for the KPSS test indicate that the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Turkey – results of testing for unit roots 
 Variable ADF PP KPSS 
 
Constant  
term  
Constant and 
trend terms 
Constant 
 term 
Constant and  
trend terms 
Constant 
term 
Constant and  
trend terms 
A. Levels 
bt  -2.670* (4) -2.329 (4) -5.414*** -6.015*** 0.533** 0.146** 
Riskt -2.483 (1) -2.427 (1) -2.304 -2.291 0.468** 0.145* 
Lendingt  -3.553*** (0) -2.178 (1) -5.849*** -2.592 0.773*** 0.204** 
EXt  0.533 (0) 0.931 (0) 0.515 -0.951 0.758*** 0.247*** 
Policyt -3.061** (1) -2.281 (1) -4.970*** -3.190* 0.802*** 0.189** 
πt
e -6.962*** (0) -5.331*** (0) -11.640*** -8.636*** 0.555** 0.196** 
B. First differences 
∆bt  -5.131*** (3) -5.304*** (3) -19.318*** -21.159*** 0.295 0.150** 
∆Riskt -6.931*** (0) -6.957*** (0) -6.916*** -6.955*** 0.109 0.041 
∆Lendingt  -6.281*** (0) -6.691*** (0) -6.231*** -7.213*** 0.550** 0.130 
∆EXt  -7.117*** (0) -7.620*** (0) -7.117*** -9.132*** 0.305 0.060 
∆Policyt -4.882*** (0) -5.339*** (0) -4.870*** -5.305*** 0.607** 0.190 
∆πt
e -7.236** (0) -1.183* (0) -7.222*** -8.221*** 0.605** 0.220 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the lag length chosen by the HQC for the corresponding ADF tests with 
the maximum lag length of 4 chosen. The asterisks ***, **, * for the ADF and PP tests indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels, respectively, while those 
for the KPSS test indicate that the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 3.9.2 Unit root tests with break 
 Given the inability of traditional unit root tests to capture the impact of structural breaks, in 
conjunction with the possible breaks suggested by the time series plots in Figures 3.1 to 3.3, 
we conduct the endogenous two-break unit root test of Lee and Strazicich (2003) (hereafter 
LS). A major advantage of the LS test over other endogenous break tests, such as those by 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), is that the LS test distinctly 
assumes the existence of structural breaks under both the null and alternative hypothesis. 
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Therefore, the significant rejection of the null hypothesis unambiguously implies that a 
variable is trend stationary with breaks (Lee and Strazicich, 2003). Results for the LS unit 
root test are presented in Tables 3.7 to 3.9. In general, the test reveals quite similar findings to 
the ADF and PP tests, indicating that all variables are either I(0) or I(1), but not I(2). The LS 
test also identifies a number of significant structural breaks. 
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Table 3.7: The results of testing for structural breaks for Brazil 
Variable 
 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e 
A C A C A C A C A C A C 
A. Levels 
 
TB 2004Q4 2003Q2 2000Q1 2003Q2 2000Q1 2001Q3 2005Q1 2004Q2 2000Q1 2000Q1 2003Q2 2003Q1 
2013Q2 2013Q3 2003Q3 2005Q2 2003Q3 2012Q2 2009Q1 2011Q4 2002Q3 2008Q2 2005Q3 2005Q3 
St−1 -2.868 -4.997* -2.587 -6.083*** -4.086** -5.039* -1.422 -4.482 -3.901** -6.044*** -4.179** -5.418** 
D1t 0.421 -2.782*** 0.837 1.329 1.965** -0.616 -1.536 -0.300 3.994*** 5.100*** 0.112 1.707* 
D2t -0.772 3.013*** -0.868 -3.882*** -0.878 -0.510 -1.802* -0.425 3.430*** 1.579 -0.844 -0.141 
DT1t - 4.130*** - 0.333 - 0.845 - -4.147*** - -1.644 - 1.148 
DT2t - -5.097*** - -0.791 - -0.697 - 3.415*** - -4.539*** - 1.410 
k 4 4 1 1 4 4 0 1 4 4 1 3 
B. First Differences 
TB 2008Q3 2009Q2 2001Q1 2002Q4 2001Q1 2000Q4 2008Q3 2000Q3 2000Q2 2000Q2 2000Q1 2002Q1 
2013Q2 2013Q3 2002Q4 2004Q4 2003Q1 2012Q3 2011Q2 2003Q1 2003Q1 2006Q1 2002Q4 2004Q1 
St−1 -1.898 -7.139*** -7.675*** -7.880*** -4.287** -4.446** -7.050*** -8.122*** -6.416*** -7.446*** -8.274*** -8.209*** 
D1t -2.022** -2.926*** 0.122 -3.679*** 2.043** -0.465 2.096** -0.452 -3.741*** -4.648*** -1.396 -0.489 
D2t -1.270 5.491*** -4.506*** 0.709 -0.667 -0.538 2.028** -3.177*** -0.532 0.553 0.758 1.182 
DT1t - 5.432*** - 1.271 - 1.284 - 1.187 - -2.391** - 1.068 
DT2t - -7.536*** - -3.577*** - -0.577 - 3.055*** - -1.438 - -1.544 
k 3 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 4 0 0 
Notes: Model A refers to a change in intercept, while model C refers to a change in both the intercept and a trend in the slope. TB denotes the estimated breakpoint. St−1 
indicates the parameter for the first lag, yt−1, while D1t, D2t, DT1t, and DT2t are the dummy variables for shifts in level and trend at the 2 breakpoints, respectively. The term, 
k, shows the lag length chosen by the general-to-specific approach, with a maximum lag length set at 4. Numbers in the Table are the LM test statistic for testing the 
significance of the corresponding parameters. The asymptotic critical values for the LM tests are -4.545, -3.842, and -3.504 for model A, and -5.823, -5.286, and -4.989 for 
model C, at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 
1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
 95 
 
Table 3.8: The results of testing for structural breaks for the Philippines 
Variable 
 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e 
A C A C A C A C A C A C 
A. Levels 
TB 2005Q1 1998Q2 2000Q1 1998Q1 1994Q3 1994Q3 1999Q2 1997Q1 1994Q4 1999Q2 2004Q4 1994Q2 
2011Q4 2004Q2 2002Q2 2005Q4 1998Q1 1998Q4 2007Q3 2005Q4 2000Q4 2001Q3 2008Q2 2004Q4 
St−1 -3.528* -4.346 -4.058** -7.151*** -2.328 -6.432*** -2.174 -5.153* -2.312 -8.148*** -2.768 -6.325*** 
D1t 2.042** 1.896* 1.827* -1.624 -1.799* -2.774*** 2.591*** -2.349** 2.072** -0.052 1.606 -0.195 
D2t 1.443 -1.524 1.067 -0.656 -2.893*** 0.741 -1.984** 0.259 -2.343** -0.627 2.701*** 1.003 
DT1t - -3.308*** - 6.305*** - 5.882*** - 5.194*** - -4.617*** - 4.129*** 
DT2t - 4.146*** - -3.906*** - -4.841*** - -5.657*** - -2.824*** - 3.094*** 
k 4 4 3 3 4 1 1 3 2 1 0 3 
B. First Differences 
TB 1997Q2 1995Q1 2000Q3 1995Q1 1995Q1 1998Q2 2004Q4 1997Q1 1999Q1 1997Q1 1997Q4 1994Q3 
2006Q4 2013Q4 2007Q2 2003Q2 2003Q2 2001Q2 2007Q2 2007Q4 2005Q3 1999Q3 2005Q3 2007Q4 
St−1 -3.848** -13.693*** -4.605*** -9.132*** -3.044 -9.651*** -9.328*** -10.056*** -10.070*** -11.250*** -10.313*** -10.528*** 
D1t 0.067 0.940 1.577 -2.850*** 2.258** 2.249** -1.169 -1.337 -3.046*** 8.693*** 1.678* -1.091 
D2t -1.282 -1.596 0.997 -0.100 -1.670* -0.014 -0.266 2.123** 0.627 -1.711* -0.783 1.966** 
DT1t - -7.568*** - 5.270*** - -7.509*** - 4.134*** - -9.102*** - 0.530 
DT2t - 3.099*** - -1.379 - -2.570*** - -4.158*** - 9.233*** - -5.008*** 
k 3 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 
Notes: Model A refers to a change in intercept, while model C refers to a change in both the intercept and a trend in the slope. TB denotes the estimated breakpoint. St−1 
indicates the parameter for the first lag, yt−1, while D1t, D2t, DT1t, and DT2t are the dummy variables for shifts in level and trend at the 2 breakpoints, respectively. The term, 
k, shows the lag length chosen by the general-to-specific approach, with a maximum lag length set at 4. Numbers in the Table are the LM test statistic for testing the 
significance of the corresponding parameters. The asymptotic critical values for the LM tests are -4.545, -3.842, and -3.504 for model A, and -5.823, -5.286, and -4.989 for 
model C, at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 
1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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Table 3.9: The results of testing for structural breaks for Turkey 
Variable 
 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e 
A C A C A C A C A C A C 
A. Levels 
TB 2009Q1 2006Q1 2008Q3 2008Q1 2004Q2 2005Q4 2006Q3 2007Q1 2006Q3 2005Q4 2009Q1 2004Q2 
2010Q3 2010Q1 2013Q2 2009Q2 2008Q3 2009Q3 2014Q4 2014Q2 2011Q2 2009Q3 2010Q4 2006Q2 
St−1 -1.276 -7.138*** -4.386** -5.417** -2.389 -7.937*** -2.935 -5.976*** -1.983 -4.604 -0.051 -6.860*** 
D1t 1.266 2.678*** 5.936*** -1.314 -1.553 -3.489*** -0.980 0.275 -0.858 -1.620 -1.204 1.138 
D2t -1.941* 1.810* 1.511 -0.825 1.691* 1.883* 2.542** -0.337 1.655 0.036 -1.156 4.338*** 
DT1t - -6.586*** - 3.964*** - 9.117*** - -2.551** - 5.986*** - 4.824*** 
DT2t - 2.003** - -2.860*** - -6.510*** - 5.024*** - -2.897*** - 0.891 
k 4 2 3 3 1 2 0 3 4 1 4 0 
B. First Differences 
TB 2009Q3 2009Q3 2007Q4 2008Q3 2005Q2 2005Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2005Q1 2006Q2 2005Q1 2005Q4 
2013Q4 2011Q1 2009Q1 2011Q1 2008Q1 2009Q3 2011Q2 2014Q3 2008Q4 2011Q1 2006Q2 2007Q1 
St−1 -3.063 -9.222*** -6.222*** -7.587*** -6.534*** -7.867*** -5.560*** -7.880*** -4.541** -7.670*** -1.991 -9.236*** 
D1t 1.772* -7.997*** 0.879 7.581*** 0.483 -2.027** 1.743* -0.135 0.731 2.670*** 1.949* -3.357*** 
D2t 1.238 4.740*** -3.056*** -1.908* -0.658 2.142** 1.943* -1.825* -3.040*** -0.620 3.187*** 5.500*** 
DT1t - 9.265*** - -6.572*** - 3.940*** - 4.020*** - -5.339*** - 0.825 
DT2t - -8.604*** - 6.815*** - -4.719*** - 3.862*** - 5.868*** - -4.978*** 
k 3 3 0 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 3 2 
Notes: Model A refers to a change in intercept, while model C refers to a change in both the intercept and a trend in the slope. TB denotes the estimated breakpoint. St−1 
indicates the parameter for the first lag, yt−1, while D1t, D2t, DT1t, and DT2t are the dummy variables for shifts in level and trend at the 2 breakpoints, respectively. The term, 
k, shows the lag length chosen by the general-to-specific approach, with a maximum lag length set at 4. Numbers in the Table are the LM test statistic for testing the 
significance of the corresponding parameters. The asymptotic critical values for the LM tests are -4.545, -3.842, and -3.504 for model A, and -5.823, -5.286, and -4.989 for 
model C, at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 
1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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3.10 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter presents the ARDL models undertaken to investigate the 
relationships between fiscal policy and the transmission channels of monetary policy. 
Initially, we conduct a three-step procedure based on the linear ARDL model. The first step 
aims to identify the relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy using the bounds 
test for cointegration between the fiscal balance and monetary variables. Consequently, the 
specified ARDL model will estimate the long-run impacts of the fiscal imbalance on the 
transmission channels of monetary policy. The Granger causality test, used to specify the 
direction of the relationship, and detect weak exogenous variables, is conducted in the last 
step.  
To examine whether the effect of fiscal policy on monetary variables depends on debt 
performance, we add the interactive debt threshold dummy to the original ARDL models. 
The sign and significance of the coefficient on the interactive term indicates whether 
monetary variables respond to fiscal shocks, emanating from the level of indebtedness. As 
another measure to test the existence of non-linearity, we apply the NARDL approach to 
examine whether monetary variables react differently to the positive and negative changes in 
the value of the government budget. 
This chapter also reports some descriptive statistics of the dataset used, and presents the 
results for the unit root tests. We conduct the unit root tests without a structural break, 
including the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests, and those with structural breaks, such as the LS test. 
Those tests all yield the same outcome, suggesting that all individual time series are either 
I(0) or I(1), but not I(2). It is therefore possible to employ the ARDL approach to investigate 
the fiscal effects on monetary variables.  
 98 
 
CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main findings of this study by estimating the linear ARDL and 
NARDL models specified in the previous chapter. We present the empirical results for the 
linear ARDL models in Section 4.2, following the three-step estimation procedure: (i) the 
bounds tests for cointegration, (ii) the long-run estimations with tests that analyse the 
research hypotheses, and (iii) the short-run dynamics along with Granger causality tests. The 
empirical results of the NARDL models used to assess the asymmetric effects of fiscal policy 
on the transmission channels of monetary policy are reported in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 
reports the empirical results for the ARDL models with the interactive dummy variable for 
the debt threshold. Section 4.5 reports the diagnostic tests and the approaches used to check 
the robustness of the results, while Section 4.6 provides some concluding remarks.  
4.2 Empirical results for linear ARDL models 
4.2.1 The selection of final ARDL specification  
First, it is important to use the correct lag order in specifying the ARDL models. If the lag 
length is too small, the residuals obtained from a regression will not be white noise, and 
consequently, the estimated standard errors will be biased. As a result, inferences made 
through hypothesis testing could be misleading. On the other hand, if the lag length is too 
large relative to the sample size, it reduces the power of the test to reject the null hypothesis. 
Information criteria are widely used methods to obtain the optimal lag length. This method 
trades off a fall in residual standard errors as more lags are added, with an increase in the 
complexity of the model. In addition, it does not require the error term to be normally 
distributed. Multivariate versions of the information criteria have been employed in empirical 
analyses, including the Aikake information criterion (AIC), Schwarz–Bayes information 
criterion (SBC), and Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQC). However, studies on lag 
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length selection offer different recommendations in choosing the best lag length. The AIC 
tends to be more accurate with monthly data (Ivanov and Kilian, 2005), and a better choice 
for small sample sizes of fewer than 120 observations (Liew, 2004). However, Lütkepohl 
(2005) criticises the use of the AIC as it overestimates the true lag order with positive 
probability. The HQC and SBC outperform the AIC in selecting the final ARDL model for 
reasonable sample sizes (Panopoulou and Pittis, 2004), and the HQC and SBC are more 
efficient in simulation results (Hatemi-J, 2003). This research, therefore, will use the HQC to 
select the lag order. 
Second, since differences in the maximum lag length might provide different empirical 
results, this research compares models using different maximum lag orders. Model 
specification is selected by the combination of the HQC and the results of diagnostic tests, 
following the several empirical studies applying the ARDL as the cointegration approach 
(Halicioglu, 2009; Ozturk and Acaravci, 2013). Diagnostic tests are necessarily conducted, 
since the violation of linear regression assumptions might affect the validity of the bounds 
testing procedure. The maximum lag length ranges from 4 to 6 only, because the limited 
number of observations does not allow for a longer lag length.15 To ascertain the reliability of 
the ARDL models, the model that best satisfies the linear regression assumptions will be 
selected. We employ four tests to finalise the specified ARDL model. These are: (i) the 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation; (ii) the 
Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity; (iii) the Jarque–
Bera test for the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors; and (iv) Ramsey’s Regression 
Specification Error Test (RESET) for the null hypothesis of a zero-mean vector of error terms 
regarding the properties of the unbiased and consistent least-squares estimators. 
                                                          
15 The maximum lag length should be specified based on the frequency of the data (i.e. a multiple of 4 in 
quarterly data). However, with a limited number of observations for the three countries in the sample, the 
inclusion of many lagged variables will use a lot of degrees of freedom. As such, the maximum lag length will 
be chosen in the range of 4 to 6. 
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Third, it is also essential to determine whether a deterministic trend should be included in 
the model, because the tests for the inclusion of this trend are undertaken jointly with testing 
for the existence of cointegration, and the asymptotic critical values will, therefore, be 
different. Moreover, the inclusion of trending variables will affect the power of the test 
(Harris and Sollis, 2002). However, without prior information on the data-generating process, 
there is no certainty that the cointegrating regression should not include a deterministic trend. 
In order to accommodate the strong trending behaviour of several variables, such as 
Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, and Policyt, as seen in Figure 3.1, we include a deterministic time trend 
in the system. 
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Table 4.1: Diagnostic tests for models using different maximum lag orders for Brazil 
No. max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation  
χSC
2  
Hetero-
skedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(bt|Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0) 
4.944 
(0.293) 
15.377 
(0.352) 
0.946 
(0.622) 
1.255 
(0.267) 
5 (4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0) 
4.944 
(0.293) 
15.377 
(0.352) 
0.946 
(0.622) 
1.255 
(0.267) 
6 (4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
1.677 
(0.794) 
19.602** 
(0.033) 
1.340 
(0.511) 
0.127 
(0.722) 
(Riskt|bt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (3, 0, 2, 3, 3, 0) 
5.908 
(0.206) 
44.426*** 
(0.000) 
38.564*** 
(0.000) 
9.091*** 
(0.003) 
5 (1, 0, 0, 5, 5, 5) 
4.331 
(0.363) 
34.477** 
(0.043) 
10.497*** 
(0.000) 
22.268*** 
(0.000) 
6 (1, 0, 0, 5, 5, 5) 
4.331 
(0.363) 
34.477** 
(0.043) 
10.497*** 
(0.000) 
22.268*** 
(0.000) 
(Lendingt|bt, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 4, 0, 0, 1, 1) 
2.483 
(0.647) 
8.549 
(0.930) 
1.832 
(0.400) 
5.106** 
(0.027) 
5 (4, 4, 0, 1, 5, 4) 
12.745** 
(0.012) 
15.662 
(0.899) 
2.324 
(0.312) 
6.524** 
(0.014) 
6 (1, 3, 2, 0, 4, 6) 
3.273 
(0.513) 
9.874 
(0.987) 
28.900*** 
(0.000) 
7.700*** 
(0.007) 
(EXt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (2, 0, 1, 3, 4, 0) 
4.869 
(0.301) 
19.601 
(0.238) 
17.314*** 
(0.000) 
0.503 
(0.480) 
5 (5, 0, 1, 3, 4, 5) 
5.781 
(0.216) 
27.326 
(0.289) 
5.873* 
(0.053) 
0.142 
(0.707) 
6 (1, 0, 1, 3, 4, 5) 
4.379 
(0.357) 
22.243 
(0.327) 
9.427*** 
(0.008) 
0.489 
(0.487) 
(Policyt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , EXt, πt
e) 
4 (3, 0, 3, 4, 3, 3) 
9.430* 
(0.051) 
11.732 
(0.962) 
0.606 
(0.738) 
31.174*** 
(0.000) 
5 (5, 1, 2, 4, 1, 4) 
3.649 
(0.455) 
6.225 
(0.999) 
2.152 
(0.340) 
9.726*** 
(0.003) 
6 (5, 0, 0, 6, 6, 6) 
5.586 
(0.232) 
7.136 
(1.000) 
0.875 
(0.645) 
8.486*** 
(0.005) 
(πt
e|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (1, 4, 3, 2, 2, 4) 
0.697 
(0.951) 
9.820 
(0.987) 
0.649 
(0.722) 
0.318 
(0.574) 
5 (1, 4, 3 ,1, 2,4 ) 
3.555 
(0.469) 
16.990 
(0.711) 
1.600 
(0.449) 
0.482 
(0.490) 
6 (1, 4, 3, 6, 6, 4) 
7.744 
(0.101) 
8.790 
(0.999) 
1.387 
(0.499) 
1.330 
(0.255) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are their respective marginal levels of 
significance. The chosen model along with its respective diagnostic tests are highlighted in bold. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Brazil 
Table 4.1 compares the results of diagnostic tests for the models using different maximum lag 
lengths. The selected models are shown in bold. In particular, with regard to the case when bt is the 
dependent variable, the ARDL(4, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0) specification is the most suitable because it passes all 
of the diagnostic tests. For the regression explaining Riskt, the model fails the tests for 
homokedasticity, normality, and functional form. Therefore, the final model is specified as 
(3, 0, 2, 3, 3, 0), with concerns about the degrees of freedom. Similarly, due to a limited number of 
observations, when the regressions are normalized on Lendingt and Policyt, the lag order is (4, 4, 
0, 0, 1, 1) and (3, 0, 3, 4, 3, 3), respectively. The models selected in the case of  EXt and πt
e as 
dependent variables satisfy all the diagnostic tests at the 5 per cent significance level. The violation 
of the classical linear regression assumptions in some models will be discussed in more detail in the 
section on robustness tests and checks. The use of White’s variance–covariance matrix of standard 
errors is appropriate to correct for the heteroskedasticity, but not serial correlation. With the 
presence of both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, the alternative approach is to use the 
Newey–West variance–covariance correction method. For those reasons, we use robust standard 
errors where either heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, or both, is present. 
The Philippines  
Table 4.2 reports the results of the diagnostic tests for the models using different maximum lag 
lengths for the Philippines. In all circumstances, the results specify a maximum lag order of 4. In 
particular, the LM tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, homoskedasticity, 
normality, and appropriate functional form at the 5 per cent significance level, when bt and πt
e 
are the dependent variables. This determines the ARDL(4, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) model for the regression 
on bt, and (2, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0) model for the regression on πt
e. The results obtained by normalising on 
Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, and Policyt all violate the assumption of either homoscedasticity, 
normality, or both. The selected models are, therefore, the ones using the smallest lag length.  
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Table 4.2: Diagnostic tests for models using different maximum lag orders for the Philippines 
 
No. max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
 χSC
2  
Hetero-
skedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(bt|Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) 
6.104 
(0.191) 
3.766 
(0.993) 
1.410 
(0.493) 
0.454 
(0.502) 
5 (5, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) 
1.265 
(0.867) 
4.688 
(0.981) 
1.368 
(0.504) 
1.945 
(0.166) 
6 (5, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) 
1.265 
(0.867) 
4.688 
(0.981) 
1.368 
(0.504) 
1.945 
(0.166) 
(Riskt|bt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) 
5.179 
(0.269) 
51.363*** 
(0.000) 
45.635*** 
(0.000) 
2.019 
(0.159) 
5 (5, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) 
1.072 
(0.898) 
50.094*** 
(0.000) 
85.664*** 
(0.000) 
1.420 
(0.236) 
6 (5, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) 
1.072 
(0.898) 
50.094*** 
(0.000) 
85.664*** 
(0.000) 
1.420 
(0.236) 
(Lendingt|bt, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
4.162 
(0.384) 
37.980*** 
(0.000) 
0.953 
(0.620) 
2.256 
(0.136) 
5 (2, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
10.033** 
(0.039) 
46.090*** 
(0.000) 
16.690*** 
(0.000) 
4.447 
(0.037) 
6 (2, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
10.033** 
(0.039) 
46.090*** 
(0.000) 
16.690*** 
(0.000) 
4.447 
(0.037) 
(EXt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1,0, 1, 1, 0, 3) 
2.548 
(0.636) 
32.432*** 
(0.001) 
8.468** 
(0.014) 
1.943 
(0.166) 
5 (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 3) 
2.548 
(0.636) 
32.432*** 
(0.001) 
8.468*** 
(0.014) 
1.943 
(0.166) 
6 (1, 0, 1, 5, 4, 0) 
8.031 
(0.090) 
44.230*** 
(0.000) 
13.465*** 
(0.001) 
0.043 
(0.836) 
(Policyt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , EXt, πt
e) 
4 (2, 1, 2, 2, 4, 0) 
1.689 
(0.792) 
36.435*** 
(0.004) 
81.639*** 
(0.000) 
0.077 
(0.781) 
5 (1, 4, 2, 2, 4, 0) 
5.496 
(0.240) 
34.478** 
(0.023) 
77.738*** 
(0.000) 
4.716** 
(0.033) 
6 (2, 5, 5, 2, 4, 6) 
2.847 
(0.646) 
26.920 
(0.627) 
37.254*** 
(0.000) 
10.557*** 
(0.001) 
(πt
e|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (2, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0) 
8.556* 
(0.073) 
14.802 
(0.191) 
0.611 
(0.736) 
0.047 
(0.827) 
5 (2, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0) 
8.556* 
(0.073) 
14.802 
(0.191) 
0.611 
(0.736) 
0.047 
(0.827) 
6 (6, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0) 
5.075 
(0.279) 
13.795 
(0.742) 
0.109 
(0.946) 
0.074 
(0.786) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are their respective marginal levels of 
significance. The chosen model along with its respective diagnostic tests are highlighted in bold. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Diagnostic tests for models using different maximum lag orders for Turkey  
No. max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation  
χSC
2  
Hetero-
skedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(bt|Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 2, 2, 0, 1, 0) 
3.407  
(0.492) 
11.906 
 (0.686) 
11.146*** 
(0.003) 
6.110** 
(0.0183) 
5 (4, 2, 2, 0, 1, 0) 
3.407 
 (0.492) 
11.906  
(0.686) 
11.146*** 
(0.003) 
6.110** 
(0.0183) 
6 (5, 6, 5, 3, 5, 6) 
26.666*** 
(0.000) 
2.952 
(1.000) 
0.052 
(0.974) 
0.077 
(0.784) 
(Riskt|bt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 3, 3, 2, 4, 4) 
14.484*** 
(0.005) 
8.067 
 (0.997) 
0.004 
(0.997) 
9.684*** 
(0.004) 
5 (4, 4, 5, 2, 5, 2) 
12.694** 
(0.012) 
8.241 
(0.999) 
0.619 
(0.733) 
17.197*** 
(0.000) 
6 (5, 6, 6, 1, 5, 6) 
23.240*** 
(0.000) 
1.684 
(1.000) 
1.141 
(0.565) 
5.812** 
(0.030) 
(Lendingt|bt, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 0, 4, 0, 3, 4) 22.144*** 
(0.000) 
5.866  
(0.995) 
2.767 
(0.250) 
0.000 
(0.986) 
5 (3, 0, 1, 0, 1, 5) 16.818*** 
(0.002) 
5.39 
0(0.993) 
0.168 
(0.919) 
10.234*** 
(0.000) 
6 (6, 4, 5, 2, 4, 6) 22.760*** 
(0.000) 
3.200 
(1.000) 
0.348 
(0.840) 
0.038 
(0.846) 
(EXt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) 
1.265 
(0.867) 
2.584 
(0.995) 
3.288 
(0.193) 
0.778 
(0.382) 
5 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) 
1.265 
(0.867) 
2.584 
(0.995) 
3.288 
(0.193) 
0.778 
(0.382) 
6 (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) 
1.265 
(0.867) 
2.584 
(0.995) 
3.288 
(0.193) 
0.778 
(0.382) 
(Policyt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , EXt, πt
e) 
4 (2, 3, 2, 0, 2, 0) 
10.943** 
(0.027) 
14.868 
(0.387) 
25.051*** 
(0.000) 
2.105 
(0.155) 
5 (1, 3, 2, 0, 0,1 ) 
14.001*** 
(0.007) 
13.695 
(0.395) 
1.446 
(0.485) 
6.619** 
(0.014) 
6 (4, 4, 2, 4, 2, 2) 
8.784* 
(0.066) 
7.695 
(0.999) 
0.832 
(0.659) 
3.494* 
(0.072) 
(πt
e|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (2, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2) 
18.026** 
(0.001) 
5.691 
(1.000) 
4.455 
(0.107) 
1.805* 
(0.082) 
5 (4, 5, 2, 3, 0, 5) 
9.340* 
(0.053) 
4.301 
(1.000) 
0.848 
(0.654) 
4.374** 
(0.046) 
6 (6, 5, 2, 4, 4, 6) 
3.236 
(0.519) 
3.249 
(1.000) 
1.882 
(0.189) 
1.882 
(0.189) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are their respective marginal levels of 
significance. The chosen model along with its respective diagnostic tests are highlighted in bold. The asterisks 
***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Turkey 
With regard to Turkey, Table 4.3 presents the results of the diagnostic tests used to choose 
the appropriate models. Although the ARDL(5, 6, 5, 3, 5, 6) model selected for the regression 
on bt has serially correlated errors, it outperforms the other two models based on diagnostic 
tests for heteroskedasticity and functional form. Despite the presence of autocorrelation, the 
regression model normalised on Lendingt using a lag order of (4, 0, 4, 4, 3, 4) is selected 
because it passes the RESET test for functional form. When Riskt is considered as the 
dependent variable, models using different lag lengths all violate the assumption of no 
autocorrelation. As such, the maximum lag order of 4 is selected due to the concern about the 
degrees of freedom. All models using EXt as the dependent variable return a consistent lag 
structure of (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1), no matter what maximum lag length is set. A maximum lag 
length of 6 is chosen for the equations of Policyt and πt
e, since the test statistics are robust to 
all the diagnostics tests at the 5 per cent significance level.  
4.2.2 The ARDL bounds tests for cointegration 
The results of the bounds testing procedure are reported in Table 4.4. In the case of Brazil, 
when bt is the dependent variable, both the F-statistic and t-statistic fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no long-run relationship at different levels of significance. In the equation for 
Riskt, the existence of a long-run relationship is significant only at the 10 per cent level, 
while the bounds t-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that αRisk is equal to zero. These 
results imply that bt and Riskt might be weakly exogenous. The regressions normalised on 
the other variables indicate that there is a significant level relationship among the variables at 
the 1 per cent level of significance. The t-tests also confirm the existence of cointegration in 
the system. 
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For the Philippines, there are only two cointegrating relationships. According to the F-
test and the t-test, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5 per cent level 
when Policyt and πt
e are the dependent variables. The empirical results obtained by 
normalising on bt and EXt fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent level of 
significance. The cointegration tests are inconclusive when the regressions are normalised on 
the risk premium and lending rate. 
Table 4.4: Bounds testing for cointegration 
Model specification Brazil Philippines Turkey 
FV tV FV tV FV tV 
F(bt|Riskt, Lendingt, EXt , Policyt, πt
e) 2.658 -1.217 1.598 -2.027 5.139** -1.433 
F(Riskt|bt, Lendingt, EXt , Policyt, πt
e) 3.819* -2.646  2.911 -3.987 6.531*** -5.146** 
F(Lendingt|bt, Riskt, EXt , Policyt, πt
e) 12.209*** -6.259*** 3.395 -3.507 6.850*** -6.511*** 
F(EXt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , Policyt, πt
e) 5.429*** -5.089**  2..320 -2.604 2.456 -1.285 
F(Policyt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , EXt, πt
e) 15.941*** -8.622*** 10.012*** -7.613*** 3.883* -2.491 
F(πt
e|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 9.613*** -6.494***  5.097** -4.981** 10.095*** -6.425*** 
Notes: FV is the F-statistic for testing the significance of the long-run coefficients that includes a time trend. The 
asymptotic critical value bounds for the FV are (3.93; 5.23), (3.12; 4.25), and (2.75; 3.79) at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. tV is the t-statistic for testing the significance of a long-
run coefficient that includes a time trend. The asymptotic critical value bounds for tV are (-3.96; -5.13), (-3.41; -
4.52), and (-3.13; -4.21) at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. The 
asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
For Turkey, the results provide strong evidence of a long-run relationship at the 5 per 
cent level of significance for all specifications, except when EXt and Policyt are the 
dependent variables. Indeed, the regression of EXt shows that the coefficients on the first lag 
of the explanatory variables are jointly insignificant at all levels, while the F-statistic obtained 
from the regression on Policyt rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at only the 
10 per cent level of significance. The t-tests in all cases are consistent with the results of the 
F-test, except where bt is the dependent variable. The t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis 
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of no level relationship, while the F-test shows the existence of a cointegrating vector. This 
result, therefore, needs more cautious interpretation. 
4.2.3 Long-run estimation 
According to the results of the bounds test, this step estimates the long-run coefficients in 
accordance with the cointegrating equations (3.13) to (3.18) in Chapter 3. The long-run 
estimation associated with the ARDL model is only applicable when the bounds test shows a 
significant cointegrating relationship between the variables in the system. Tables 4.5 to 4.7 
present the long-run coefficients for Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey, respectively.  
Brazil 
The results obtained by normalising on Lendingt reveal the negative and significant 
relationship between bt and Lendingt at the 5 per cent level of significance. A decrease in the 
budget balance-to-GDP ratio by 1 per cent is estimated to raise the lending rate by 1.106 per 
cent. The variable Riskt is positively and significantly related to Lendingt at the 10 per cent 
level. The respective t-statistics reject the null hypotheses (1) and (2) stated in the previous 
chapter that there is no significant long-run relationship between budget deficits and lending 
rates, and between the risk premium and lending rates. This provides support for the model of 
the risk premium for Brazil. Furthermore, the policy rate has a positively significant effect on 
lending rates, reflecting the transmission of the interest rate channel. Higher expected 
inflation is more likely to lead to lower interest rates, suggesting a perverse result in the long 
run. 
According to Table 4.5, significant coefficients for bt and Riskt in the regression of EXt 
demonstrate that the fiscal position and the risk premium are key determinants of the 
exchange rate. A worsening of the budget balance by 1 per cent causes a rise in the exchange 
rate by 0.081 units, implying that the Brazilian real depreciates. Moreover, the positive 
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coefficient on Riskt indicates that the higher the probability of default, the weaker is the 
domestic currency. The null hypotheses (3) and (4) of no significant effect of fiscal policy on 
the exchange rate channel, which is mentioned in Chapter 3, is therefore rejected at the 1 per 
cent level. This again provides evidence for the model of sovereign risk premium. A 
significantly positive link is found between inflation expectations and the exchange rate, 
which supports the argument that a higher expected inflation rate leads to a depreciating 
domestic currency. In addition, Brazil’s domestic currency tends to depreciate over time, as 
highlighted by the significantly positive coefficient on the time trend. 
Table 4.5: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients for Brazil 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt -1.106** 
(0.504) 
0.672* 
(0.266) 
- 1.376 
(2.327) 
1.629*** 
(0.267) 
-1.851** 
(0.577) 
-0.135 
(0.088) 
EXt -0.081*** 
(0.038) 
0.163*** 
(0.045) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
- 0.086* 
(0.043) 
0.158** 
(0.054) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
πt
e -0.242* 
(0.108) 
0.531*** 
(0.110) 
-0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.410 
(0.396) 
0.103 
(0.072) 
- 0.075*** 
(0.019) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are conventional standard errors, in according to the results of diagnostic tests 
given in Table 4.1. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.   
Considering the impacts of fiscal policy on inflation expectations, the coefficient on bt is 
significantly negative. In combination with the positive coefficient on Riskt, the results 
suggest that a higher level of budget deficits and default risk can raise the expected rate of 
inflation, following the model of sovereign risk premium. This helps to reject the null 
hypotheses (5) and (6) that fiscal performance and sovereign risk premium have no significant 
impact on inflation expectations. Another noteworthy result is that there is no significant 
relationship between the policy rate and the expected inflation rate, raising concerns about the 
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effectiveness of monetary policy to control inflation when fiscal imbalances trigger sovereign 
default. 
The Philippines 
 Since there is only one cointegrating vector when πt
e is the dependent variable, we use the 
ARDL model normalised on πt
e to estimate the long-run impact of fiscal deficits and 
sovereign risk premium on inflation expectations, the results of which are presented in Table 
4.6.  
Table 4.6: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients for the Philippines 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e 0.102 
(0.110) 
0.452** 
(0.182) 
0.477*** 
(0.112) 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
0.102 
(0.105) 
- 
0.031 
(0.025) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to the results reported in Table 4.4. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors due to the 
concern of serial correlation shown in Table 4.2. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
The results obtained from the equation estimated for πt
e are inconsistent with the model 
of sovereign risk premium, because the estimated coefficient on bt is insignificant. This result 
fails to reject the null hypothesis (5) that there is no significant impact of budget deficits on 
the level of inflation expectations. The coefficient on Riskt, however, shows a positive and 
significant relationship between the probability of sovereign default and the level of the 
expected inflation rate. Similar to the results for Brazil, those for the Philippines demonstrate 
that monetary policy is not significantly effective in controlling inflation, as the coefficient on 
Policyt is statistically insignificant at all conventional levels.  
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Turkey 
As seen in Table 4.7, when the regression is normalised on Lendingt, the dependent variable 
is insignificantly related to the fiscal balance at all levels. On the other hand, there is a 
significantly positive link between sovereign risk premium and borrowing costs at the 10 per 
cent level, as suggested by the model of sovereign risk premium. 
Table 4.7: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients for Turkey 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt -0.146 
(0.084) 
0.766* 
(0.450) 
- 1.606* 
(0.732) 
0.420*** 
(0.071) 
0.264* 
(0.113) 
-0.137*** 
(0.044) 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -1.120*** 
(0.220) 
2.898*** 
(0.496) 
-0.476 
(0.295) 
1.390 
(0.969) 
0.347** 
(0.146) 
- -0.043 
(0.053) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to the results reported in Table 4.4. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for the 
regression of Lendingt due to the concern of serial correlation shown in Table 4.3, and conventional standard 
errors for the regression of πt
e. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
According to the equation for πt
e, fiscal policy plays a determining role in controlling 
inflation expectations, as the model of the risk premium suggests. Specifically, a 1 per cent 
worsening of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio leads to a 1.120 per cent increase in the level 
of expected inflation, while an increase in the sovereign risk premium by 1 per cent leads to 
an increase in inflation expectations by 2.898 per cent. This rejects the research’s null 
hypotheses (5) and (6) that budget deficits have no significant impact on inflation 
expectations. Notably, the long-run result is puzzling with regard to the link between πt
e and  
Policyt, as the estimated coefficient on the policy rate is significantly positive at the 5 per cent 
level. As such, a higher policy rate is more likely to put upward pressure on inflation 
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expectations, which is counter-intuitive to what the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
suggests.  
4.2.4 Granger causality test for weak exogeneity 
The ECMs at step 3 aim to assess the short-run dynamics of the system, along with testing for 
Granger causality. Tables 4.8 to 4.10 present the ECM estimates associated with the specified 
ARDL models, while Tables 4.11 to 4.14 show the results of testing for short-run and long-
run Granger causality based on the ECMs.  
4.2.4.1 The estimated ECMs 
Brazil 
Table 4.8 presents the short-run dynamic coefficients associated with the corresponding 
ARDL models for Brazil. Budget deficits significantly affect lending rates, exchange rates, 
and inflation expectations, since the coefficients on its contemporaneous and lagged 
differences are statistically significant in the equations for lending, the exchange rate, and 
inflation expectations, respectively. Similarly, the risk premium helps to determine the 
monetary variables in the short run. Inflation expectations and exchange rates respond to 
variations in the policy rate in the short run. It is consistent with the argument that monetary 
policy has a temporary effect on macroeconomic variables. 
Table 4.8: ECMs for the selected ARDL models for Brazil 
Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio T-probability 
ARDL(4,4,0,0,1,1) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.316*** 0.025 -12.625 0.000 
∆Lendingt−1 0.327*** 0.058 5.624 0.000 
∆Lendingt−2 -0.094 0.058 -1.619 0.111 
∆Lendingt−3 0.250*** 0.070 3.591 0.001 
∆bt 0.130 0.129 1.012 0.315 
∆bt−1 0.444*** 0.135 3.276 0.002 
∆bt−2 0.281 0.181 1.556 0.125 
∆bt−3 0.433*** 0.156 2.773 0.007 
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Table 4.8 (Continued) 
∆Riskt 0.287** 0.131 2.190 0.032 
∆EXt 1.276 1.179 1.083 0.283 
∆Policyt 0.719*** 0.048 14.986 0.000 
∆πt
e -0.127 0.171 -0.742 0.461 
Constant 10.188*** 0.921 11.063 0.000 
 
 
R-squared: 0.869 
RSS: 166.950 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.868 
F-statistics: 33.455*** (0.000) 
ARDL(5,0,1,3,4,5) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑬𝑿𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.341*** 0.041 -8.241 0.000 
∆EXt−1 -0.260*** 0.073 -3.521 0.000 
∆EXt−2 -0.122 0.091 -1.339 0.186 
∆EXt−3 0.038 0.103 0.365 0.716 
∆EXt−4 -0.264*** 0.082 -3.207 0.002 
∆bt -0.027** 0.011 -2.273 0.027 
∆Riskt 0.137*** 0.008 15.503 0.000 
∆Lendingt 0.024*** 0.007 3.222 0.002 
∆Lendingt−1 -0.009 0.008 -1.080 0.285 
∆Lendingt−2 0.024*** 0.008 2.925 0.005 
∆Policyt -0.024*** 0.005 -4.434 0.000 
∆Policyt−1 -0.018** 0.007 -2.492 0.015 
∆Policyt−2 -0.036*** 0.006 -5.557 0.000 
∆Policyt−3 -0.035*** 0.005 -6.846 0.000 
∆πt
e -0.020 0.016 -1.241 0.220 
∆πt−1
e  -0.001 0.013 -0.064 0.948 
∆πt−2
e  -0.011 0.023 -0.481 0.632 
∆πt−3
e  -0.029** 0.012 -2.314 0.024 
∆πt−4
e  -0.053*** 0.011 -4.466 0.000 
Constant -0.377*** 0.050 -7.503 0.000 
 
 
R-squared: 0.790 
RSS: 0.897 
 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.826 
F-statistics: 10.304*** (0.000) 
ARDL(1,4,3,2,2,4) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝝅𝒕
𝒆 
ECt−1 -0.544*** 0.062 -8.720 0.000 
∆bt 0.051 0.043 1.180 0.243 
∆bt−1 0.243*** 0.046 5.325 0.000 
∆bt−2 0.281*** 0.055 5.083 0.000 
∆bt−3 0.192*** 0.043 4.478 0.000 
∆Riskt -0.235*** 0.069 -3.396 0.001 
∆Riskt−1 -0.243*** 0.057 -4.247 0.000 
∆Riskt−2 -0.168*** 0.056 -3.001 0.004 
∆Lendingt 0.039 0.027 1.432 0.158 
∆Lendingt−1 0.083*** 0.026 3.251 0.002 
∆EXt 0.495 0.384 1.287 0.203 
∆EXt−1 1.326*** 0.270 4.909 0.000 
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Table 4.8 (Continued) 
∆Policyt -0.040* 0.022 -1.825 0.073 
∆Policyt−1 0.019 0.028 0.665 0.509 
∆Policyt−2 0.057*** 0.018 3.220 0.002 
∆Policyt−3 -0.039 0.024 -1.619 0.111 
Constant -0.044 0.075 -0.559 0.579 
 
R-squared: 0.855 
RSS: 17.509 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 2.063 
F-statistics: 20.782*** (0.000) 
Notes: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. Numbers in parentheses are 
the marginal significance levels for the F-test of the joint significance of all coefficients.  
Table 4.9: ECMs for the selected ARDL models for the Philippines 
Regressor Coefficient Robust  
standard error 
T-ratio T-probability 
ARDL(2,0,0,0,3,0) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝝅𝒕
𝒆 
ECt−1 -0.486*** 0.069 -7.051 0.000 
∆πt−1
e  0.165 0.114 1.445 0.152 
∆bt 0.040 0.032 1.262 0.210 
∆Riskt 0.362*** 0.114 3.169 0.002 
∆Lendingt 0.263** 0.120 2.180 0.032 
∆EXt -0.170** 0.083 -2.060 0.042 
∆EXt−1 0.102 0.063 1.630 0.107 
∆EXt−2 -0.107* 0.055 -1.940 0.056 
∆Policyt -0.022 0.073 -0.305 0.761 
Constant -0.833*** 0.163 -5.111 0.000 
 
R-squared: 0.476 
RSS: 74.905 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 2.048 
F-statistics: 8.910*** (0.000) 
Notes: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. Numbers in parentheses are 
the marginal significance levels for the F-test of the joint significance of all coefficients. 
The Philippines 
The estimated results of the ECMs for the Philippines are provided in Table 4.9. The ECM is 
applicable only in the case where cointegration exists, following the results of the bounds test 
in Table 4.4. Budget deficits have no short-run impact on the expected rate of inflation, while 
the risk premium is a key determinant of inflation expectations. The results show that the 
coefficient on ∆Policyt is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the level of expected 
inflation is not responsive to changes in the policy rate in the short run. 
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Turkey 
Table 4.10 shows the results of the ECMs for Turkey. The ECMs are estimated for the 
equations for Lendingt and πt
e, since cointegration is found only when these variables are the 
dependent variables. For interest rates, both the budget deficit and sovereign risk premium 
play a significant role in driving borrowing costs. Lagged differences in the policy rate and 
expected inflation are also significantly related to lending rates, which may confirm the 
transmission of the interest rate channel in the short run. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the 
exchange rate is not statistically significant, implying that the exchange rate does not have 
any short-run effect on the interest rate. 
With regard to the short-run dynamics of expected inflation, there is a significant 
relationship between bt and πt
e, and between Riskt and πt
e as well. This supports the 
hypothesis that budget deficits and sovereign default risks drive inflation expectations, not 
only in the long run but in the short run as well. The movement of ∆πt
e can also be explained 
by changes in lending rates, exchange rates and policy rates. 
Table 4.10: ECMs for the selected ARDL models for Turkey 
Table 4.10 (continued) 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio T-probability 
ARDL(4,0,4,0,3,4) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.978*** 0.135 -6.633 0.000 
∆Lendingt−1 0.331* 0.140 1.903 0.065 
∆Lendingt−2 0.409*** 0.105 3.017 0.005 
∆Lendingt−3 0.275*** 0.088 2.860 0.007 
∆bt -0.144* 0.069 -1.936 0.061 
∆Riskt 1.617*** 0.231 7.203 0.000 
∆Riskt−1 0.131 0.408 0.262 0.795 
∆Riskt−2 0.352 0.253 1.508 0.140 
∆Riskt−3 -0.946** 0.430 -2.202 0.034 
∆EXt 0.336 0.236 1.034 0.308 
∆Policyt 0.602*** 0.180 3.584 0.001 
∆Policyt−1 0.009 0.081 0.843 0.405 
∆Policyt−2 -0.323*** 0.106 -3.098 0.004 
∆πt
e -0.136 0.074 -0.517 0.608 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
∆πt−1
e  -0.549*** 0.138 -3.131 0.004 
∆πt−2
e  -0.402*** 0.064 -5.035 0.000 
∆πt−3
e  -0.129** 0.051 -2.241 0.031 
Constant 7.562*** 1.267 4.905 0.000 
 
R-squared: 0.903 
RSS: 38.527 
 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.629 
F-statistics: 19.265*** (0.000) 
ARDL(6,5,2,4,4,6) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝝅𝒕
𝒆  
ECt−1 -0.821*** 0.073 -11.228 0.000 
∆πt−1
e  -0.324*** 0.072 -4.484 0.000 
∆πt−2
e  -0.392*** 0.060 -6.577 0.000 
∆πt−3
e  -0.283*** 0.057 -4.938 0.000 
∆πt−4
e  -0.053 0.047 -1.120 0.274 
∆πt−5
e  -0.181** 0.068 -2.647 0.014 
∆bt 0.067* 0.055 1.217 0.236 
∆bt−1 1.198*** 0.114 10.539 0.000 
∆bt−2 1.058*** 0.111 9.508 0.000 
∆bt−3 0.738*** 0.077 9.533 0.000 
∆bt−4 0.401*** 0.067 5.984 0.000 
∆Riskt 1.483*** 0.241 6.155 0.000 
∆Riskt−1 -0.908*** 0.264 -3.443 0.002 
∆Lendingt -0.082 0.067 -1.225 0.233 
∆Lendingt−1 0.627*** 0.139 4.522 0.000 
∆Lendingt−2 0.492*** 0.051 9.662 0.000 
∆Lendingt−3 0.148** 0.069 2.160 0.041 
∆EXt -1.685* 0.857 -1.966 0.061 
∆EXt−1 -2.061** 0.849 -2.428 0.023 
∆EXt−2 -4.028*** 0.593 -6.790 0.000 
∆EXt−3 -2.861** 1.201 -2.381 0.026 
∆Policyt 0.136 0.080 1.709 0.101 
∆Policyt−1 0.064 0.076 0.838 0.410 
∆Policyt−2 0.274*** 0.074 3.684 0.001 
∆Policyt−3 0.484*** 0.079 6.122 0.000 
∆Policyt−4 0.530*** 0.103 5.167 0.000 
∆Policyt−5 0.267*** 0.078 3.404 0.002 
Constant 1.243*** 0.159 7.824 0.000 
 
R-squared: 0.959 
RSS: 5.596 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 2.021 
F-statistics: 20.098*** (0.000) 
Notes: The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for residual sum of squares. Numbers in parentheses are 
the marginal significance levels for the F-test of the joint significance of all coefficients. Robust standard errors 
are used in the regression of Lendingt due to the concern of serial correlation shown in Table 4.3. 
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4.2.4.2 Granger causality test for weak exogeneity 
Tables 4.11 to 4.13 report the results of Granger causality tests, following the specifications 
given in Section 3.5.3. We include an error correction term in the models when a long-run 
relationship exists, as suggested by Table 4.4 of the bounds tests. The Granger causality tests 
are also applied to other models excluding the error correction term, when there is no 
cointegration. For each variable, there are two forms of the test to assess: short-run Granger 
causality through the F-tests for the joint significance of the lagged-differenced coefficients, 
and long-run causality through the t-tests for the significance of the lagged error-correction 
(EC) term. 
Brazil 
Table 4.11 presents the results of Granger causality tests for Brazil. In general, the error-
correction terms within the ECMs are correctly signed and significant, confirming the results 
of the bounds test for cointegration. This also reflects the fact that the interest rate, exchange 
rate, policy rate, and inflation expectations all adjust when they depart from their equilibrium 
values. Budget deficits and the risk premium Granger-cause the interest rate, exchange rate, 
and inflation expectations in both long run and short run. 
Turning to the F-statistic on the lagged explanatory variables, the results show that 
budget deficits are Granger-caused by the policy rate and the reverse short-run causation 
from the latter to the former is also supported at the 5 per cent level. However, there is no 
significant Granger causality from the other variables to the fiscal variable, indicating that  
bt is weakly exogenous to monetary variables. The F-statistic on the explanatory variables 
suggest that there is two-way Granger causality between the risk premium and monetary 
policy transmission channels, including the interest rate, exchange rate, and inflation 
expectations. Similarly, bidirectional Granger causality between the policy rate and inflation 
expectations is also confirmed. Although the causality flows from lending rates to exchange 
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rates, the reverse case does not hold. This implies a unidirectional Granger causality running 
from the interest rate to the exchange rate. There is also one-way Granger causality running 
from lending rates to inflation expectations.  
Table 4.11: Results of Granger causality tests for Brazil 
Dependent 
variables 
Regressor 
F-testb F-testRisk  F-testLending F-testEX F-testPolicy F-test𝜋𝑒  
All regressors 
(F-statistic) 
EC (t-
statistic) 
∆bt - 1.104 
(0.273) 
-1.602 
(0.114) 
)) 
-0.849 
(0.398) 
5.330** 
(0.001) 
0.198 
(0.843) 
3.578*** 
(0.001) 
N/A 
∆Riskt 0.318 
(0.751) 
- 11.080*** 
(0.000) 
2.672* 
(0.055) 
22.882*** 
(0.000) 
-2.435** 
(0.018) 
17.687*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆Lendingt 5.501*** 
(0.000) 
2.189** 
(0.032) 
- 1.082 
(0.283) 
14.986*** 
(0.000) 
-0.741 
(0.461) 
58.072*** 
(0.000) 
-12.624*** 
(0.000) 
∆EXt -2.273** 
(0.027) 
15.503*** 
(0.000) 
5.157*** 
(0.003) 
- 19.327*** 
(0.000) 
7.483*** 
(0.000) 
34.577*** 
(0.000) 
-8.241*** 
(0.000) 
∆Policyt -2.636** 
(0.011) 
3.607** 
(0.018) 
62.068*** 
(0.000) 
7.527*** 
(0.000) 
- 3.370** 
(0.024) 
34.107*** 
(0.000) 
-10.371*** 
(0.000) 
∆πt
e 11.095*** 
(0.000) 
14.454*** 
(0.000) 
10.470*** 
(0.000) 
12.049*** 
(0.000) 
3.871*** 
(0.008) 
- 15.632*** 
(0.000) 
-8.720*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ in the case of no cointegration. Numbers in parentheses are the 
marginal significance levels. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
The Philippines 
Table 4.12 reports the results of short-run and long-run Granger causality tests for the 
Philippines. Beginning with the long-run effects, the error-correction terms in the equation 
for Policyt and πt
e are negatively signed and significant, which supports the results of the 
bounds test in the first step. This implies that changes to policy rates and inflation 
expectations are a function of the disequilibrium in the cointegrating relationship, but this is 
not the case for the other variables. 
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Table 4.12: Results of Granger causality tests for the Philippines 
Dependent 
variables 
Regressor 
F-testb F-testRisk  F-testLending F-testEX F-testPolicy F-test𝜋𝑒  
All regressors 
(F-statistic) 
EC (t-
statistic) 
∆bt - 15.803*** 
(0.000) 
1.574  
(0.118) 
-0.999 
(0.320) 
0.007 
(0.994) 
1.006 
(0.317) 
6.786*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆Riskt 0.277 
(0.781) 
- -1.024 
 (0.308) 
3.447*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.998) 
2.842*** 
(0.005) 
7.978*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆Lendingt 1.119 
(0.266) 
-0.925 
(0.357) 
- 3.051* 
(0.052) 
7.700*** 
(0.000) 
1.540 
(0.127) 
6.438*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆EXt 0.124 
(0.901) 
3.761*** 
(0.000) 
1.405 
(0.163) 
- -0.170 
(0.865) 
1.211 
(0.310) 
7.250*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆Policyt 1.418 
(0.159) 
2.478* 
(0.090) 
12.249*** 
(0.000) 
10.732*** 
(0.000) 
- 1.391 
(0.167) 
7.798*** 
(0.000) 
-6.999*** 
(0.000) 
∆πt
e 1.261 
(0.210) 
3.168*** 
(0.002) 
2.179** 
(0.031) 
2.288* 
(0.084) 
-0.304 
(0.761) 
- 2.081* 
(0.053) 
-7.051*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ in the case of no cointegration. Numbers in parentheses are the 
marginal significance levels. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
There is evidence of a short-run unidirectional causal relationship from the risk premium 
to budget deficits, but there is no significant Granger causality from the other variables to the 
fiscal variable. Regarding the equation for Riskt, the causality flows from the exchange rate 
and inflation expectations to the dependent variable. The reverse short-run causation from 
Riskt to EXt and πt
e is also supported at the 1 per cent level. The F-statistics indicate that the 
lending rate is not Granger-caused by either budget deficits or the risk premium. Moreover, 
budget deficits do not Granger-cause both exchange rates and inflation expectations. This is 
consistent with the results obtained from the first two steps of the ARDL procedure, which 
shows that the link between fiscal policy and the monetary policy transmission channels does 
not exist for the Philippines. Turning to the results for the regression normalised on πt
e, there is 
no significant causal relationship from Policyt to πt
e. The reverse short-run causality is also 
insignificant. 
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Turkey 
Table 4.13 shows the results of the Granger causality tests for Turkey. Generally speaking, all 
ECMs have the expected negative sign and are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, 
which supports the existence of a long-run relationship. In particular, there is evidence of a 
long-run causal relationship from budget deficits, risk premium, exchange rate, the policy 
rate, and inflation expectations to the lending rate. Furthermore, there is evidence of one-way 
Granger causality running from bt to πt
e, implying the exogeneity of fiscal balance to 
inflation expectations.  
Table 4.13: Results of the Granger causality tests for Turkey 
Dependent 
variable 
Regressor 
F-testb F-testRisk  F-testLending F-testEX F-testPolicy F-test𝜋𝑒  
All regressors 
 (F-statistic) 
EC (t-
statistic) 
∆bt - 5.539*** 
(0.000) 
2.086 
(0.107) 
2.809* 
(0.064) 
0.955 
(0.466) 
0.899 
(0.513) 
12.187*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆Riskt 4.759*** 
(0.007) 
- 17.483*** 
(0.000) 
7.251*** 
(0.002) 
8.192*** 
(0.000) 
6.425*** 
(0.000) 
70.409*** 
(0.000) 
-9.511*** 
(0.000) 
∆Lendingt -1.936* 
(0.065) 
16.252*** 
(0.000) 
- 1.033 
(0.308) 
17.310*** 
(0.000) 
6.614*** 
(0.000) 
44.978*** 
(0.000) 
-6.632*** 
(0.000) 
∆EXt -1.090 
(0280) 
-0.965 
(0.339) 
4.039** 
(0.000) 
- -1.845 
(0.070) 
-1.746* 
(0.086) 
5.543*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆Policyt 2.192* 
(0.090) 
4.888** 
(0.013) 
13.573*** 
(0.000) 
3.613** 
(0.037) 
- 2.664* 
(0.083) 
34.604*** 
(0.000) 
N/A 
∆πt
e 50.008*** 
(0.000) 
19.949*** 
(0.000) 
28.168*** 
(0.000) 
14.981*** 
(0.000) 
25.946*** 
(0.000) 
- 222.237*** 
(0.000) 
-1.228*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ in case of no cointegration. Numbers in parentheses are the 
marginal significance levels. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
With respect to short-run Granger causality, the F-statistics explore the unilateral 
Granger causality relationships from budget deficits to lending rates, and from budget deficits 
to inflation expectations, at the 10 per cent and 1 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
This implies the weak exogeneity of the fiscal variable. There is bidirectional causality 
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between the risk premium and lending rate, and the risk premium and inflation expectations. 
The results for the relationship between fiscal policy and the exchange rate channel are 
noteworthy, since there is no significant Granger causality from either bt or Riskt to EXt. 
This provides clear evidence that fiscal policy has a temporary effect on the interest rate and 
inflation expectations, but not on the exchange rate. There is Granger causality from bt to 
Policyt, suggesting that fiscal policy might drive the policy rate in the short run. Considering 
monetary policy transmission channels, a change in the policy rate will Granger-cause 
inflation expectations in the short run, and vice versa. Moreover, there is evidence of a 
unidirectional causal relationship from exchange rates to policy rates and expected rates of 
inflation, showing the association between transmission channels. 
4.3 Empirical results for the NARDL models 
The non-linear ARDL models are conducted to examine whether the transmission channels of 
monetary policy respond differently to negative and positive changes in the budget balance, 
which aims to answer the research sub-question (1) stated in Section 1.3. The budget balance 
is decomposed in two partial sum series consisting of negative changes, bt
−, and positive 
changes, bt
+. We follow the three-step modelling procedure undertaken for the linear ARDL 
models. First, the bounds tests are employed to examine whether there exists a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables. The long-run asymmetry estimations in step 2 
primarily focus on the significance and sign of the estimated coefficients associated with both 
bt
− and  bt
+, followed by the analysis of short-run dynamic asymmetry in the final step. The 
lag lengths selected for the NARDL models are reported in Appendix 2.  
4.3.1 The bounds tests for cointegration  
Table 4.14 represents the results of the cointegration tests for three economies. With respect 
to Brazil, the tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in the regressions normalised 
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on Lendingt and πt
e, which corroborates those earlier findings in the restricted symmetric 
ARDL models. However, when EXt is the dependent variable, the t-statistics and F-statistics 
reveal inconsistent results, as the F-statistic rejects the null of no cointegration whereas the t-
statistic does not. 
It is noteworthy that the cointegration tests for the Philippines yield no conclusive 
evidence of a long-run relationship in the regressions of Lendingt and  EXt in the restricted 
symmetric regressions, but the test statistics resoundingly reject the null when long-run 
asymmetry is modelled appropriately. The results further support the existence of 
cointegration among the variables, when inflation expectations is the dependent variable.  
Table 4.14: Bounds testing for cointegration in the NARDL models  
Model specification Brazil Philippines Turkey 
FV tV FV tV FV tV 
F(Lendingt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 11.498*** -6.817*** 4.283** 
 
-4.697** 
 
5.309*** 
 
-5.019** 
F(EXt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 6.666*** 
 
-1.559 
 
4.626** 
 
-5.774*** 
 
1.302 
 
-1.285 
 
F(πt
e|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 12.097*** -7.094*** 6.843*** -6.716*** 8.700*** 
 
-7.576*** 
Notes: FV is the F-statistics for testing the long-run coefficient significance with a linear time trend. The 
asymptotic critical value bounds for the FV are (3.93; 5.23), (3.12; 4.25), and (2.75; 3.79) at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. tV is the t-statistics for testing the significance of a long-
run coefficient with time trend involved. The asymptotic critical value bounds for the tV are (-3.96; -5.13), 
(-3.41; -4.52), and (-3.13; -4.21) at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
The findings obtained from the NARDL models are in line with those from the linear 
ARDL models for Turkey, confirming the presence of long-run equilibrium in the equations 
of Lendingt and πt
e.  
4.3.2 Long-run estimates of the NARDL models 
Regarding the estimated long-run coefficients of the NARDL models shown in Table 4.15, 
both interest rates and expected inflation rates significantly respond to the negative changes 
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in the budget balance, while their responses to positive changes are insignificant for Brazil. In 
particular, a worsening fiscal position by 1 per cent causes the lending rate to rise by 1.812 
per cent. The Wald test for symmetry rejects the null hypothesis, indicating the presence of 
strong non-linear effects of fiscal performance on the interest rate. The asymmetric effects of 
the fiscal balance on inflation expectations needs to be interpreted with caution, given the 
non-rejection of the null hypothesis, that there is no difference in the estimated coefficients 
between bt
− and  bt
+. It is important to highlight that allowing for asymmetry increases the 
magnitude and the significance of fiscal effects, in comparison to those obtained from the 
symmetric estimations.  
Table 4.15: Results of the asymmetric long-run estimations for Brazil 
 
Dep. 
variable 
 
 
 
Regressor 
 
bt
− bt
+ EMBIt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time WLR 
Lendingt -1.812*** 
(0.564) 
-0.218 
(0.530) 
 
0.367 
(0.231) 
 
 
- -6.105*** 
(1.386) 
 
1.601*** 
(0.268) 
 
1.032*** 
(0.375) 
 
-1.656*** 
(0.210) 
 
-4.120*** 
 
EXt N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -0.362** 
(0.149) 
 
 
-0.290 
(0.209) 
 
0.459*** 
(0.126) 
 
-0.008 
(0.047) 
0.187 
(0.421) 
0.143 
(0.089) 
- 0.141* 
(0.081) 
0.857 
 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.14. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for the equations of Lendingt and 
EXt due to the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity shown in Table A.1 (Appendix 2), and 
conventional standard errors for the equation for πt
e. The statistic, WLR, represents the Wald-test for the null 
hypothesis of long-run symmetry. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
Interestingly, the results for the Philippines in Table 4.16 suggest a single asymmetric 
direction: a strengthening of the domestic currency is attributed to an improvement in fiscal 
performance, bt
+, in the long run. This finding is different from the estimates of the 
corresponding linear ARDL model, and is contrary to the findings for the other countries, 
where the negative component of the budget balance is expected to have a stronger impact on 
the transmission channels of monetary policy. Unlike the regression of EXt, we cannot find 
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any evidence of an asymmetric relationship between the fiscal position and the interest rate, 
or between the fiscal position and inflation expectations. 
Table 4.16: Results of asymmetric long-run estimations for the Philippines 
 
Dep. 
variable 
 
 
 
Regressor 
 
bt
− bt
+ EMBIt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time WLR 
Lendingt 0.248 
(0.228) 
 
 
0.285 
(0.206) 
 
-0.065 
(0.457) 
 
 
- 0.040 
(0.099) 
 
-0.032 
(0.186) 
 
0.556** 
(0.259) 
 
-0.137 
(0.183) 
 
 -0.230 
 
EXt -0.250 
(0.399) 
 
-1.527*** 
(0.349) 
 
1.184** 
(0.456) 
 
1.004*** 
(0.309) 
 
- -0.486 
(0.341) 
 
-0.764* 
(0.419) 
 
1.549*** 
(0.108) 
 
 
4.058*** 
 
πt
e -0.068 
(0.095) 
 
 
(0.108) 
0.041 
(0.103) 
 
0.390** 
(0.148) 
 
0.213** 
(0.090) 
-0.008 
(0.076) 
 
 
0.421 
) 
0.515*** 
(0.117) 
- -0.091 
(0.118) 
-1.033 
 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.14. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for the equations of Lendingt and 
EXt due to the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity shown in Table A.2 (Appendix 2), and 
conventional standard errors for the equation for πt
e. The statistic, WLR, represents the Wald-test for the null 
hypothesis of long-run symmetry. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
Table 4.17: Results of the asymmetric long-run estimations for Turkey 
 
Dep. 
variable 
 
 
 Regressor  
bt
− bt
+ EMBIt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time WLR 
Lendingt -0.203 
(0.146) 
 
-0.147 
(0.130) 
 
0.729 
(0.508) 
 
 
 
- 1.702 
(1.118) 
 
0.455** 
(0.196) 
 
0.266 
(0.205) 
 
-0.217 
(0.241) 
 
 -0.252 
 
EXt N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -1.020*** 
(0.096) 
 
-0.673*** 
(0.120) 
1.611*** 
(0.167) 
 
 
-0.339*** 
(0.084) 
 
 
3.603*** 
(0.932) 
 
0.499*** 
(0.073) 
 
- -0.499*** 
(0.105) 
 
-4.050*** 
 
Notes: The term N/A stands for “not applicable” as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.14. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for the equations of Lendingt and 
πt
e due to the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity shown in Table A.3 (Appendix 2), and 
conventional standard errors for the equation for EXt. The statistic, WLR, represents the Wald-test for the null 
hypothesis of long-run symmetry. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively 
Investigating the results for Turkey, which are shown in Table 4.17, the expected inflation 
rate reacts more strongly to the deterioration in the fiscal balance. Indeed, a worsening of the 
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio by 1 per cent leads to an increase in the expected rate of inflation by 
1.020 per cent, while a 1 per cent improvement in the fiscal balance results in a decline in 
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inflation expectations by 0.673 per cent. Both coefficients on bt
− and bt
+ are statistically 
significant at conventional levels, and the long-run asymmetry is confirmed by the Wald test. 
This shows conclusive evidence of non-linearity in the effects of fiscal performance on inflation 
expectations. For the model using the interest rate as the dependent variable, neither bt
− nor bt
+ 
has a significant impact on Lendingt, which is in line with the findings of the symmetric 
regression. As such, we can conclude that fiscal policy is not an important mechanism in driving 
interest rates for Turkey. 
4.3.3 Short-run dynamic asymmetry  
Tables 4.18 to 4.20 show the asymmetric short-run estimations for Brazil, the Philippines, and 
Turkey, respectively. There is an interesting finding in this research that the three countries share 
the same patterns of asymmetry: a worsening fiscal position is more influential in determining 
inflation expectations than a fiscal improvement in the short run, as supported by the rejection of 
the short-run symmetry hypothesis. Nevertheless, the Wald test fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of an additive short-run symmetry in the regression normalised on either Lendingt or EXt. This 
implies that there is no apparent non-linearity in the short-run relationship between the fiscal 
balance and the interest rate channel, or between the fiscal balance and the exchange rate channel, 
for all three countries. The error-correction terms are significantly negative for all equations, 
confirming the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. 
Table 4.18: Short-run asymmetric estimations for Brazil 
Table 4.18 (continued) 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio T-probability 
ARDL(4, 4, 3, 0, 4, 4, 4) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.476*** 0.048 -9.965 0.000 
∆Lendingt−1 0.239** 0.091 2.620 0.012 
∆Lendingt−2 -0.194*** 0.062 -3.141 0.003 
∆Lendingt−3 0.282*** 0.062 4.568 0.000 
∆bt
− -0.217* 0.110 -1.977 0.054 
∆bt−1
−  0.497*** 0.176 2.833 0.007 
∆bt−2
−  0.021 0.163 0.128 0.899 
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Table 4.18 (continued) 
∆bt−3
−  0.561*** 0.136 4.120 0.000 
∆bt
+ 0.274 0.190 1.439 0.157 
∆bt−1
+  0.287* 0.152 1.886 0.066 
∆bt−2
+  0.447*** 0.111 4.028 0.000 
∆Riskt 0.302 0.187 1.615 0.113 
∆EXt 1.726 1.094 1.578 0.121 
∆EXt−1 3.402*** 0.945 3.600 0.001 
∆EXt−2 3.546*** 0.707 5.013 0.000 
∆EXt−3 1.409** 0.637 2.211 0.032 
∆Policyt 0.855*** 0.069 12.449 0.000 
∆Policyt−1 0.157* 0.085 1.842 0.072 
∆Policyt−2 0.130*** 0.032 4.104 0.000 
∆Policyt−3 0.241*** 0.045 5.324 0.000 
∆πt
e 0.276** 0.134 2.052 0.046 
∆πt−1
e  -0.488*** 0.155 -3.156 0.003 
∆πt−2
e  -0.747*** 0.146 -5.131 0.000 
∆πt−3
e  -0.259** 0.126 -2.057 0.045 
Time 11.629*** 1.256 9.261 0.000 
Constant -0.476*** 0.048 -9.965 0.000 
 
WSR : -0.454 (0.652) 
R-squared: 0.953 
RSS: 58.805 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic: 2.191 
F-statistics: 653.968*** (0.000) 
ARDL(3, 4, 4, 3, 1, 0, 4) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝝅𝒕
𝒆 
ECt−1 -0.603*** 0.054 -11.168 0.000 
∆πt−1
e  0.123** 0.052 2.372 0.022 
∆πt−2
e  0.241*** 0.056 4.336 0.000 
∆bt
− 0.184*** 0.055 3.330 0.002 
∆bt−1
−  0.351*** 0.057 6.118 0.000 
∆bt−2
−  0.313*** 0.058 5.431 0.000 
∆bt−3
−  0.142** 0.060 2.371 0.022 
∆bt
+ -0.171*** 0.058 -2.949 0.005 
∆bt−1
+  0.152** 0.062 2.450 0.018 
∆bt−2
+  0.206** 0.085 2.422 0.019 
∆bt−3
+  0.211*** 0.052 4.016 0.000 
∆Riskt -0.141*** 0.045 -3.120 0.003 
∆Riskt−1 -0.115** 0.044 -2.629 0.011 
∆Riskt−2 -0.115** 0.055 -2.089 0.042 
∆Lendingt 0.098*** 0.031 3.189 0.002 
∆EXt 0.009 0.306 0.031 0.976 
∆Policyt -0.114*** 0.031 -3.647 0.001 
∆Policyt−1 0.038** 0.016 2.456 0.018 
∆Policyt−2 0.034** 0.014 2.349 0.023 
∆Policyt−3 -0.110*** 0.011 -9.690 0.000 
Constant 0.377*** 0.125 3.022 0.004 
 
 
 
 
 Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.886 
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Table 4.18 (continued) 
WSR : 4.992*** (0.000) 
R-squared: 0.896 
RSS: 12.392 
F-statistics: 163.148*** (0.000) 
Notes: The WSR represents the Wald test for the null hypothesis of short-run symmetry and the numbers in 
parentheses are marginal significance levels. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance of the 
coefficient at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for residual 
sum of squares. Robust standard errors are used for the equations of Lendingt and EXt due to the concern of 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity shown in Table A.1 (Appendix 2), and conventional standard errors are 
used for the equation of πt
e.  
Table 4.19: Short-run asymmetric estimations for the Philippines 
Table 4.19 (continued) 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio T-probability 
ARDL(2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.335*** 0.053 -6.283 0.000 
∆Lendingt−1 0.367*** 0.084 4.349 0.000 
∆bt
− 0.098* 0.057 1.710 0.091 
∆bt
+ 0.057 0.045 1.268 0.208 
∆Riskt -0.179 0.125 -1.427 0.157 
∆EXt 0.136 0.088 1.541 0.127 
∆EXt−1 0.140** 0.066 2.109 0.038 
∆Policyt -0.027 0.041 -0.654 0.515 
∆Policyt−1 0.226*** 0.052 4.390 0.000 
∆πt
e 0.168* 0.091 1.847 0.068 
Constant 4.030*** 0.675 5.972 0.000 
 
 
 
WSR: 0.528 (0.599) 
R-squared: 0.660 
RSS: 41.077 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.846 
F-statistics: 13.789*** (0.000) 
ARDL(1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 5, 0) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑬𝑿𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.391*** 0.063 -6.172 0.000 
∆bt
− 0.020 0.117 0.167 0.868 
∆bt
+ -0.062 0.126 -0.492 0.624 
∆bt−1
+  0.334** 0.127 2.627 0.010 
∆Riskt 0.883*** 0.216 4.097 0.000 
∆Lendingt 0.596*** 0.219 2.716 0.008 
∆Policyt 0.120 0.138 0.866 0.389 
∆Policyt−1 0.026 0.129 0.203 0.840 
∆Policyt−2 0.273** 0.123 2.218 0.029 
∆Policyt−3 0.001 0.088 0.007 0.994 
∆Policyt−4 0.159** 0.069 2.314 0.023 
∆πt
e -0.471*** 0.161 -2.920 0.005 
Constant 3.829*** 0.662 5.784 0.000 
     
WSR: -1.172 (0.244) Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.766 
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Table 4.19 (continued) 
R-squared: 0.531 
RSS: 149.299 
F-statistics: 6.863*** (0.000) 
ARDL(3, 4, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝝅𝒕
𝒆 
ECt−1 -0.603*** 0.054 -11.168 0.000 
∆πt−1
e  0.123** 0.052 2.372 0.022 
∆πt−2
e  0.241*** 0.056 4.336 0.000 
∆bt
− 0.184*** 0.055 3.330 0.002 
∆bt−1
−  0.351*** 0.057 6.118 0.000 
∆bt−2
−  0.313*** 0.058 5.431 0.000 
∆bt−3
−  0.142** 0.060 2.371 0.022 
∆bt
+ -0.171*** 0.058 -2.949 0.005 
∆bt−1
+  0.152** 0.062 2.450 0.018 
∆bt−2
+  0.206** 0.085 2.422 0.019 
∆bt−3
+  0.211*** 0.052 4.016 0.000 
∆Riskt -0.141*** 0.045 -3.120 0.003 
∆Riskt−1 -0.115** 0.044 -2.629 0.011 
∆Riskt−2 -0.115** 0.055 -2.089 0.042 
∆Lendingt 0.098*** 0.031 3.189 0.002 
∆EXt 0.009 0.306 0.031 0.976 
∆Policyt -0.114*** 0.031 -3.647 0.001 
∆Policyt−1 0.038** 0.016 2.456 0.018 
∆Policyt−2 0.034** 0.014 2.349 0.023 
∆Policyt−3 -0.110*** 0.011 -9.690 0.000 
Constant 0.377*** 0.125 3.022 0.004 
 
 
 
 
WSR: 4.992*** (0.000) 
R-squared: 0.896 
RSS: 12.392 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.886 
F-statistics: 163.148*** (0.000) 
Notes: The WSR represents the Wald test for the null hypothesis of short-run symmetry and the numbers in 
parentheses are marginal significance levels. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance of the 
coefficient at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for 
Residual Sum of Squares. Robust standard errors are used for the equations of Lendingt and EXt due to the 
concern of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity shown in Table A.2 (Appendix 2), and conventional 
standard errors are used for the equation of πt
e. 
Table 4.20: Short-run asymmetric estimations for Turkey 
Table 4.20 (continued) 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio T-probability 
ARDL(4, 0, 0, 4, 0, 3, 3) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒕 
ECt−1 -0.949*** 0.137 -6.910 0.000 
∆Lendingt−1 0.357*** 0.126 2.827 0.008 
∆Lendingt−2 0.394*** 0.104 3.769 0.001 
∆Lendingt−3 0.268** 0.104 2.586 0.014 
∆bt
− -0.159 0.124 -1.285 0.207 
∆bt
+ -0.162 0.100 -1.619 0.115 
 
 128 
 
Table 4.20 (continued) 
∆Riskt 1.581*** 0.278 5.686 0.000 
∆Riskt−1 0.057 0.408 0.139 0.890 
∆Riskt−2 0.461** 0.198 2.329 0.026 
∆Riskt−3 -1.067** 0.431 -2.478 0.018 
∆EXt 0.679 1.622 0.419 0.678 
∆Policyt 0.624*** 0.152 4.095 0.000 
∆Policyt−1 -0.016 0.102 -0.154 0.879 
∆Policyt−2 -0.370*** 0.107 -3.450 0.002 
∆πt
e -0.091 0.076 -1.198 0.239 
∆πt−1
e  -0.491*** 0.161 -3.052 0.004 
∆πt−2
e  -0.327*** 0.076 -4.309 0.000 
Constant 9.678*** 1.445 6.697 0.000 
 
 
 
WSR : 0.015 (0.988) 
R-squared: 0.909 
RSS: 36.200 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 1.959 
F-statistics: 244.390*** (0.000) 
ARDL(1, 5, 5, 1, 4, 5, 5) selected using the HQC. Dependent variable: ∆𝛑𝐭
𝐞 
ECt−1 -1.038*** 0.104 -9.945 0.000 
∆bt
− -0.263*** 0.067 -3.920 0.001 
∆bt−1
−  0.735*** 0.118 6.222 0.000 
∆bt−2
−  0.841*** 0.108 7.819 0.000 
∆bt−3
−  0.452*** 0.097 4.681 0.000 
∆bt−4
−  0.223*** 0.070 3.170 0.004 
∆bt
+ 0.248*** 0.062 3.998 0.001 
∆bt−1
+  1.105*** 0.122 9.063 0.000 
∆bt−2
+  0.693*** 0.124 5.602 0.000 
∆bt−3
+  0.484*** 0.081 5.949 0.000 
∆bt−4
+  0.196*** 0.048 4.087 0.000 
∆Riskt 0.978*** 0.180 5.435 0.000 
∆Lendingt 0.172*** 0.060 2.860 0.009 
∆Lendingt−1 0.538*** 0.071 7.597 0.000 
∆Lendingt−2 0.479*** 0.067 7.152 0.000 
∆Lendingt−3 0.133** 0.062 2.147 0.042 
∆EXt -2.438*** 0.610 -3.996 0.001 
∆EXt−1 -8.280*** 1.608 -5.148 0.000 
∆EXt−2 -9.740*** 1.172 -8.311 0.000 
∆EXt−3 -7.016*** 1.473 -4.765 0.000 
∆EXt−4 -3.066*** 0.901 -3.402 0.002 
∆Policyt 0.132* 0.077 1.714 0.099 
∆Policyt−1 -0.071 0.083 -0.847 0.405 
∆Policyt−2 0.036 0.040 0.899 0.378 
∆Policyt−3 0.271*** 0.071 3.801 0.001 
∆Policyt−4 0.333*** 0.066 5.080 0.000 
Constant 10.821*** 1.164 9.293 0.000 
 
     
WSR : -6.022*** (0.000) 
R-squared: 0.963 
Durbin–Watson statistic: 2.891 
F-statistics: 347.138*** (0.000) 
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Table 4.20 (continued) 
RSS: 5.045 
Notes: The WSR represents the Wald test for the null hypothesis of short-run symmetry and the numbers in 
parentheses are marginal significance levels. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate statistical significance of the 
coefficient at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. RSS stands for residual 
sum of squares. Robust standard errors are used for the equations of Lendingt and πt
e due to the concern of 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity shown in Table A.3 (Appendix 2), and conventional standard errors are 
used for the equation of EXt. 
4.4 Empirical results for the ARDL models with the interactive dummy variable for 
debt threshold 
The external debt threshold of 40 per cent of GDP is chosen, following several seminal 
studies, such as Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001), IMF (2002), Reinhart et al. (2003), and 
Manasse and Roubini (2009).16 Based on the ARDL model specified in Section 3.6, we 
initially conduct the bounds test to identify the presence of cointegration between the 
variables, and then focus on the analysis of long-run estimates. 
4.4.1 The bounds tests for cointegration 
Table 4.21: Bounds testing for cointegration with the interactive term 
Model specification Brazil Philippines Turkey 
FV tV FV tV FV tV 
F(Lendingt|bt, Dt × bt, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 14.160*** 
 
-6.206*** 
 
3.435 
 
-3.576 
 
6.564*** 
 
-6.391*** 
 F(EXt|bt, Dt × bt, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 6.095*** 
 
-4.330* 
 
2.531 
 
-3.105 
 
1.999 
 
-1.274 
 
F(πt
e|bt, Dt × bt, Riskt, Lendingt , EXt, Policyt) 9.188*** 
 
-5.634*** 
 
5.045** 
 
-4.949** 
 
9.551*** 
 
-5.626*** 
 
Notes: FV is the F-statistic for testing the long-run coefficient significance with a linear time trend. The 
asymptotic critical value bounds for the FV are (3.93; 5.23), (3.12; 4.25), and (2.75; 3.79) at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. tV is the t-statistic for testing the significance of a long-
run coefficient with time trend involved. The asymptotic critical value bounds for the tV are (-3.96; -5.13), 
(-3.41; -4.52), and (-3.13; -4.21) at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. 
                                                          
16 We also estimate the ARDL models for the debt thresholds of 35 per cent and 45 per cent of GDP, but the 
study includes only the results using the debt threshold of 40 per cent, as that value is widely recommended by a 
number of empirical studies on emerging economies (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; IMF, 2002; Manasse 
and Roubini, 2009). 
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Table 4.21 shows the results of the bounds testing procedure applied to the ARDL models 
with an interactive dummy term. These results are in accordance with the earlier findings 
reported in Table 4.4. We find the presence of long-run equilibrium relationships in 
regressions normalised on Lendingt, EXt, and πt
e for Brazil, while cointegration exists only in 
the equation for  πt
e for the Philippines. In the case of Turkey, the variables are cointegrated 
when Lendingt and πt
e serve as dependent variables.  
4.4.2 Long-run estimation 
Table 4.22: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients with an interactive dummy 
term for Brazil 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Dt × bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt -0.048 
(0.370) 
 
 
 
-2.180** 
(0.887) 
 
-0.936 
(0.684) 
 
- 
1.771 
(2.276) 
 
2.293*** 
(0.349) 
 
-0.376 
(0.884) 
 
-0.145 
(0.105) 
 
EXt -0.100*** 
(0.036) 
 
0.218 
(0.150) 
 
0.295** 
(0.114) 
 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
 
- 
0.070 
(0.044) 
 
0.069 
(0.090) 
 
0.039** 
(0.018) 
 
πt
e -0.329*** 
(0.117) 
 
-0.499** 
(0.194) 
 
0.382** 
(0.152) 
 
-0.044 
(0.032) 
 
-0.539 
(0.523) 
 
0.179** 
(0.077) 
 
- 
0.068*** 
(0.024) 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are conventional standard errors, according to the results of the diagnostic tests 
given in Table 4.1. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.   
Table 4.22 reports the estimated long-run parameters of the ARDL models with the 
interactive term for Brazil. In general, there is evidence of non-linearity, with the effects of 
the fiscal balance on the transmission channels of monetary policy relying on the external 
debt stock. Considering the link between the fiscal balance and the interest rate, the 
significantly negative coefficient on the interactive threshold dummy variable reflects that the 
borrowing cost is more elastic to changes in the fiscal balance, once the external debt passes 
40 per cent of GDP. When the external debt to GDP is below 40 per cent, the impact of fiscal 
policy becomes weaker, shown by the insignificant estimated coefficient on bt. Likewise, the 
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results obtained from the regression normalised on πt
e show the point where the response of 
monetary variables to fiscal shocks depends on the level of external debt. A deterioration in 
the fiscal balance by 1 per cent under the high-debt regime raises the level of expected 
inflation by an additional 0.499 per cent. The regression of EXt reveals a different finding 
from those for Lendingt and πt
e, as there is no evidence of a debt threshold effect. However, 
we still point out that a fiscal imbalance rather than the policy rate acts as a major driver of 
the exchange rate, since the coefficient on the fiscal variable is significantly negative. 
Table 4.23: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients with an interactive dummy 
term for the Philippines 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Dt × bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e 0.102 
(0.113) 
-0.021 
(0.152) 
0.449** 
(0.189) 
0.482*** 
(0.117) 
-0.030 
(0.042) 
0.105 
(0.105) 
- 
 
0.034 
(0.027) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
from Table 4.21. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors due to the presence of serial correlation 
shown in Table 4.2. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.   
As seen from Table 4.23, the results for the Philippines show that there is no long-run 
relationship between fiscal performance and inflation expectations, irrespective of the level of 
external debt to GDP. However, we still find that a high probability of default risk is an 
obstacle to conducting monetary policy, as it can give rise to inflation expectations. This is 
consistent with the model of the risk premium, as well as the findings obtained from the 
ARDL model without the interactive dummy term.  
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Table 4.24: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients with an interactive dummy 
term for Turkey 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Dt × bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt -0.151* 
(0.086) 
 
 
0.082 
(0.087) 
 
0.935* 
(0.504) 
 
- 
 
1.721** 
(0.764) 
 
0.411*** 
(0.076) 
 
0.309*** 
(0.103) 
 
-0.144*** 
(0.045) 
 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -1.200*** 
(0.297) 
 
 
-0.182* 
(0.106) 
 
3.002*** 
(0.563) 
 
-0.503 
(0.320) 
 
1.320 
(1.004) 
 
 
0.364** 
(0.162) 
 
- 
 
-0.043 
(0.055) 
 
 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
from Table 4.21. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for the regression of Lendingt due to the 
presence of serial correlation shown in Table 4.3, and conventional standard errors for the regression of πt
e. The 
asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per 
cent significance levels, respectively.   
Turning now to the case of Turkey, we find that high borrowing costs can be attributed to 
high levels of fiscal deficits and sovereign risk premium, as seen in Table 4.24. However, 
there is no existence of a debt threshold, since the estimated parameter on (Dt × bt) is 
statistically insignificant. When πt
e is the dependent variable, the coefficients of the fiscal 
variable and the interactive threshold dummy are both negatively signed and significant. This 
demonstrates that the long-run effect of fiscal deficits on the expected inflation rate varies 
depending on debt performance. The excess debt accumulation of over 40 per cent of GDP 
shows that inflation becomes more vulnerable to fiscal imbalances. The role of fiscal policy 
is considerably important in controlling inflation, even when external debt remains at levels 
below the threshold. 
4.5 Diagnostic test and robustness checks 
4.5.1 Diagnostic tests 
In addition to the diagnostic tests (i.e. autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, normality, and 
functional form) conducted in Section 4.2.1, it is important to check the stability of the 
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model, since the estimation of long-run coefficients may be unstable due to structural changes 
in these economies. We utilise the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the 
cumulative sum of the squared recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) tests proposed by Brown et 
al. (1975) to check for parameter stability, based on the ECMs estimated in Section 4.2.4.17 
The primary advantage of these tests over the Chow tests is that they do not require prior 
determination of break points. If the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots cross the 5 per cent 
critical bounds, this implies that the model is unstable. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 present the plot of 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for the ECMs estimated for Brazil, the Philippines, and 
Turkey, respectively. In general, the plots fall inside the critical bounds of the confidence 
interval at the 5 per cent significance level, suggesting that there is no indication of parameter 
instability. 
  
                                                          
17 It is necessary to use both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, since the latter may be more informative if there 
are various parameter shifts, which reduces the power of the CUSUM test. 
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Dependent variable: ∆Lendingt 
  
Dependent variable: ∆EXt 
  
Dependent variable: ∆Policyt 
  
Dependent variable: ∆πt
e 
 
Figure 4.1: Plots of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for Brazil 
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Dependent variable: ∆Policyt 
  
Dependent variable: ∆πt
e 
Figure 4.2: Plots of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for the Philippines 
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Dependent variable: ∆Riskt 
  
Dependent variable: ∆Lendingt 
  
Dependent variable: ∆πt
e 
Figure 4.3: Plots of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for Turkey 
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4.5.2 Robustness checks 
4.5.2.1 Estimated ARDL models with structural breaks 
The LS unit root tests in Chapter 3 reveal the presence of several structural breaks. Since 
model estimation that neglects breaks can cause serious misspecification, we extend the 
selected ARDL models by adding dummy variables. This also allows for a comparison 
between the estimated models with and without breaks. The identification of breakpoints is 
associated with the results for the LS unit root tests presented in Tables 3.7 to 3.9. We only 
take into consideration the breaks in the intercept and slope that are statistically significant. 
Table 4.25 provides a list of dummy variables used in the corresponding ARDL models.18  
Table 4.25: Dummy variables 
Variable Brazil The Philippines Turkey 
Intercept 
dummy 
Trend 
dummy 
Intercept 
dummy 
Trend 
dummy 
Intercept 
dummy 
Trend 
dummy 
bt 2003Q2 
2013Q3 
2003Q2 
2013Q3 
- 
1998Q2 
2004Q2 
2006Q1 
2006Q1 
2010Q1 
Riskt 2005Q2 - - 
1998Q1 
2005Q4 
- 
2008Q1 
2009Q2 
Lendingt - - 1994Q3 
1994Q3 
1998Q4 
2005Q4 
2005Q4 
2009Q3 
EXt - 
2004Q2 
2011Q4 
1997Q1 
1997Q1 
2005Q4 
- 
2007Q1 
2014Q2 
Policyt 2000Q1 2008Q2 - 
1999Q2 
2001Q3 
- 
2005Q4 
2009Q3 
πt
e 
- - - 
1994Q2 
2004Q4 
2006Q2 2004Q2 
 
a. The ARDL bounds tests for cointegration 
The results for the bounds testing procedures associated with the ARDL models that have a 
structural break are reported in Table 4.26. In general, these tests show similar results to those 
                                                          
18 Structural breaks in Table 4.25 are selected based on the significance of the coefficients on dummy variables 
indicated in Tables 3.7 to 3.9 from model C. 
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indicated in Table 4.4. For Brazil, we find a significant cointegrating relationship when 
Lendingt, Policyt, and πt
e are considered as dependent variables. The null hypothesis of no 
cointegration cannot be rejected in the regression normalised on EXt, which is different from 
the findings obtained from the bounds tests without breaks. Considering the Philippines, both 
the F-statistic and t-statistic significantly reject the null hypothesis in the cases where 
Policyt and πt
e appear as dependent variables. This is comparable with results for the ARDL 
models in the absence of structural breaks. With regard to Turkey’s model, there are only two 
cointegration vectors among the variables for the regressions of Riskt and πt
e. The F-statistics 
obtained from the other regressions do not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. This 
differs from the results of the ARDL models estimated without structural breaks which 
suggests the existence of cointegration in the equation of  bt and Lendingt as well. 
Table 4.26: Bounds testing for cointegration with structural breaks 
Model specification Brazil Philippines Turkey 
FV tV FV tV FV tV 
F(bt|Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 3.735 -4.122 2.426 -2.366 3.777 -0.647 
F(Riskt|bt, Lendingt, EXt , Policyt, πt
e) 3.391 -2.627 3.644 -4.753** 5.029** -4.974** 
F(Lendingt|bt, Riskt, EXt , Policyt, πt
e) 7.527*** -4.893** 3.602 -4.203* 3.510 -4.321* 
F(EXt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , Policyt, πt
e) 3.299 -4.196 3.365 -4.375* 3.251 -3.032 
F(Policyt|bt, Riskt, Lendingt , EXt, πt
e) 11.789*** -8.406*** 13.608*** -8.830*** 2.293 -1.058 
F(πt
e|bt, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 9.613*** -6.494*** 7.044*** -5.983*** 8.138*** -3.275 
Notes: FV is the F-statistics for testing the long-run coefficients significance with a linear time trend. The 
asymptotic critical value bounds for the FV are (3.93; 5.23), (3.12; 4.25), and (2.75; 3.79) at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. tV is the t-statistics for testing the significance of a long-
run coefficient with time trend involved. The asymptotic critical value bounds for the tV are (-3.96; -5.13), 
(-3.41; -4.52), and (-3.13; -4.21) at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. 
b. Long-run estimations 
Tables 4.27 to 4.29 show the results of long-run estimations for the ARDL models that 
include structural breaks for Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey, respectively. Generally 
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speaking, there is robust evidence of fiscal effects on the transmission channels of monetary 
policy in accordance with the risk premium model for Brazil and Turkey, but not the 
Philippines. The parameter estimates for bt, as well as Riskt, are very similar to those 
obtained in Section 4.2.3, and have the same signs. For Brazil, interest rates and expected 
inflation rates significantly rise with budget deficits, while the risk premium has a significant 
positive effect on those monetary variables. The inclusion of dummy variables does not affect 
the signs and significance of the long-run coefficients for the Philippines. As seen in Table 
4.28, the relationship between bt and πt
e is insignificant, which is different from the estimates 
for the other countries that reveal a significant relationship between bt and πt
e. For both 
Turkey and Brazil, the expected inflation rates rise as a result of higher levels of budget 
deficits and the probability of sovereign default, supporting the existence of the model of the 
risk premium in those countries. 
Table 4.27: Results of estimated long-run coefficients with structural breaks for Brazil 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt -1.543** 
(0.648) 
0.853** 
(0.352) 
- -0.220 
(2.850) 
1.770*** 
(0.309) 
-2.052*** 
(0.659) 
-0.105 
(0.095) 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -0.242* 
(0.108) 
0.531*** 
(0.110) 
-0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.410 
(0.396) 
0.103 
(0.072) 
- 0.075*** 
(0.019) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.26. Numbers in parentheses are conventional standard errors, according to the results of the 
diagnostic tests given in Table 4.1. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.28: Results of estimated long-run coefficients with structural breaks for the Philippines 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e 
0.045 
(0.092) 
0.419** 
(0.181) 
0.311** 
(0.122) 
-0.001 
(0.028) 
0.061 
(0.111) 
- 
-0.245** 
(0.098) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors due to the presence of serial correlation shown in Table 4.2. 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 
per cent significance levels, respectively. 
Table 4.29: Results of estimated long-run coefficients with structural breaks for Turkey 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt Riskt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -1.102*** 
(0.338) 
2.815** 
(1.072) 
-0.452 
(0.391) 
1.281 
(1.827) 
0.339 
(0.200) 
- 
-0.002 
(0.451) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.27. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors for the regression of Lendingt due 
to the presence of serial correlation shown in Table 4.3, and conventional standard errors for the regression of 
πt
e. The asterisks ***, **, * represent the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
4.5.2.2 An alternative measure of sovereign risk premium 
A further robustness check is undertaken to estimate the ARDL models with an alternative 
measure of the sovereign risk premium. We use EMBI spreads (denoted as EMBIt), as 
suggested by previous studies, such as Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), Baldacci et al. (2008), 
and Dell’erba et al. (2013a), instead of the risk premium on US dollar-denominated debt. The 
sample range differs slightly from the original one described in Chapter 3, due to data 
availability on EMBI spreads.19 The final ARDL models are specified by the combination of 
                                                          
19 Data for EMBI spreads is available from 1999Q1 to 2016Q1 for all 3 countries.  
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the HQC and diagnostic tests, as mentioned in Section 4.2.1. Details on model selection are 
reported in Appendix 3.  
a. The ARDL bounds tests for cointegration 
The bounds tests for cointegration, shown in Table 4.30, accord with our earlier tests shown 
in Table 4.4, indicating that there is a cointegrating relationship between the variables in the 
regression of  πt
e for all countries. Unlike the previous results, there is no significant long-run 
relationship between the interest rate and the explanatory variables for Brazil, since the FV 
and tV test statistics are both smaller than their respective lower critical values. In the case of 
the Philippines, the F-statistic firmly rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration when EXt 
is the dependent variable. This also differs from the findings obtained from the ARDL model 
using the US dollar-denominated debt as a proxy for the sovereign risk premium. The results 
for Turkey are still consistent with those obtained previously, regardless of the choice of the 
risk premium measure. 
Table 4.30: Bounds testing for cointegration using EMBI spreads 
Model specification Brazil Philippines Turkey 
FV tV FV tV FV tV 
F(bt|EMBIt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 1.526 -1.012 
 
4.100* 
 
-3.816 
 
5.600*** -1.697 
F(EMBIt|bt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 5.751*** 
 
-1.895 
 
4.883** 
 
-4.574** 
 
3.925* 
 
0.313 
 F(Lendingt|bt, EMBIt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 2.670 
 
-1.819 
 
1.745 
 
-2.250 
 
10.577*** -7.573*** 
 F(EXt|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 4.678** 
 
-3.614 
 
4.533** 
 
-2.275 
 
1.689 
 
-0.151 
 F(Policyt|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, EXt, πt
e) 4.701** 
 
-3.741 
 
3.597 
 
-3.300 
 
7.343*** 
 
-3.064 
 F(πt
e|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 6.679*** 
 
-5.323*** 
 
4.708** 
 
-5.209*** 
 
6.651*** 
 
-3.736 
 Notes: FV is the F-statistics for testing the long-run coefficients significance with a linear time trend. The 
asymptotic critical value bounds for the FV statistic are (3.93; 5.23), (3.12; 4.25), and (2.75; 3.79) at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. tV is the t-statistic for testing the significance 
of a long-run coefficient with time trend involved. The asymptotic critical value bounds for the tV are (-3.96; -
5.13), (-3.41; -4.52), and (-3.13; -4.21) at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels, 
respectively. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 
per cent significance levels, respectively. 
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b. Long-run estimation 
Given the results of the bounds tests, Tables 4.31 to 4.33 present the estimated long-run 
coefficients when the regressions are normalised on Lendingt, EXt, and πt
e for the three 
emerging economies. In general, the results obtained do not differ with the use of a different 
proxy for the sovereign risk premium, confirming that high expected inflation rates can be 
attributed to larger budget deficits and higher default risks for Brazil and Turkey, but not for 
the Philippines. Consistent with the previous findings shown in Table 4.5, the significance of 
the estimated coefficients on bt and EMBIt in the regression of EXt supports the important 
role of the fiscal balance to exchange rate movements for Brazil. Interestingly, we discover 
that the interest rate significantly rises as a response of fiscal deterioration for Turkey, while 
the models using the risk premium on US dollar-denominated debt reveal no significant 
relationship between these two variables. 
Table 4.31: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients using EMBI spreads for Brazil 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt EMBIt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
EXt -0.112** 
(0.034) 
 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
 
- 0.095** 
(0.047) 
 
0.106** 
(0.042) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
πt
e -0.366* 
(0.200) 
 
(0.108) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.050 
(0.050) 
-0.652 
(0.823) 
0.168 
(0.138) 
- 0.075** 
(0.032) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.30. Numbers in parentheses are conventional standard errors, according to the results of 
diagnostic tests given in Table A.4, Appendix 3. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 4.32: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients using EMBI spreads for the Philippines 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
 
Regressor 
bt EMBIt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
EXt 
0.649 
(0.728) 
 
0.139** 
(0.061) 
 
-5.429** 
(2.629) 
 
- 
2.567 
(1.944) 
 
0.318 
(1.122) 
 
0.383 
(0.465) 
 
πt
e -0.029 
(0.081) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.759** 
(0.199) 
-0.018 
(0.061) 
0.125 
(0.219) 
- 
0.082 
(0.052) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for “not applicable” as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.30. Numbers in parentheses are conventional standard errors, according to the results of 
diagnostic tests given in Table A.5, Appendix 3. The asterisk ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
Table 4.33: Results of the estimated long-run coefficients using EMBI spreads for Turkey 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
 
Regressor 
bt EMBIt Lendingt EXt Policyt πt
e Time 
Lendingt -0.507** 
(0.189) 
 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
 
- 3.138*** 
(1.017) 
 
0.364*** 
(0.066) 
 
0.485*** 
(0.091) 
 
-0.168*** 
(0.052) 
 
EXt N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
πt
e -1.452*** 
(0.393) 
0.071** 
(0.018) 
-0.010 
(0.223) 
-0.045 
(1.948) 
0.237 
(0.143) 
- -0.017 
(0.107) 
Notes: The term N/A stands for ‘not applicable’ as the null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected 
according to Table 4.30. Numbers in parentheses are conventional standard errors, according to the results of 
diagnostic tests given in Table A.6, Appendix 3. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels of significance, respectively. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reports the empirical findings of the effects of budget deficits on the 
transmission channels of monetary policy, following the three-step procedure proposed in 
Chapter 3. Prior to running the model, the ARDL specification is chosen using the HQC, 
together with a battery of diagnostic tests. In the first step, we employ the bounds testing 
procedure for cointegration. Based on these results, the long-run coefficients associated with 
the ARDL models are estimated. There is a significant positive relationship between fiscal 
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deficits and inflation expectations for Brazil and Turkey in the long run. The model of the 
risk premium seems to perform well in the case of Brazil, since an increase in budget deficits 
also leads to higher interest rates and a domestic currency depreciation. This reflects a high 
degree of vulnerability to weak fiscal performance in that country. The estimates for the 
Philippines, however, demonstrate considerable differences from those for the other emerging 
countries. There is no evidence supporting the existence of cointegration between fiscal and 
monetary variables, as suggested by the model of the risk premium. The ECMs for the short-
run dynamics of the system are estimated in the third step, in parallel with Granger causality 
tests. Results for the ECMs and Granger causality tests are in line with those for long-run 
estimations, suggesting that budget deficits are significantly correlated with monetary 
variables for Brazil and Turkey, but not for the Philippines. As such, the findings explicitly 
demonstrate that the Philippines’ Government has committed itself toward a more sustainable 
fiscal stance, compared with the other emerging countries. This argument is well supported 
by the fact that although the overall budget in all three countries is in chronic deficit, the 
Philippines has shown more positive fiscal prospects than the others, as a result of the 
successful and consistent strategies implemented in the medium-term fiscal framework.20 As 
a result, that country has maintained its primary surplus, with a stable downward trajectory in 
both government and external debt since 2000. In contrast, Brazil exhibits the worst fiscal 
performance, in which the primary balance has sharply deteriorated, and government debt has 
grown at an alarming rate during recent years. This solidifies the outcome that the impact of a 
worsening fiscal position appears to be the strongest for Brazil. 
To consider the robustness of the results, we perform further estimations: (i) including 
dummy variables for the presence of a structural break, and (ii) using an alternative measure 
for the sovereign risk premium. The empirical results for both the ARDL models with breaks 
                                                          
20 The medium-term fiscal policy framework enacted by the Philippines’ Government seeks to maintain the ratio 
of overall fiscal deficit to GDP at 2 per cent throughout 2013–2016, mostly by tax administration enhancements 
to raise tax revenue. 
 145 
 
and those using EMBI spreads as a proxy for the risk premium support the earlier findings, 
that being that a weak fiscal position is detrimental to the transmission channels of monetary 
policy for Brazil and Turkey, but not for the Philippines. The robustness checks, in 
conjunction with the stability tests, confirm the validity of our results. 
Furthermore, we employ the NARDL models to examine whether a non-linear pattern 
between a country’s fiscal position and its transmission channels of monetary policy can be 
identified. The results of long-run estimations suggest that the responsiveness of monetary 
variables to variations in the budget balance is asymmetric. More particularly, lending rates 
and inflation expectations rise more as a consequence of fiscal deterioration, compared with 
how they fall as a result of a fiscal improvement in Brazil and Turkey. The asymmetric 
relationship between a country’s fiscal policy and the exchange rate does not hold in either 
the long run or the short run in those economies. The results for the Philippines, however, 
demonstrate a completely different pattern, indicating that the exchange rate responds more 
significantly to an improvement in fiscal balance in the long run. However, there is no clear 
evidence of non-linearity in fiscal effects on the other monetary variables for the Philippines. 
Besides the use of the NARDL models, the use of interactive dummies for the external 
debt threshold further confirms the non-linearity of the long-run relationship between the 
fiscal balance and transmission channels of monetary policy for Brazil and Turkey. The 
elasticity of monetary variables to fiscal performance rises considerably when a country shifts 
from a low debt to a high debt regime. This supports the results of Belhocine and Dell’erba 
(2013) and Dell’erba et al. (2013b), who find that emerging economies become much more 
vulnerable as a result of high default risks emanating from large indebtedness. We observe 
that interest rates and inflation expectations react more strongly to changes in the budget 
balance-to-GDP ratio once the external–debt to GDP ratio goes beyond the threshold value of 
40 per cent for Brazil. For Turkey, inflation expectations are more responsive to fiscal 
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deficits when debt accumulates over the threshold level. In line with the ARDL findings 
obtained without an interactive dummy, there is no evidence of a long-run relationship 
between the fiscal position and transmission channels of monetary policy for the Philippines, 
regardless of the stock of external debt. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
A series of economic crises in the 1990s and 2000s have persistently devastated the global 
economy. Advanced economies have struggled against a drastic economic slowdown, while 
emerging economies have remained vulnerable because of excessive debt, high inflation, and 
political instability. Global risk aversion, as a result of uncertain economic prospects, has 
become more challenging for emerging countries. Huge capital outflows from major markets 
have deteriorated their fiscal position and debt trajectories. In the underlying trend of high 
sovereign default risks, a worsening fiscal trend would drive up interest rates, weaken the 
domestic currency, and eventually, trigger high inflation. This raises a concern about the 
effectiveness of tightening monetary policy in the situation where fiscal policy performs as a 
major driver of monetary variables. To address that concern, this thesis primarily examines 
the extent to which the fiscal position affects different transmission channels of monetary 
policy in three emerging economies that suffer from chronic fiscal deficits and persistently 
high inflation. From there, we seek to answer the question of whether a contractionary 
monetary policy fails to control inflation, without the need for corresponding action from 
fiscal policy. 
This thesis provides an insight into the relationship between fiscal policy and the 
transmission channels of monetary policy in Brazil, the Philippines, and Turkey, by 
empirically investigating: (i) the effects of fiscal performance on the interest rate, exchange 
rate and inflation expectations in both the long run and short run; (ii) the asymmetric effects 
of fiscal performance on those monetary variables, and (iii) the role of country-specific fiscal 
performance on monetary variables. A comparison of the impacts of monetary policy and 
fiscal policy would make recommendations on the suitability of adopting an inflation 
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targeting regime, together with the necessity of monetary and fiscal coordination, to achieve 
price stability for emerging economies.   
The thesis consists of a comprehensive literature review that examines the relationship 
between fiscal policy and transmission channels of monetary policy, in both theory and 
practice. Theoretically, it is based on the model of sovereign risk premium, which suggests 
that a weakening fiscal position, associated with higher default risks, results in interest rate 
increases, a domestic currency depreciation, and eventually, higher inflation expectations. A 
number of empirical studies consistently show the strong relationship between fiscal 
performance and interest rates, or between fiscal performance and exchange rates, for 
emerging economies. Nevertheless, there are only a few studies investigating the link 
between fiscal policy and inflation expectations using the model of sovereign risk premium. 
Another important issue emerging from the literature review is the potential non-linearity in 
fiscal effects, driven by the nature of fiscal shocks and country-specific fundamentals. Given 
the evidence of the determining role of fiscal policy for the transmission channels of 
monetary policy, some scholars question the feasibility of adopting an inflation targeting 
regime, since maintaining high interest rates would increase fiscal deficits by raising the cost 
of government borrowing. On the other hand, supporters of inflation targeting rationalise that 
fiscal consolidation would be achieved as a result of implementing an inflation targeting 
regime. The findings from this thesis, therefore, make a significant contribution to the 
discussion for and against the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in emerging 
economies.  
The model specified in Chapter 3 applies the ARDL modelling procedure to examine the 
impacts of fiscal performance on transmission channels of monetary policy. This represents a 
distinguishing feature of the thesis from previous studies, which employ simple linear 
regression models. There are several distinct advantages of the ARDL models over other 
 149 
 
time-series approaches: (i) the discrimination between the long-run and short-run estimations; 
(ii) no requirement for the same order of integration; (iii) the correction of autocorrelation 
and endogeneity, and (iv) the efficiency gained in small sample sizes. Apart from a linear 
ARDL model, we add an interactive dummy variable for an external debt threshold, to test 
the hypothesis that monetary variables are more sensitive to fiscal shocks in high debt 
regimes. The non-linear ARDL (NARDL) approach to asymmetric effects of the fiscal 
balance is conducted as well.  
Empirical results obtained from the ARDL models are discussed in Chapter 4. Overall, 
the findings provide additional evidence of the importance of fiscal policy for the 
transmission channels of monetary policy, based on the model of sovereign risk premium. 
The results show that the reaction of monetary policy channels to changes in the fiscal 
balance varies across the three emerging countries, depending on government efforts toward 
fiscal consolidation in the medium to long term. With the presence of fiscal impacts, the 
policy rate as a major monetary policy instrument fails to anchor inflation expectations, 
regardless of its strong correlation with the interest rate and with the exchange rate. Another 
interesting finding that emerges from the NARDL results is a different elasticity of monetary 
variables to negative and positive changes in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP. The 
significant role of debt performance to the size of fiscal effects is also evident, indicating that 
an emerging economy could become far more vulnerable to fiscal deterioration, once the 
external debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 40 per cent. Importantly, various robustness tests 
undertaken support the validity and consistency of the results. 
This chapter summarises the key findings of the research. In Section 5.2, a synthesis of 
the main findings is provided, while Section 5.3 identifies the thesis’s valuable contribution 
to the literature. Section 5.4 shows policy implications, followed by Section 5.5, which 
highlights the research limitations and suggestions for further research.  
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5.2 Research findings  
We summarise the findings that correspond to the research questions stated in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis.  
Research question 1: Why and to what extent does fiscal deterioration (an increase in fiscal 
deficits in terms of GDP) lead to higher market interest rates? Does the relationship between 
fiscal performance and the interest rate hold in the long run, short run, or both?  
Regarding the interest rate channel, the findings demonstrate that the fiscal position is a 
major driver of interest rates for Brazil and Turkey. This is consistent with other studies 
conducted on emerging economies, such as Baldacci et al. (2008), Baldacci and Kumar 
(2010), and Jaramillo and Weber (2013). In particular, higher levels of budget deficits and 
sovereign default risks significantly raise the lending rate in both the long run and short run 
for Brazil, while that link is significant in the short run only for Turkey. The Granger 
causality tests also support the existence of a causal relationship running from the fiscal 
balance to the interest rate for those economies. The results for the Philippines differ from its 
counterparts as there is no significant relationship found between fiscal and monetary 
variables in either the long run or short run.  
Sub-question 1: Does the market interest rate react differently to negative and positive 
changes in the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP?  
The use of the NARDL model is a distinctive feature of this research. It indicates that 
monetary variables are more sensitive to fiscal deterioration than fiscal improvement. This is 
in line with the results obtained from the linear ARDL model, which show that fiscal deficits 
matter to the monetary transmission channels. In regards to the interest rate channel, the 
lending rate significantly responds to the negative changes in the budget balance in the long 
run, while its responses to positive changes are insignificant for Brazil. Nevertheless, 
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evidence of an asymmetric effect of fiscal policy on the interest rate channel cannot be found 
for the Philippines or Turkey, in either the short run or long run. 
Sub-question 2: Does the impact of fiscal performance on the interest rate channel rely 
on the country’s debt performance? 
To gain insight into the importance of debt performance in explaining the variation in the 
relationship between fiscal policy and monetary policy, we add an interactive variable 
between the fiscal balance and the dummy variable for an external debt threshold to the initial 
ARDL model. There is clear evidence that the interest rate is more vulnerable to fiscal 
performance in the case of Brazil, once debt accumulates up to and beyond the threshold 
level of 40 per cent of GDP which is consistent with that found by other empirical studies. On 
the other hand, there is an absence of a debt threshold for the Philippines and Turkey, since 
the reaction of the lending rate to fiscal shocks is independent of the debt stock. 
Research question 2: Why and to what extent does fiscal deterioration (an increase in 
fiscal deficits in terms of GDP) lead to a depreciation of the domestic currency? Does the 
relationship between fiscal performance and the exchange rate hold in the long run, short run, 
or both? 
The evidence of a long-run relationship between fiscal performance and the exchange 
rate is detected for Brazil, which is consistent with earlier findings from Blanchard (2004), 
Zoli (2005), and Bouakez and Eyquem (2015) that the domestic currency significantly 
depreciates as a result of a weaker fiscal position. However, there is no significant 
relationship between fiscal performance and the exchange rate channel for the Philippines 
and Turkey. 
Sub-question 1: Does the exchange rate react differently to negative and positive 
changes in the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP? 
 152 
 
Regarding Brazil and Turkey, no significant difference in the reaction of the exchange 
rate to negative and positive changes in their respective fiscal positions was evident. For the 
Philippines, a distinctive finding of the study is that a fiscal improvement leads to a domestic 
currency appreciation, while a fiscal deterioration has no significant effect on the exchange 
rate. 
Sub-question 2: Does the impact of fiscal performance on the exchange rate channel rely 
on the country’s debt performance? 
For all three economies, the level of country indebtedness does not affect the impact of 
fiscal performance through the exchange rate channel. 
Research question 3: Why and to what extent does fiscal deterioration (an increase in fiscal 
deficits in terms of GDP) raise inflation expectations? Does the relationship between fiscal 
performance and inflation expectations hold in the long run, short run, or both?  
The long-run estimation yields a remarkable result that high expected inflation rates can 
be attributed to larger fiscal deficits for Brazil and Turkey. This is comparable with the 
results obtained from Celasun et al. (2004), Cerisola and Gelos (2005), and Tekin-Koru and 
Özmen (2010). However, while other studies pay very little attention to explain the rationale 
behind the significant cointegration between the fiscal balance and the expected inflation rate, 
our study points out that larger fiscal imbalances associated with a high probability of default 
would cause a depreciation of the domestic currency, which then leads to higher inflation 
expectations. The positive correlation between sovereign risk premium and inflation 
expectations also strengthens that argument. On the other hand, fiscal performance plays no 
determining role for inflation expectations for the Philippines. 
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Sub-question 1: Does the expected inflation rate react differently to negative and 
positive changes in the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP? Does the asymmetry hold in the 
long run, short run, or both? 
Interestingly, the result indicates that a weakening fiscal position has a more powerful 
and significant effect on inflation expectations than an improving one for Brazil and Turkey. 
The expected inflation rate increases more as a response to negative changes in the fiscal 
balance, compared with how it decreases as a result of a positive change in the fiscal variable. 
The asymmetric link holds in the long run, but not the short run, which corroborates the idea 
of Sargent and Wallace (1981), that larger fiscal deficits may not necessarily be a determinant 
of short-term inflation volatility. The asymmetric relationship between the fiscal balance and 
inflation expectations does not hold for the Philippines 
Sub-question 2: Does the impact of fiscal deficits on inflation expectations rely on the 
country’s debt performance? 
Inflation expectations are more vulnerable to changes in the fiscal balance once external 
debt goes beyond the threshold value of 40 per cent of GDP for Brazil and Turkey. There is 
no evidence of a long-run association between the fiscal position and inflation expectations 
for the Philippines, regardless of the country’s debt performance. 
Research question 4: Could the implementation of an inflation targeting regime act as an 
effective application for the conduct of monetary policy in the absence of a fiscal 
improvement? Does the policy rate, in particular, have a significant impact on inflation 
expectations, given the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy in emerging 
economies? 
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Considering the effectiveness of monetary policy, the results for the three countries all 
demonstrate that the policy rate either has no significant influence (in the case of Brazil and 
the Philippines), or has a counter-intuitive effect (for Turkey) on inflation expectations in the 
long run. This is contrary to Guinigundo’s (2012) finding that the expectations channel 
becomes stronger as a result of the adoption of an inflation targeting regime. This difference 
could be attributed to the fact that we control for the role of fiscal policy to control inflation, 
and discover that the long-term effect of fiscal policy outweighs that of monetary policy. On 
the other hand, our study supports the idea of a persistent puzzling impact of monetary policy 
in emerging economies, suggested by Mello and Moccero (2011). In addition, the exchange 
rate seems to be a relatively weak channel. The effect of the policy rate on exchange rates is 
significant at the 10 per cent level only for Brazil, while no cointegrating relationship is 
found for the other two countries. Furthermore, the interest rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission appears to be strong, as shown by a significant level relationship between the 
policy rate and market interest rates. 
Another noteworthy point is that no matter whether the relationship between fiscal and 
monetary variables is non-linear, a contractionary monetary policy is unsuccessful in 
lowering inflation. This implies fiscal policy plays a dominant role in price stability in 
situations where emerging countries experience chronic fiscal deficits with sovereign risk 
soaring. The insignificant impact of the policy rate on inflation expectations supports the 
argument that an inflation targeting regime may fail to reduce and stabilise inflation in the 
absence of fiscal consolidation. This supports the view advocated by Amatoa and Gerlach 
(2002), Fraga et al. (2003), and Mishkin (2004) that fiscal stability is a pre-requisite for 
implementing an inflation targeting regime. 
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5.3 Research contribution 
First, this research fills a gap in the literature by appropriately applying the model of 
sovereign risk premium to explain the association between fiscal and monetary policy in 
emerging economies that suffer from chronic fiscal deficits and face high inflationary 
pressures. While this issue has been previously studied for advanced economies, it has been 
insufficiently researched for emerging economies. The results demonstrate that weak fiscal 
performance and high perceived default risks are associated with an interest rate rise, a 
domestic currency depreciation, and more importantly, an expected inflation increase. It is 
worth noting that the long-run effect of fiscal policy on inflation expectations outweighs that 
of monetary policy, suggesting that a long-term unsustainable fiscal path would impede the 
central bank’s efforts to reduce and stabilise inflation. 
Second, this research, for the first time, explores the existence of asymmetric 
cointegration between fiscal policy and the transmission channels of monetary policy, by 
employing NARDL models. In general, we find that monetary variables are more elastic to 
negative changes than to positive changes in the fiscal balance. This finding indicates that the 
model of sovereign risk premium may work well in one direction only: a fiscal deterioration 
would promptly cause inflation expectations to rise, while a fiscal improvement would only 
reduce inflation expectations sluggishly.  
Third, the results obtained from the ARDL model with the interactive dummy variable 
make a contribution to the literature by providing evidence of an external debt threshold in 
emerging economies, following the view of Reinhart et al. (2003). We suggest that monetary 
variables respond more strongly to fiscal shocks when external debt exceeds 40 per cent of 
GDP. The debt threshold, therefore, could act as a warning indicator of fiscal 
unsustainability. 
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Finally, it is important to highlight that the research employs an up-to-date data set that 
covers the economic crises of the late 1990s in emerging markets and the Global Financial 
Crisis. This period shows substantial variation in fiscal policy and monetary policy, which 
allows us to detect and capture the presence of structural breaks in the cointegrating 
relationship between fiscal policy and the monetary policy transmission channels. 
5.4 Policy implications 
An important implication proposed by this thesis is that fiscal consolidation is an essential 
criterion for the adoption of inflation targeting in emerging economies that suffer from a 
prolonged weak fiscal position. We agree with Favero and Giavazzi (2004) that the tightening 
of monetary policy itself could fail to achieve price stability without fiscal cooperation, 
because maintaining high interest rates weakens a country’s fiscal position, further raising 
borrowing costs, and eventually, inflation. As such, to achieve the primary objective without 
hampering fiscal stability, the central bank may have to resort to an alternative instrument, 
especially in times of an expansionary fiscal stance together with high sovereign default risk. 
Schaber and Wijnbergen (2014) suggest that inflation targeting based on the money supply 
rather than an interest rate rule may be appropriate, as it could limit the central bank’s ability 
to finance fiscal deficits, thereby improving its independence and credibility to achieve price 
stability. Exchange rate intervention also serves as a complementary measure in the operation 
of the inflation targeting regime, since the central bank is able to alleviate the depreciation 
pressures on the domestic currency caused by high interest rates (Ghosh et al., 2016). 
Given the existence of asymmetric effects of the fiscal balance, the government should 
be deliberately cautious in their implementation of a more expansionary fiscal policy and 
debt growth, since increasing fiscal deficits could rapidly lead to hyperinflation. Once the 
economy is highly vulnerable, severe fiscal contraction will not immediately lower interest 
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rates and inflation expectations. It is necessary for policymakers to refine long-term fiscal 
projections in the direction of deficit reduction. Policy incentives for private savings should 
be offered to reduce the dependence on external funds, and consequently, the volatility in 
default risk. 
The divergence in the empirical results across countries gives an indication of the 
important role of policy commitment towards long-term fiscal sustainability, in order to 
alleviate negative impacts of fiscal policy on monetary variables. For Brazil, the failure of 
fiscal consolidation is mainly attributed to profligate spending due to increasing interest rates, 
accompanied by revenue shortfall, as a result of a plunge in commodity prices.21 Therefore, 
rebuilding a fiscal buffer by imposing spending limits, together with strengthening the 
financial system to improve the allocation of savings, should be a priority. Tight fiscal 
constraints should allow for some flexibility to avoid a perverse effect on investment and 
growth. As a commodity exporter, Turkey also faces a sharp drop in government revenue and 
increasingly depends on foreign capital flows in the post-crisis period. To address this issue, 
its government should concentrate on regulatory reform in combination with strategies for 
political stability, with an effort to facilitate private investment. For the Philippines, the 
medium-term fiscal framework has achieved initial success in creating adequate fiscal space. 
Therefore, the government should focus on maintaining oversight of all fiscal activities to 
remain consistent with the objective of fiscal sustainability. 
5.5 Research limitations and recommendations for future research 
Although this thesis makes several contributions to the literature and expounds policy 
implications for the governments of emerging economies, it has some limitations that require 
                                                          
21 According to World Bank (2016b), Brazil’s government final consumption (as a percentage of GDP) has 
climbed from 18 per cent to more than 20 per cent during the last four years because of a rapid increase in 
interest payment. 
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further consideration and analysis. First, the scope of the research is limited, as it 
concentrates on the case of three emerging economies, these being Brazil, the Philippines, 
and Turkey. The findings would be more interesting and valuable with a larger set of 
emerging economies. With more countries included in the investigation, the analysis based on 
cross-sectional data and advanced panel data modelling techniques may be more appropriate. 
The evidence of fiscal effects on the monetary transmission channels for Brazil and 
Turkey raises a question about the presence of fiscal dominance, where fiscal deficits are 
financed by price adjustment (Bajo-Rubio et al., 2009). Fiscal sustainability, in the context of 
dominant fiscal policy, therefore, requires interest rate decreases during high inflation 
periods, which challenges the adoption of an inflation targeting regime. In further research, it 
might be possible to use Granger causality tests (Bajo-Rubio et al., 2014) or impulse-
response functions (Canzoneri et al., 2001) to examine the existence of fiscal dominance for 
those countries. 
Although we find that the level of external debt matters in the relationship between fiscal 
and monetary policy, there are other country-specific factors that should be considered. For 
example, diverse changes in the framework of fiscal policy and political risks have recently 
occurred in some emerging economies, which may reshape the effects of fiscal performance 
on the transmission channels of monetary policy. This issue is an interesting one that could be 
thoroughly examined in future research.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Transforming equations (Chapter 3)  
∆yt = c0 + δωt + (γ1 − 1)yt−1 + ∑ γiyt−i
p
i=2
+ ∑ βj
q
j=0
xt−j + εt  
Note that: 
yt−p = yt−1 − ∑ ∆yt−i
p−1
i=1
 
xt−q = xt−1 − ∑ ∆xt−j
q−1
j=1
 
  Substituting these relations into (3.4): 
               ∆yt =  c0 + δωt + (γ1 + γ2 + γ3 +  … + γp − 1)yt−1
+ (β0 + β1 + β2 +  … + βq)xt−1 + (β0xt − β0xt−1)
− [γ2∆yt−1 + γ3(∆yt−1 + ∆yt−2) + … + γp ∑ ∆yt−i
p−1
i=1
]
− [β2∆xt−1 + β3(∆xt−1 + ∆xt−2) +  … + βq ∑ ∆xt−j
q−1
j=1
] + εt 
             ∆yt =  c0 + δωt + (γ1 + γ2 + γ3 +  … + γp − 1)[yt−1
−
(β0 + β1 + β2 +  … + βq)
(1 − γ1 − γ2 − γ3 −  … − γp)
xt−1] + β0∆xt
− [(γ2 + γ3 + ⋯ + γp)∆yt−1 + (γ3 + γ4 + ⋯ + γp)∆yt−2 + ⋯ + γp∆yt−p+1]
− [(β2 + β3 + ⋯ + βq)∆xt−1 + (β3 + β4 + ⋯ + βq)∆xt−2 + ⋯
+ βq∆xt−q+1] + εt 
After rearranging: 
∆yt = c0 + δωt + ∅(yt−1 −  θxt−1) + β0∆xt − ∑ γi
∗∆yt−i
p−1
i=1 −  ∑ βj
∗q−1
j=1 ∆xt−j + εt    
Where  
∅ = ∑ γi
𝑝
𝑖=1
− 1;  θ = −
∑ βj
𝑞
𝑗=0
∅
 γi
∗ = ∑ γs
𝑝
𝑠=𝑖+1
;  βj
∗ = ∑ βs
𝑞
𝑠=𝑗+1
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Appendix 2: Lag length selection for NARDL (Chapter 4) 
Table A.1: Diagnostics tests for models using different maximum lag orders for Brazil  
No. 
max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
χSC
2  
Heteros-
kedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
Distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(Lendingt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 4, 3, 0, 4, 4, 4) 
3.588**  
(0.014) 
19.822 
(0.921) 
0.531 
(0.766) 
1.948 
(0.170) 
5 (5, 4, 3, 0, 5, 4, 4) 
4.463*** 
(0.005) 
25.172 
(0.799) 
0.313 
(0.854) 
0.937 
(0.339) 
6 (6, 6, 3, 0, 5, 5, 4) 
3.113** 
(0.030) 
23.302 
(0.950) 
3.347 
(0.187) 
1.226 
(0.276) 
(EXt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 0, 0, 1, 3, 4, 0) 
1.004 
(0.414) 
19.597 
(0.239) 
17.673** 
(0.000) 
1.301 
(0.282) 
5 (5, 0, 0, 1, 3, 5, 5) 
0.967 
(0.436) 
36.430* 
(0.084) 
6.821** 
(0.033) 
0.144 
(0.706) 
6 (5, 6, 0, 1, 3, 5, 5) 
1.823 
(0.148) 
48.911** 
(0.028) 
0.270 
(0.873) 
0.004 
(0.951) 
(πt
e|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (3, 4, 4, 3, 1, 0, 4) 
1.584 
(0.197) 
21.779 
(0.701) 
1.667 
(0.434) 
1.426 
(0.239) 
5 (3, 4, 4, 1, 0, 0, 4) 
2.096* 
(0.097) 
20.270 
(0.626) 
0.553 
(0.758) 
5.168** 
(0.028) 
6 (5, 0, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4) 
0.419 
(0.794) 
25.224 
(0.758) 
8.243** 
(0.016) 
2.454 
(0.126) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the marginal levels of significance. 
The asterisks ****, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively.  
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Table A.2: Diagnostics tests for models using different maximum lag orders for the Philippines 
No. 
max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
χSC
2  
Heteros-
kedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
Distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(Lendingt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
2.378* 
(0.059) 
34.874*** 
(0.001) 
17.162*** 
(0.000) 
4.455** 
(0.038) 
5 (2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
2.378* 
(0.059) 
34.874*** 
(0.001) 
17.162*** 
(0.000) 
4.455** 
(0.038) 
6 (2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
2.378*** 
(0.059) 
34.874*** 
(0.001) 
17.162*** 
(0.000) 
4.455** 
(0.038) 
(EXt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) 
1.624 
(0.176) 
25.893*** 
(0.007) 
6.097** 
(0.047) 
0.047 
(0.829) 
5 (1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 5, 0) 
1.656 
(0.169) 
34.630*** 
(0.005) 
4.636* 
(0.098) 
0.316 
(0.575) 
6 (1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 5, 0) 
1.656 
(0.169) 
34.630*** 
(0.005) 
4.636* 
(0.098) 
0.316 
(0.575) 
(πt
e|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (3, 0, 4, 0, 0, 2, 2) 
2.255* 
(0.072) 
17.745 
(0.473) 
0.618 
(0.733) 
0.487 
(0.487) 
5 (3, 0, 4, 0, 0, 2, 2) 
2.255* 
(0.072) 
17.745 
(0.473) 
0.618 
(0.733) 
0.487 
(0.487) 
6 (3, 4, 4, 3, 0, 0, 4) 
1.158 
(0.338) 
20.760 
(0.596) 
0.012 
(0.994) 
0.001 
(0.976) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the marginal levels of significance. 
The asterisks ****, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively.  
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Table A.3: Diagnostics tests for models using different maximum lag orders for Turkey 
No. 
max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
χSC
2  
Heteros-
kedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
Distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(Lendingt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 0, 0, 4, 0, 3, 3) 3.924** 
(0.012) 
16.710 
(0.729) 
1.843 
(0.397) 
0.474 
(0.497) 
5 (3, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 5) 3.838** 
(0.012) 
15.260 
(0.577) 
0.200 
(0.904) 
3.194* 
(0.083) 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(EXt|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 3, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) 
1.148 
(0.351) 
15.521 
(0.344) 
0.610 
(0.736) 
1.893 
(0.177) 
5 (1, 5, 0, 5, 4, 3, 4) 
0.147 
(0.962) 
27.003 
(0.572) 
0.605 
(0.738) 
2.381 
(0.138) 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(πt
e|bt
−, bt
+, Riskt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (2, 4, 3, 0, 3, 4, 4) 
5.848*** 
(0.003) 
37.555* 
(0.085) 
0.556 
(0.757) 
0.681 
(0.418) 
5 (1, 5, 5, 1, 4, 5, 5) 
6.520*** 
(0.004) 
27.688 
(0.729) 
2.964 
(0.227) 
0.331 
(0.573) 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the marginal levels of significance. 
The asterisks ****, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively. The term N/A stands for “not applicable”. 
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Appendix 3: Lag length selection for EMBI spreads (Chapter 4) 
Table A.4: Diagnostics tests for models using different maximum lag orders for Brazil 
No. 
max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
χSC
2  
Hetero-
skedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
Distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(Lendingt|bt, EMBIt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (4, 4, 2, 1, 2, 4) 
1.107 
(0.369) 
16.099 
(0.851) 
0.164 
(0.920) 
3.832* 
(0.058) 
5 (4, 4, 0, 5, 3, 5) 
2.724** 
(0.045) 
21.722 
(0.751) 
0.946 
(0.623) 
1.940 
(0.172) 
6 (4, 4, 0, 5, 6, 6) 
2.631* 
(0.054) 
21.267 
(0.950) 
1.081 
(0.583) 
5.443** 
(0.026) 
(EXt|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 0, 1, 4, 4, 1) 
1.502 
(0.218) 
28.887 
(0.701) 
0.489 
(0.782) 
0.792 
(0.378) 
5 (1, 0, 1, 5, 3, 1) 
1.779 
(0.151) 
30.536** 
(0.023) 
0.422 
(0.809) 
1.082 
(0.304) 
6 (1, 0, 1, 4, 6, 1) 
1.242 
(0.308) 
29.536* 
(0.058) 
0.525 
(0.768) 
1.124 
(0.295) 
(πt
e|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (1, 4, 3, 2, 0, 0) 
0.154 
(0.960) 
19.656 
(0.236) 
0.313 
(0.854) 
0.794 
(0.378) 
5 (1, 3, 5, 0, 0, 3) 
0.672 
(0.615) 
17.086 
(0.517) 
2.931 
(0.230) 
4.193** 
(0.047) 
6 (1, 3, 6, 5, 0, 1) 
0.265 
(0.898) 
20.119 
(0.576) 
7.379** 
(0.024) 
2.547 
(0.119) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the marginal levels of significance. 
The asterisks ****, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively.  
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Table A.5: Diagnostics tests for models using different maximum lag orders for The Philippines 
No. 
max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
χSC
2  
Hetero-
skedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
Distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(Lendingt|bt, EMBIt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) 
1.559 
(0.199) 
15.347* 
(0.053) 
1.552 
(0.460) 
0.365 
(0.548) 
5 (4, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0) 
0.815 
(0.522) 
4.370 
(0.358) 
1.371 
(0.503) 
0.975 
(0.328) 
6 (4, 6, 0, 0, 6, 2) 
1.175 
(0.338) 
18.677 
(0.769) 
0.972 
(0.615) 
0.236 
(0.630) 
(EXt|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (2, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0) 
1.822 
(0.140) 
18.822* 
(0.093) 
12.109*** 
(0.002) 
0.129 
(0.721) 
5 (3, 0, 4, 5, 4, 2) 
0.711 
(0.590) 
13.564 
(0.956) 
1.083 
(0.581) 
5.572** 
(0.024) 
6 4, 0, 4, 5, 6, 3 
0.703 
(0.596) 
17.323 
(0.942) 
0.491 
(0.781) 
4.512** 
(0.042) 
(πt
e|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (3, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0) 
2.049 
(0.104) 
20.567 
(0.151) 
0.206 
(0.901) 
2.920* 
(0.094) 
5 (1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 4) 
2.677** 
(0.043) 
10.516 
(0.651) 
5.693* 
(0.058) 
0.080 
(0.778) 
6 (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 3) 
3.167** 
(0.021) 
16.902 
(0.111) 
3.469 
(0.176) 
0.128 
(0.722) 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the marginal levels of significance. 
The asterisks ****, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively.  
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Table A.6: Diagnostics tests for models using different maximum lag orders for Turkey 
No. 
max 
lags 
Model specification 
 
Serial 
correlation 
χSC
2  
Hetero-
skedasticity 
χH
2  
Normal 
Distribution 
χN
2  
Functional 
form 
χFF
2  
(Lendingt|bt, EMBIt, EXt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (3, 1, 3, 4, 3, 4) 
1.198 
(0.337) 
19.323 
(0.735) 
0.795 
(0.671) 
0.121 
(0.731) 
5 (5, 2, 4, 5, 3, 5) 
0.867 
(0.504) 
26.176 
(0.666) 
1.962 
(0.374) 
0.041 
(0.842) 
6 (5, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6) 
2.540 
(0.167) 
38.672 
(0.575) 
3.840 
(0.146) 
4.578* 
(0.065) 
 
(EXt|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, Policyt, πt
e) 
4 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 
0.525 
(0.718) 
12.852 
(0.380) 
2.281 
(0.319) 
0.281 
(0.599) 
5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 
0.525 
(0.718) 
12.852 
(0.380) 
2.281 
(0.319) 
0.281 
(0.599) 
6 (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0) 
0.695 
(0.600) 
 
14.331 
(0.158) 
 
1.138 
(0.565) 
0.600 
(0.443) 
 
(πt
e|bt, EMBIt, Lendingt, EXt, Policyt) 
4 (2, 3, 4, 4, 3, 4) 
0.821 
(0.526) 
18.867 
(0.842) 
0.519 
(0.771) 
10.467*** 
(0.003) 
5 (4, 5, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
1.593 
(0.219) 
28.883 
(0.471) 
0.903 
(0.635) 
9.601 
(0.599) 
6 (6, 5, 2, 3, 4, 6) 
3.554** 
(0.034) 
 
34.784 
(0.337) 
 
0.909 
(0.634) 
4.730** 
(0.044) 
 
Notes: The test statistics χSC
2 , χH
2 , χN
2 , and χFF
2  represent the LM tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, 
normality, and functional form, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the marginal levels of significance. 
The asterisks ****, **, * indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
